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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Can political decisions we make be right or wrong, or true or false? Are they just the expression of 
our personal interests, and consequently have no truth value? If they can be true or false, are there 
people who are better at getting it right or wrong? And if there are, does this imply that those who 
are better in making correct decisions should have political authority over others? These are some 
of the key questions I try to answer in this thesis. 
 Though democracy is highly valued and widely accepted as a collective decision-making 
procedure with legitimacy-generating potential, there is little clarity regarding the grounds of the 
value of democracy or its legitimacy-generating potential. The general idea is that the democracy is 
a good thing and that is should be a part of a just society. This, however, does not enable us to 
evaluate different democratic systems and procedures, as well as to improve the democratic 
decision-making process. In order to be able to do that, we need to understand what grounds the 
democratic legitimacy. This thesis represents an inquiry into the source of legitimacy-generating 
potential of democratic procedures. 
 In this thesis I defend the standard account of epistemic democracy, a position that grounds 
democracy's legitimacy-generating potential both in its moral and in its epistemic qualities. Though 
the very idea of an epistemic justification of democratic legitimacy might evoke very high 
expectations regarding its epistemic value, I argue no such thing: democracy does not have to be 
epistemically the best possible decision-making procedure. All it has to do is to perform better than 
other procedures that can meet the same moral requirements as democracy can (e.g. procedural 
fairness). Democracy's epistemic value is nonetheless an important part of its legitimacy-generating 
potential, and increasing its epistemic value is a good way to generally improve the democratic 
decision-making process. 
 Apart from some considerations in the final chapter, I do not offer an account how existing 
democratic practices can be improved. What I am concerned with are fundamental values that 
ground the legitimacy-generating potential of democratic procedures. Though this thesis represents 
a theoretical framework, it does not imply that the ideas presented here cannot be implemented into 
contemporary politics. This, however, represents a separate task, probably one more appropriate for 
political scientists than political philosophers. 
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1.1. POLITICAL LEGITIMACY 
1.1.a. Introduction 
This part of the chapter gives a brief clarification of the central concepts in the discussion, as well 
as an overview of different accounts of political legitimacy. I briefly discuss the difference between 
political authority and political legitimacy, as well as the difference between the descriptive and the 
normative account of political legitimacy. I proceed by sketching two basic (monistic) accounts of 
political legitimacy, and argue that we should adopt the third, non-monistic account (one that 
combines legitimacy-generating elements from both basic accounts). Finally, I briefly discuss and 
endorse the liberal criterion of legitimacy as a basic standard against which various decision-
making procedures will be evaluated—in order to have legitimacy-generating potential, a decision-
making procedure has to meet this standard. Furthermore, all other qualities of a procedure that 
could be considered as potential sources of legitimacy-generating potential have to be able to meet 
the liberal criterion of legitimacy. 
1.1.b. Political Legitimacy 
A discussion on political legitimacy lasts for more than 2500 years, and many prominent thinkers 
and philosophers have contributed with their own theories and accounts to this ongoing debate. 
However, an important turn in the debate took place several decades ago: John Rawls (1993, see 
also Peter 2011) shifted the discussion from the legitimacy of states and governments typical for the 
19th and early 20th century (Weber 1964) to the legitimacy of the decision-making process. It is 
also important to emphasize that Rawls started the debate on justice in 1970s with his book A 
Theory of Justice, and he shifted the debate to legitimacy in the 1990s with his book Political 
Liberalism. Political legitimacy is nowadays one of the central topics discussed within political 
philosophy and political theory, so it is important to make some specifications and define what kind 
of political legitimacy is this thesis about. 
(i) Political Authority and Political Legitimacy 
Authority and legitimacy are connected by nonetheless distinct concepts. Authority is the moral 
power of one agent (e.g. the state) to morally require or forbid actions by others through commands. 
The state thus lacks authority if its requiring you to pay taxes has no tendency to make you morally 
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required to do so (Estlund 2008). A particular political decision is authoritative if one is morally 
obliged to follow it.  
 Legitimacy, on the other hand, is the moral permissibility of one agent's (e.g. the state's) 
issuing and enforcing its commands owning to the process by which they were produced. The state 
acts illegitimately if it puts you in jail for not paying taxes when it is morally wrong for it to do so 
(Estlund 2008). A particular political decision is legitimate if the one who issued and enforced it had 
the moral right to do so.  
 This thesis focuses primarily on political legitimacy since it analyzes different processes of 
making political decisions and tries to answer which qualities a decision-making process has to 
have in order to be able to make legitimate decisions. 
(ii) Descriptive and Normative Concept of Political Legitimacy 
Like many other ideas, political legitimacy can be understood as a descriptive as well as a 
normative concept. Its descriptive concept focuses on people's beliefs about how the right to rule is 
exercised, as well as on people's beliefs about the acceptability of a certain political decision. A 
particular political decision is thus legitimate if people see it as legitimate, and a decision-making 
procedure has a legitimacy-generating potential if people tend to accept the decisions produced by 
that procedure as legitimate. As Max Weber (1964) puts it, political regime is legitimate when its 
participants have certain beliefs or faith in regard to it. Social and political scientists often use and 
analyze this concept of political legitimacy. 
 The normative concept focuses on a binding reason (or reasons) to support and not to 
challenge the coercive power of the state. Political decisions are seen as legitimate regardless of 
what other people think of them, as long as these decisions have certain legitimacy-generating 
qualities. When we try to assess whether a particular decision is legitimate, we do not analyze what 
other people think about it, but instead we analyze its moral and epistemic qualities, as well as the 
qualities of a decision-making procedure that has produced it.  
 The normative concept is primarily used by political philosophers, and it is the concept I use 
throughout this thesis. I do not write about the legitimacy of particular states in the real world, but 
instead on the normative conditions a decision-making procedure has to meet in order to have 
legitimacy-generating potential. 
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1.1.c. Accounts of Political Legitimacy 
According to the definition given earlier, in order to be legitimate a decision has to be a product of a 
legitimacy-generating procedure. The state can legitimately enact and enforce political decisions 
owing to the procedure by which these decisions were made. What are these legitimacy-generating 
qualities that a decision-making procedure needs in order to be able to produce legitimate 
decisions?  
 The procedure's legitimacy-generating qualities can generally be divided into two important 
groups: purely procedural qualities and instrumental qualities. Following these two groups of 
legitimacy-generating qualities, two basic positions of political legitimacy can be distinguished. 
These two accounts—pure proceduralism and instrumentalism—can be regarded as basic or 
monistic (Christiano 2004) positions since each appeals to only one group of legitimacy-generating 
qualities when determining the legitimacy-generating potential of a decision-making procedure.  
Diagram 1.1. 
(i) Pure Proceduralism 
Pure proceduralism focuses only on purely procedural qualities of a decision-making procedure 
when determining its legitimacy-generating potential. These purely procedural (sometimes called 
intrinsic) qualities are defined regardless of the procedure's ability to produce a certain goal or 
outcome—a decision-making procedure has legitimacy-generating potential because it embodies 
some important moral (or epistemic) qualities. Procedural fairness (i.e. giving every citizen an equal 
chance to participate in the decision-making process) can be one such purely procedural quality. A 
collective decision is thus legitimate if (and only if) it was produced by a fair decision-making 
procedure. Positions developed by Hannah Arendt (1967), Thomas Christiano (2008), Gerald Gaus 
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(1996), Fabienne Peter (2011), Iris Marion Young (2000) and Robert Dahl (1989) are some 
examples of pure proceduralism.  
(ii) Instrumentalism 
Instrumentalism, on the other hand, focuses only on the instrumental qualities of a decision-making 
procedure when determining its legitimacy-generating potential. These instrumental qualities are 
defined by the procedure's ability to reach a desired aim or outcome—a decision-making procedure 
has legitimacy-generating potential because of its ability to generate decisions with some 
substantial, procedure-independent quality. The ability to produce correct, true or just decisions can 
be one such instrumental quality. A collective decision is thus legitimate if (and only if) it was 
produced by a decision-making procedure that has a tendency to produce correct or true decisions. 
Positions developed by Steven Wall (2007) and Richard Arenson (2003b), but also by Robert 
Talisse (2009a), Cheryl Misak (2000) and John Stuart Mill (1977a), are some examples of political 
instrumentalism.  
 Though these two basic positions use very different argumentation and appeal to completely 
different qualities when assessing the procedure's legitimacy-generating potential, they still have 
one thing in common—they both rely only on one group of the procedure's qualities. Pure 
proceduralists completely disregard the instrumental qualities of a decision-making procedure, 
while instrumentalist completely disregard the purely procedural (intrinsic) qualities of a decision-
making procedure. In this thesis I argue against both monistic positions—I claim that a decision-
making procedure has to have both purely procedural and instrumental qualities in order to have 
legitimacy-generating potential.  
(iii) Non-monistic Accounts of Political Legitimacy 
Having rejected both pure proceduralism and instrumentalism as inadequate accounts of political 
legitimacy, non-monists try to incorporate both the procedural fairness of the process and the 
procedure-independent quality of outcomes into a single account of political legitimacy. These 
accounts are often referred to as rational proceduralist positions in order to differentiate them from 
pure proceduralist positions . Accounts developed by Kenneth Arrow (1984), John Rawls (1993), 1
 The distinction between pure and rational proceduralism is similar to Rawls' distinction between pure procedural 1
justice and perfect (and imperfect) procedural justice (Rawls 1971). While pure procedural justice does not make 
reference to a desirable outcome that is defined procedure-independently, perfect and imperfect procedural justice set a 
procedure-independent criterion for ideal or correct outcomes. More about this distinction can be found in the fifth 
chapter of this thesis. 
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Philip Pettit (1999), John Dewey (1987), Fabienne Peter (2012) and David Estlund (2008) are some 
examples of non-monistic approach to democratic legitimacy. Following Estlund, in this thesis I 
develop a non-monistic account that emphasizes both the fairness of the decision-making process 
and its ability to produce correct decisions.  
  
1.1.d. The Liberal Principle of Legitimacy 
The central principle of political legitimacy that I endorse and against which I evaluate all other 
qualities of a procedure that could be considered as potential sources of legitimacy-generating 
potential is the liberal principle of legitimacy.  
Our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution 
the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of 
principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason. (Rawls 1993: 137) 
The moral idea behind this principle is that no one can legitimately be coerced unless sufficient 
reasons can be given—reasons that do not violate his reasonable moral beliefs. There are two 
notable interpretations of the liberal principle of legitimacy and the idea of public reason that 
follows from it: the substantive and the procedural interpretation. The substantive interpretation 
applies the principle to the justification of (all) political decisions: a political decision is legitimate 
if it could be justified in terms of public reason, i.e. justified in accordance with ideas and principles 
acceptable to all citizens as free and equal (Quong 2011, Baccarini 2015, Zelić 2014). Not every 
reasonable citizen must agree with or be able to accept the final decision, but the premises used in 
the process of justification must be such that all reasonable citizens can endorse them. The 
procedural interpretation, on the other hand, applies the principle to the justification of the 
constitution that shapes and constrains the process of democratic decision-making (Peter 2011, 
Larmore 1996, Wenar 2013). Political decisions are legitimate if they are the product of a decision-
making procedure that all reasonable citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to 
endorse. Particular political decisions are thus legitimate even if there are some reasonable citizens 
who cannot be expected to endorse them, as long as they are a product of a decision-making 
procedure that all reasonable citizens can endorse. In such cases, those who have no substantial 
reason to endorse a particular political decision still have a procedural reason to endorse it.  
 I follow the latter (procedural) interpretation of the liberal principle of legitimacy. However, 
I do not think that this plays an important role at this point in the debate since those who follow the 
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substantial interpretation also agree that, in order to have legitimacy-generating potential, the 
decision-making procedure has to be acceptable to all reasonable citizens. The liberal principle of 
legitimacy enables us to reject various claims for power: claims like "I can exercise political power 
over you because I am the King" or "We can exercise political power over you because we believe 
in the one true God" can easily be rejected as illegitimate since not every reasonable citizen can, in 
the conditions of reasonable pluralism of moral and religious doctrines, agree with their 
justification. Since not all reasonable citizens can be expected to endorse a decision-making 
procedure in which one person has absolute political power and authority, nor can they be expected 
to endorse a procedure in which only leaders of a particular religion have political power and 
authority, these (and many similar) decision-making procedures can be rejected from the start. 
However, many other, more sophisticated decision-making procedures, some of which base their 
justification in the epistemic qualities of a decision-making procedure (like Mill's scholocracy 
characterized by the plural voting proposal) can be disqualified on the basis of liberal principle of 
legitimacy.  
1.2. PLAN OF THE THESIS 
In this part of the chapter I shall first present three tenets that are typically ascribed to epistemic 
accounts of political legitimacy and emphasize that various epistemic accounts of political 
legitimacy can acknowledge a different number of these tenets. According to the number of tenets 
endorsed, I differentiate between various positions of political legitimacy. In the final part of this 
chapter I present the plan of the thesis by briefly summarizing each chapter. 
1.2.a. The Epistemic Account of Political Legitimacy 
The epistemic account of political legitimacy can take all three approaches described in the first part 
of this chapter. Epistemic pure proceduralism will thus claim that a decision-making procedure has 
legitimacy-generating potential if it embodies certain intrinsic epistemic virtues and qualities (Peter 
2011), epistemic instrumentalism will claim that a decision-making procedure has legitimacy-
generating potential if it represents the best means to have political decisions and outcomes that are 
true, correct or just according to some procedure-independent standard (Talisse 2009a, Misak 
2000), and epistemic non-monism (e.g. the standard account of epistemic democracy) will claim 
that a decision-making procedure has legitimacy-generating potential if it is able to meet both 
purely procedural (fairness) and instrumental (epistemic quality of outcomes) requirements (Estlund 
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2008). All these positions, as well as several other non-epistemic accounts of political legitimacy, 
are discussed in detail in this thesis.  
 There are three tenets that are usually related to the epistemic account of political legitimacy 
(Estlund 2008): 
Table 1.1. 
Three tenets presented here are connected and come in a specific order: if we reject one tenet, we 
are bound to reject every tenet that comes after it (e.g. if we reject the first tenet we are bound to 
reject the second and the third tenets as well). We cannot endorse the third (authority) tenet if we 
deny the first (truth) or the second (knowledge) tenet. It is also very important to emphasize that, 
just as epistemic account of political legitimacy can take a form of pure proceduralism, 
instrumentalism and rational proceduralism, so can it reject any number of these tenets. Fabienne 
Peter's (2011) pure epistemic proceduralism, for example, clearly rejects the truth tenet (and 
therefore all other tenets as well), but it still represents a clear case of the epistemic account of 
political legitimacy. In this thesis I try to establish an epistemic account of political legitimacy that 
acknowledged the first (truth) and the second (knowledge) tenet, but rejects the third (authority) 
tenet.  
1.2.b. Structure of the Thesis 
Democracy has epistemic value, and its legitimacy-generating potential should be established in 
part due to its ability to produce political decisions of satisfying (procedure-independent) quality. 
This is the central claim of this thesis. In order to properly support this claim, I reject the idea that 
democracy does not have epistemic value (or that this epistemic value does not establish its 
legitimacy-generating potential), as well as the idea that democracy's epistemic value is the only 
source of its legitimacy-generating potential. The former claim is a part of pure 
proceduralists' (monistic) argumentation, while the latter is a part of instrumentalists' (monistic) 
argumentation. I reject both monistic positions, arguing that a non-monistic account should be 
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1 The truth tenet There are true procedure-independent normative standards for evaluating political 
decisions. 
There is truth in politics.
2 The knowledge tenet Some (few) people know these normative standards better than others. 
There are experts in politics.
3 The authority tenet Normative political knowledge of those who know better implies that they should have 
political authority over others. 
Experts should rule.
established: democracy's legitimacy-generating potential is the result of both its moral and 
epistemic qualities.  
 When establishing the epistemic account of the procedure's legitimacy-generating potential, 
we should set our position according to the three tenets discussed earlier. Though it is possible to 
build an epistemic account of the procedure's legitimacy-generating potential without endorsing any 
of them, most epistemic accounts at least accept the truth tenet. In order to systematically analyze 
various positions that introduce procedure's epistemic qualities when constituting its legitimacy-
generating potential, I set them against the three tenets and distinguish them (in part) due to the 
number of tenets they endorse. First, I discuss positions that reject the truth tenet (and consequently 
the knowledge tenet and the authority tenet as well) (second chapter), and proceed by discussing 
positions that accept the truth tenet but reject the knowledge tenet (and consequently the authority 
tenet) (third chapter). I reject these positions, arguing that both the truth tenet and the knowledge 
tenet should be endorsed. Since more than one account meets this requirement, I analyze and 
ultimately reject positions that also endorse the authority tenet (fourth chapter). Having concluded 
that the truth tenet and the knowledge should be granted, but the authority tenet should be rejected, I 
have considerably narrowed the scope of eligible accounts of political legitimacy. Finally, since 
there are still a few different decision-making procedures that meet the abovementioned criteria, I 
have narrowed the selection further by arguing that these positions should be evaluated according to 
their epistemic qualities, thus rejecting aggregative and establishing deliberative (epistemic) 
democracy as the procedure with legitimacy-generating potential (fifth chapter). 
 The table below systemizes the positions discussed in this thesis and sets them according to 
the number of tenets they endorse. Note the order of chapters in the first column—since it was my 
intention to first reject a number of positions in order to determine what an appropriate position on 
political legitimacy should look like (i.e. to narrow the set of eligible positions), I have first rejected 
positions that do not endorse the truth and the knowledge tenet (claiming that they are not epistemic 
enough or in the right way), and then I have rejected positions that accept the authority tenet 
(claiming that they are too epistemic) before discussing positions that reject the authority tenet but 
endorse the other two (which is an approach I find appropriate). 
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Table 1.2. 
1.2.c. The Plan of the Thesis 
This thesis has three parts: in the first part (second, third and fourth chapter) I discuss which (if any) 
tenets should be endorsed and which (if any) should be rejected by a collective decision-making 
procedure with a legitimacy-generating potential. In the second part (fifth chapter) I defend 
Estlund's (2008) standard account of epistemic democracy and analyze which kind of democracy 
can have legitimacy-generating potential. In the third part of the thesis (sixth chapter) I consider 
what the social and economic preconditions for epistemic democracy's legitimacy-generating 
potential are. 
 In the second chapter I discuss two positions that reject the truth tenet. Fabienne Peter's 
(2011) Pure Epistemic Proceduralism states that democratic decision-making procedures have 
legitimacy-generating potential owing to some moral and intrinsic epistemic qualities—the 
epistemic quality of a procedure is not its ability to produce correct outcomes, but its tendency to 
enable citizens to critically engage each other in a transparent and non-authoritarian way. I reject 
this view and claim that instrumental epistemic value is needed in order to evaluate and to be able to 
improve our epistemic practices. Thomas Christiano's Pure Deliberative Proceduralism is discussed 
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Chapter Tenets 
endorsed
Tenets 
rejected
Positions discussed Account
2nd /
Truth 
Knowledge 
Authority
Fabienne Peter (2011 and before):  
Pure Epistemic Proceduralism
Monistic: 
Pure Proceduralism
Thomas Christiano:  
Pure Deliberative Proceduralism
Monistic: 
Pure Proceduralism
3rd Truth Knowledge 
Authority
Robert Talisse and Cheryl Misak: 
Pragmatist Deliberative Democracy
Monistic: 
Instrumentalism
Fabienne Peter (2012 and after): 
Second-Personal Epistemic Democracy
Non-monistic: 
Rational Proceduralism
5th Truth 
Knowledge
Authority David Estlund: 
The standard Account of Epistemic 
Democracy
Non-monistic: 
Rational Proceduralism
Marquis De Condorcet: 
Aggregative Epistemic Democracy
Monistic: 
Instrumentalism
4th Truth 
Knowledge 
Authority
/
Plato: 
Epistocracy
Monistic: 
Instrumentalism
John Stuart Mill: 
Scholocracy
Monistic: 
Instrumentalism
in the second part of the chapter—Christiano (2008) thinks that we cannot have an instrumental 
account of democratic legitimacy because we would have to have a public agreement on the 
qualities of outcomes. I reject Christiano's position by claiming that he himself uses an instrumental 
argumentation when he argues in favor of deliberative democracy (i.e. when he claims that a state 
with more well-being is better than a state with less well-being). I end the second chapter by 
claiming that the truth tenet should be endorsed. 
 Positions that endorse the truth tenet but reject the knowledge tenet are discussed in the third 
chapter. Proponents of Pragmatist Deliberative Democracy thus claim that political decisions can 
be right or wrong, and that we should evaluate the decision-making system by its ability to produce 
correct decisions (Talisse 2009a, Misak 2004). However, since the relevant knowledge is distributed 
equally among citizens, and since public deliberation is the best means for arriving at correct 
decisions, we should favor deliberative democracy. I reject this position by claiming that it is 
successful in defending the epistemic value of public deliberation, but not necessarily the epistemic 
value of democracy. The second position I discuss in this chapter is Fabienne Peter's (2012) Second-
Personal Epistemic Democracy. Peter now endorsed the truth tenet, but nonetheless still claims that 
democratic procedures have some intrinsic epistemic qualities. I find Peter's idea of epistemic peers 
unpersuasive and argue that the knowledge tenet should be granted. I end the third chapter by 
concluding that the knowledge tenet should be endorsed.  
 Having concluded that the truth and the knowledge tenet should be acknowledged, in the 
fourth chapter I discuss whether the authority tenet should be endorsed as well. First, I discuss 
epistocracy, the rule of those who know, and claim that, though this decision-making procedure 
might have considerable epistemic value, it cannot meet the liberal criterion of legitimacy. Namely, 
we cannot expect all reasonable citizens to see the same group of people as experts in politics, and 
therefore the rule of any group would be rejectable to at least some reasonable citizens. In the 
second part of this chapter I discuss Mill's (1977a) scholocracy, a decision-making procedure in 
which everyone has at least one vote, but those better educated have more than one. Though it 
presents a more sophisticated version of epistocracy, I believe that scholocracy can be rejected as 
well, since it is not unreasonable to think that some epistemically damaging features (biases) might 
be present in the group that is given greater political authority. I end this chapter by claiming that 
the authority tenet should be rejected. 
 Having narrowed the search for the procedure with legitimacy-generating potential by 
excluding those that reject the truth or the knowledge tenet, as well as those that accept the authority 
tenet, in the fifth chapter I claim that the proper decision-making procedure has to acknowledge that 
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there are correct or incorrect political decisions, as well as those who know better what should be 
done, but should not give greater political authority to any specific group of citizens. This can be 
claimed only if one adopts a non-monistic account of political legitimacy, such as Estlund's (2008) 
standard account of epistemic democracy, which I endorse and defend in this thesis. In the rest of 
this chapter I analyze how various forms of democratic decision-making meet the criteria set by 
Estlund, and conclude that aggregative democracy should be rejected in favor of deliberative 
democracy. 
 In the sixth chapter I discuss the social and economic conditions needed for deliberative 
democracy's epistemic value. A division of epistemic and political labor should be implemented, 
with citizens and their representatives setting the aims and values the society is to pursue, and 
experts and policy-makers devising means (laws and decisions) for the achievement of these aims. 
In the second part of the chapter I discuss whether political equality should go deeper than just the 
formal politics, rejecting Estlund's view and claiming that the informal political sphere should be 
more egalitarian as well.  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CHAPTER II 
THE TRUTH TENET 
This chapter discusses the first tenet of the epistemic justification of decision-making procedures. 
According to the truth tenet, there are true (at least in minimal sense) procedure-independent 
normative standards for evaluating political decisions (Estlund 2008). The legitimacy-generating 
potential of a decision-making procedure is (at least partly) constituted by its ability to produce 
decisions or outcomes of substantive (procedure-independent) quality. 
 Positions that reject this tenet take a form of Pure Proceduralism: they claim that a decision-
making procedure has its legitimacy-generating potential solely because of its intrinsic (purely 
procedural) qualities. The ability of a procedure to produce decisions or outcomes of substantive 
quality should not influence its legitimacy-generating potential. There are two ways to reject the 
truth tenet: one is to claim that political decisions do not have truth-value and cannot be evaluated 
according to some procedure-independent standard, and the other is to claim that, although political 
decisions have (or might have) truth-value, not every reasonable citizen can recognize and affirm 
this truth-value, and consequently it cannot be used in political justification nor constitute a basis 
for legitimacy.  
 In this chapter I first elaborate and then reject Pure Proceduralism—I believe that the truth 
tenet should be granted, i.e. I believe that political decisions and outcomes can be evaluated 
according to some procedure-independent standard, as well as that their quality (and the ability of a 
decision-making procedure to produce decisions of such quality) should play a certain role when 
discussing the legitimacy-generating potential of that procedure. I further support my claim by 
discussing and rejecting two important purely proceduralist positions: Fabienne Peter's Pure 
Epistemic Proceduralism and Thomas Christiano's Pure Deliberative Proceduralism . 2
 Peter explicitly named her position Pure Epistemic Proceduralism (Peter 2011), while Christiano did not use some 2
specific term to name his position. His view is characterized as a form of Pure Deliberative Proceduralism by David 
Estlund (Estlund 1997) and Fabienne Peter (Peter 2014), and since Christiano's position indeed has many attributes that 
qualify it as a form of Pure Deliberative Proceduralism, I find it appropriate to refer to it in such a way.
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2.1. TRUTH AND POLITICS 
2.1.a. Introduction 
Many scholars reject the idea that truth (or some other procedure-independent standard of 
evaluation of collective decisions) should be introduced in discussion on political legitimacy. They 
see truth as something antipolitical—appeals to the truth of a proposition might be appropriate in 
some non-political contexts (e.g. scientific inquiry, religious conference), but should not be made 
when we discuss public issues and make collective decisions binding on all members of the political 
community.  
 There are two different approaches that reject the idea of introducing truth in public 
justification. First (ontological) approach claims that truth and politics are conceptually 
incompatible—there is simply no such thing as truth in politics. Collective decisions reflect 
interests and values of citizens, but they are neither true nor untrue. There is no procedure-
independent standard against which we can judge or evaluate our public decisions (Peter 2009, 
Young 2000, Arendt 1967, Schmitt 2007). Second (epistemic) approach does not reject the idea that 
there might be truth in politics, and that consequently political decisions might be true or untrue. 
However, it rejects the idea that we can have public agreement on reasons appealing to the truth of 
some political proposal. Burdens of judgment and conditions of reasonable pluralism prevent any 
appeal to the truth of a proposition from meeting the publicity criteria. Since we cannot agree 
whether a particular decision is true or whether it is supported by true reasons, we should exclude 
appeals to the truth from the discussion on political legitimacy. A collective decision can still be true 
or untrue, but in the conditions of reasonable pluralism we cannot appeal to the truth of a decision 
(or the ability of a procedure to produce true or correct decisions) in order to establish its legitimacy 
(or legitimacy-generating potential) (Rawls 1993, Christiano 2008, Gaus 1996, Bohman 2000, 
Elster 1983).  
 Though these two approaches do not have the same standing on whether a political decision 
can be true or untrue (according to some procedure-independent standard), they both agree that 
truth or procedure-independent substantial quality of a political decision (or decision-making 
procedure) does not play any role in determining its legitimacy (or its legitimacy-generating 
potential). In the rest of this part of the chapter I shall further elaborate these two approaches, as 
well as demonstrate why both should be rejected and why the truth tenet should be granted. After 
that, in the following parts of this chapter, I shall examine two sophisticated examples of these 
positions: the first one is pure epistemic proceduralism defended by Fabienne Peter who claims that 
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there are no procedure-independent standards for evaluating political decisions (Peter 2009), and 
the second one is pure deliberative proceduralism defended by Thomas Christiano who claims that 
procedure-independent standards might exist, but since we cannot agree upon them, we should not 
introduce them in the discussion on political legitimacy (Christiano 2008).  
2.1.b. Political Nihilism  
Scholars who argue that there is no truth in politics generally agree that, 'from the standpoint of 
politics, truth has despotic character' (Arendt 1967). Politics is about dispute, disagreement and 
deliberation among equals, and truth forecloses this activities. Introducing truth in politics brings 
along a serious threat that some will be more capable of coming to this truth, and this might lead to 
them having not only epistemic, but also political (and moral) authority over others. In such 
conditions, dispute, disagreement and deliberation among equals are not possible. Therefore, 
politics should not begin with conclusions (Arendt 1967).  
 This view is supported by an additional claim, one holding that truth and politics are 
conceptually incompatible. Truth commits us to the realist ontology, which might be appropriate for 
a scientific inquiry, but is not appropriate for ethics and politics. It is one thing to say that a water 
molecule consists of an oxygen atom with two hydrogen atoms bound to it, and yet another to say 
that reverse discrimination is just or unjust. While it seems plausible to say that a claim about water 
molecule refers to a real object—object independent of human perspective and inquiry—it is very 
difficult (or at least contestable) to consider our values and moral beliefs as any kind of a real 
object. According to this position there are empirical truths, but there are no normative truths 
(Arendt 1967). Consequently, any appeal to truth in politics is void and meaningless . Similar view 3
is defended by Habermas who argues that there are no procedure-independent standards that loom 
over political process—the only normative standards are noninstrumental evaluations of the 
procedure. If we introduce substantive standards and start referring to procedure-independent 
qualities of a particular decision or procedure that has produced it, we are rejecting the dialogical 
 Similar ideas were held by Carl Schmitt, fascist legal philosopher, who argued that deliberative and democratic 3
procedures cannot be justified. Outcomes of political procedures are not (nor can they be) true or rational, they are 
simply a product of a contestation of different groups, with the strongest advancing their interests and values, and the 
weakest disappearing. In the political arena different comprehensive doctrines and different conceptions of good 
compete, and population tries to attain substantive homogeneity (Schmitt 2007). Of course, Arendt and Schmitt end up 
disagreeing on purely procedural qualities of democracy (with Arendt claiming that there are purely procedural 
normative standards, and Schmitt denying that), but they agree that there is no procedure-independent standard against 
which outcomes of political decisions can be judged. 
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basis that constitutes political normativity  (Habermas 1996). If there is truth in politics and if there 4
are experts, we will end up privileging the experts' perspective (Habermas 1999). Rejecting truth in 
politics is one way of combating epistocracy, a rule of experts, and defending democracy. Both 
Arendt and Habermas thus claim that political decisions and procedures that have produced them 
should not be evaluated by appeal to truth or good consequences (or other procedure-independent 
standards), but solely by appeal to purely procedural values.  
 I believe that these ideas should be rejected. However, before I can start arguing that truth is 
compatible with deliberation and disagreement (even more so, that truth is essential for deliberation 
and disagreement), I have to briefly explain what 'truth' is. In order to avoid complex discussions 
within epistemology that try to answer the question at hand, but nonetheless offer different 
contestable solutions, epistemic democracy should take a minimalist approach that is compatible 
with other prominent epistemic positions (Estlund 2008, Misak 2009, Talisse 2009b). Therefore, 
instead of claiming that 'p is true' when p corresponds with things and relations in the world, or that 
'p is true' when it is in coherence with our other beliefs, or even that 'p' is true when it works 
satisfactorily or improves our performance in the world, we should simply claim that 'p is true' 
when p . This deflationary account, first introduced by Gottlob Frege, is not incompatible with 5
other epistemic positions on truth. When we argue in favor of the claim that 'p is true' we are 
simultaneously arguing in favor of 'p'. When we combine this minimalist account with some aspects 
of pragmatist epistemology, we can conclude that true belief is one that is best supported by 
reasons, arguments and evidence. This does not imply, of course, that the truth of a belief consists in 
 Habermas' view rejects truth and any other procedure-independent standard for evaluating decision-making 4
procedures and decisions produced by them. He explicitly argues that we need not confront reason as an alien authority 
residing somewhere beyond political communication (Habermas 1996). A political decision is thus legitimate iff it is a 
product of a proper decision-making procedure, and a decision-making procedure has this legitimacy-generating 
potential because of its intrinsic, purely procedural qualities. Habermas does not, on the other hand, think that we can 
legitimately limit or deny certain basic individual rights and liberties, not even when laws and policies that deny them 
are produced through a proper legitimacy-generating procedure. It seems that there is some way of evaluating the 
outcomes of a decision-making procedure after all. Actual decision-making procedure can make different outcomes, but 
they become legitimate only when they could have been produced by an ideal deliberative procedure (Habermas 1999). 
Actual decision-making procedures have their legitimacy-generating potential because they mirror (to a certain degree) 
the ideal deliberative procedure. Therefore, there is a substantive, actual-procedure-independent standard for evaluating 
political decisions. In this sense Habermas defends a form of rational (and not pure) proceduralism because he 
introduces certain procedure-independent standard for evaluating political decisions produced by actual decision-
making procedures. David Estlund and Fabienne Peter elaborate and defend this interpretation of Habermas' work 
(Estlund 1997, 2008, Peter 2011). 
 One might claim that Rawls or Habermas would not reject this minimalist concept of truth. When they argue against 5
truth in politics, they are primarily referring to the strong metaphysical concept of truth, one that is also rejected (or at 
least not endorsed) by Estlund, Talisse, Misak and other proponents of the minimalist concept of truth. I thank Nebojša 
Zelić for pointing this out. However, even minimalist truth represents a kind of procedure-independent standard, so the 
argument against pure proceduralism still stands. What might be brought in question is whether Rawls and Habermas 
represent pure proceduralism, or should their views be seen as a form of rational proceduralism. Both Estlund (1997, 
2008) and Peter (2011) claim that Rawls' and Habermas' views can be interpreted as a form of rational proceduralism, 
but it seems that these authors themselves (especially Habermas) side up with pure proceduralism. 
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it being supported by reasons and evidence. Pragmatism does not say what it means for a belief to 
be true, it only points out the method we can use to find out whether it is true (Misak 2009). 
Therefore, when epistemic democrats speak of truth in politics, they are not referring to some 
contested metaphysical attribute of a belief (correspondence, coherence...), but simply to the claim 
that 'p is true' when p. Contrary to Arendt's claim that truth forecloses dispute and deliberation, this 
concept of truth is not only compatible with the idea of deliberation and disagreement among 
equals, but also a precondition for such practices.  
 Without the concept of truth politics would, just like any other public deliberation (or even 
any belief or assertion), make no sense (Price 2003, Misak 2009). The concept of truth is not 
foreclosing public deliberation, as Hannah Arendt claims, but just the opposite—the concept of 
truth is essential for any disagreement and deliberation. Imagine a community of citizens who 
accept the norms of sincerity and personal justification, but nonetheless do not hold that there is 
truth about public matters. They use language to express their preferences and values, but do not 
think that disagreement among them indicates that one or the other is mistaken. If we do not think 
that our own beliefs are somehow better supported by arguments and reasons than the beliefs held 
by someone else, why should we deliberate or discuss with others (Price 2003)? We distinguish 
phrases "It seems to me that p" and "I assert / believe that p", and we use the first one to distance 
ourselves from the obligations which come with the second. When we say that we believe that p, we 
are saying that we believe that p is true, or that p is supported by the best reasons and evidence. 
Therefore, truth and responsiveness to reasons and evidence are constitutive norms of a belief 
(Misak 2009).  
 Similar ideas are put forward by Robert Talisse, who introduces truth in the first of the five 
principles of folk epistemology (Talisse 2009a, 2009b). He claims not only that truth in politics is a 
necessary precondition for public deliberation, but also that appeal to the notion of truth in politics 
is the best way of justifying and supporting public deliberation. Talisse's argumentation is very 
valuable when rejecting Arendt's view, and I want to use the next few paragraphs to explain his 
view and demonstrate how it can be used to undermine the political nihilist's idea that truth 
forecloses deliberation and disagreement.  
 Talisse starts his argumentation with a claim that he considers a truism: 'To believe that p is 
to hold that p is true'. If I believe that Munich is north of Trieste, I hold that it is true that Munich is 
north of Trieste. Similarly, if I believe that abortion should be legalized, I hold that it is true that 
abortion should be legalized. Talisse than introduces a pragmatic but still uncontested idea that to 
say that p is true is to hold that p is supported by best arguments, reasons and evidence. If I believe 
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that it is true that Munich is north of Trieste, I hold that the proposition 'Munich is north of Trieste' 
is supported by best reasons and evidence (e.g. various maps and writings support this claim, 
experts in geography claim that it is true, if one travels north of Trieste he or she will eventually get 
to Munich, etc.). Similarly, if I believe that it is true that abortion should be legalized, I hold that the 
proposition 'Abortion should be legalized' is supported by best reasons and evidence (e.g. the idea 
of women as equal citizens entails certain rights for control over one's own body, there are studies 
showing that in countries where abortion is illegal it is still conducted, but in much worse 
conditions and with greater risks for women, etc.). Talisse thus claims that, when one believes that 
p, one takes oneself to have sufficient reasons for p's truth (Talisse 2009a, 2009b). Hence the second 
claim of folk epistemology: 'To hold that p is true is to hold that it is supported by best reasons, 
arguments and evidence'. Furthermore, when we assert or claim that p, we present ourselves as 
having reasons (that can be articulated) for believing p. By publicly claiming that we believe that p, 
we are opening the logical space for the exchange of reasons. Third claim of folk epistemology thus 
follows: 'To hold that p is supported by best reasons and evidence is to incur the obligation to 
articulate one's reasons and evidence when called upon to do so'. However, our reasons can fail if 
others can show that they are inconsistent or ill-supported or if others can find and defend better 
reasons for the claim opposite to the one we are asserting. When we articulate our reasons and 
evidence, we are entering a dialectical space in which we have to evaluate the reasons given by 
others and answer the objections others have presented against our view. Consequently, the fourth 
claim of folk epistemology follows: 'To articulate one's reasons is to enter into a social process of 
reason exchange'. This process, however, has to be ordered in some way to best promote its 
epistemic qualities—some cognitive and dispositional norms have to be taken into account. Thus 
arises the fifth claim of folk epistemology: 'To engage in social process of reason exchange is to at 
least implicitly adopt certain cognitive and dispositional norms related to one's epistemic character' 
(Talisse 2009a, 2009b). Democracy is seen as the best institutional arrangement for upholding good 
epistemic practices, and is thus considered a legitimacy-generating decision-making procedure. 
Democratic decisions are legitimate because they are the product of collective decision-making 
procedure that promotes epistemic values and supports good epistemic practices. Talisse's argument 
for democracy will be discussed in detail (and rejected) in the next chapter since he acknowledges 
the truth tenet, but rejects the knowledge tenet. However, Talisse's argumentation is precious here 
because he holds both the idea that there is truth in democratic decisions, and the idea that truth is 
compatible with political deliberation and disagreement. Contrary to Arendt and Habermas, Talisse 
points out that the concept of truth is not only compatible, but also necessary for any disagreement 
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or deliberation. Concept of truth does not foreclose deliberation—quite the contrary, it enables 
deliberation and disagreement.  
 I find the argumentation presented by Misak, Talisse and Price very convincing. People who 
disagree tend to believe that they are right, and that those who hold the opposite views are wrong. 
Though political decisions can be right or wrong according to some procedure-independent 
standard, this does not imply that there are those who know better (the knowledge tenet) nor that 
those who know better should rule (the authority tenet). Fear expressed by Arendt and partially by 
Habermas thus seems unnecessary—even if we acknowledge the truth tenet, there are other ways to 
block epistocracy. Furthermore, the claim that the introduction of truth in politics will block 
deliberation and disagreement also seems unfounded—people will nonetheless disagree on what the 
truth is and how to implement it through laws and public policies. Political nihilist's claim should 
thus be rejected, and those who want to block the truth tenet should search for an alternative 
approach. Admitting that there is (or there might be) truth in politics (i.e. that political decisions can 
be right or wrong, true or false, according to some procedure-independent standard), but also that 
truth of political decisions is always contested and cannot be publicly recognized and accepted in 
the conditions of reasonable pluralism, and thus cannot be introduced as a criterion for legitimacy, 
looks like a promising approach.  
2.1.c. Epistemic Abstinence 
Political nihilism expresses worry that introducing truth in politics might foreclose deliberation and 
disagreement, disqualifying some views and privileging the position of experts or those who are 
best at knowing the truth. Defenders of the idea of epistemic abstinence  fear that introducing truth 6
in politics might provoke too much deliberation and disagreement, eventually leading to division 
and instability. Rawls emphasizes that appeals to the truth introduce certain 'zeal' and 'the relentless 
struggle to win the world for the whole truth' (Rawls 1993, 2001). Consequently, truth should be 
omitted from political discourse: political decisions might be true or untrue, but since reasonable 
people deliberating in good faith cannot agree which decisions are true or untrue, the substantive 
quality of decisions (or the ability of decision-making procedures to produce decisions of certain 
substantive quality) should not play any role when discussing the legitimacy of these political 
decisions (or the legitimacy-generating potential of the procedures that have produced them). 
 This expression is introduced (and as an idea rejected) by Joseph Raz. Epistemic abstinence characterizes positions 6
that claim that reasonableness (or some other procedural ideal), and not truth, is what we are looking for in a political 
doctrine (Raz 1994).
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Instead of aiming for the truth, we should aim for the overlapping consensus in which people affirm 
the same freestanding conception of justice but hold different versions of the good (Rawls 1993). 
Rawls' political liberalism is thus 'political, not metaphysical'—it does not assert itself as true, but 
only as the most reasonable doctrine, i.e. the best doctrine to arrange our political life as free and 
equal.  
 Similar views are held and advanced by other proponents of epistemic abstinence. Gerald 
Gaus claims that, in conditions of reasonable pluralism, we cannot agree on whether some political 
decision is true, nor can we agree whether it is supported by the best reasons, arguments and 
evidence. Consequently, substantive (procedure-independent) qualities of a political decision or a 
decision-making procedure that has produced it cannot be included in discussion on legitimacy 
since some of us would then be unable to recognize this legitimacy. Gaus claims that deliberative 
democracy cannot realize Ideal of Reason (i.e. ideal that political decisions should be supported by 
best reasons and evidence, and these reasons should be exchanged with other members of the 
political community), Ideal of Public Justification (i.e. ideal that policy is justifiable only if it can 
be embraced by all members of the public) and Ideal of Real Political Consensus (i.e. ideal that 
political institutions should generate wide, though, of course, not complete, actual consensus on 
political outcomes) simultaneously (Gaus 1997). His answer to this problem is rejecting the 
consensus view and embracing the convergence view: a political decision is legitimate iff it is 
substantively acceptable to all qualified citizens. Citizens do not have to share reasons that support 
particular political decision: if citizen C1 accepts a particular decision D on the basis of reason R1, 
and C2 accepts D on the basis of R2, D represents a legitimate decision since it is justifiable from 
the viewpoints of both C1 and C2. As we have seen, D does not have to have some definite 
substantive quality all citizens can recognize and affirm (Gaus 1996). Democracy comes in as a 
mechanism for selecting among decisions that are already acceptable to all citizens, as its 
legitimacy-generating qualities are purely procedural—no decision is considered legitimate because 
it represents substantively better outcome than the other, and democracy is not considered to be 
legitimacy-generating because it produces substantively correct or true outcomes. It is a fair 
decision-making procedure, one that treats all citizens as free and equal.  
 Another proponent of this view is Thomas Christiano, who argues that democracy cannot be 
instrumentally justified by appealing to the procedure-independent quality or desirability of the 
results and end states it produces, simply because we cannot have a public agreement on which 
results are better and which end states are more desirable. Since we cannot publicly agree on the 
substantive quality of the end state that is the result of a certain decision-making procedure, we 
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cannot publicly agree on the instrumental qualities of that procedure, i.e. on its ability to produce 
valuable or desirable end states. Decision-making procedure can thus be justified only by appealing 
to its purely procedural qualities (e.g. whether it treats everyone's interests as equally important) 
(Christiano 2008). Even if some decision-making procedure is better than the other in achieving this 
truly desirable result or end state (or truth), this cannot be considered a valid argument for its 
legitimacy since not all qualified citizens can see this (such procedure would be rejected by the 
principle of public equality).  
 There is a common way of answering the objections put forward by the proponents of 
epistemic abstinence. These scholars argue that, even if political decisions might be true or correct, 
this substantive and procedure-independent quality of political decisions does not influence their 
legitimacy. Furthermore, even if various decision-making procedures can have tendency of 
producing more or less correct or true decisions, this substantive quality of these decision-making 
procedures does not influence their legitimacy-generating potential. Procedures have their 
legitimacy-generating potential solely because of their purely procedural qualities—their ability to 
produce outcomes of a certain substantive quality plays no role in determining their legitimacy-
generating potential. David Estlund invites us to imagine two (or more) decision-making procedures 
that have the same purely procedural qualities, but nonetheless (because of some other qualities) 
produce outcomes of different substantive quality (Estlund 1997, 2008, 2009). Since these 
procedures have the same purely procedural qualities, they should (according to pure 
proceduralism) have equal legitimacy-generating potential. One such decision-making procedure 
might be coin-flipping: when we have two alternatives and cannot agree what should be done, we 
could simply flip a coin and let it decide for us. This is a fair decision-making procedure, since 
every citizen has an equal chance to participate in decision-making and to influence the final 
decision—no chance at all. Coin-flipping might seem as a bad decision-making procedure, but it 
cannot be said to be unfair. Similarly, when two (equally-deserving) persons have to distribute some 
resources, they can agree to flip a coin and to accept the outcome—winner will get all the resources, 
and loser will get none. Though this might seem as a bad model of distribution, it is not unfair, since 
all involved parties have been treated equally. Fair decision-making procedure, as we have seen, 
guarantees that the decision will be produced in a fair way (or in a fair state), but does not guarantee 
that the decision itself (or the end state) will be fair, moral or correct. Coin-flipping, though it might 
be a fair decision-making procedure, does not yield strong moral reasons for accepting and 
promoting (or even subduing others to) decision produced in such a way. Fairness of a procedure is 
a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the procedure's legitimacy-generating potential. There 
 21
must be something other than its fairness that constitutes democracy’s legitimacy-generating 
potential.  
 One (purely proceduralist) way of answering this objection is by introducing intrinsic moral 
(Habermas 1990) or intrinsic epistemic (Peter 2011) qualities of public deliberation. Unlike coin-
flipping, democracy has its legitimacy-generating potential because it enables citizens to discuss 
their views and to compare and evaluate reasons and arguments through a public deliberation, 
which is itself a valuable purely procedural moral (or epistemic) standard. The result of such 
democratic procedure will be legitimate regardless of its tendency to be true or to have some 
procedure-independent quality—it will be legitimate because it was produced by a fair decision-
making procedure that embodies the procedural moral (or epistemic) value of pubic deliberation. 
Engaging others in public deliberation might be considered valuable for numerous purely 
procedural reasons: it might be seen as an essential part of the good life for an individual (Arendt 
1963), or as a realization of mutual respect and concern among citizens (Gutmann and Thompson 
2004) , or even as realization of epistemic accountability among equals (Peter 2011). However, if 7
public deliberation has only purely procedural (moral or epistemic) value, then the quality of the 
results of the decision-making procedure should not influence the legitimacy-generating potential of 
that procedure. If we have a procedure that embodies public deliberation (one that represents an 
essential part of a good life, or one that realizes equal respect among citizens), but after the 
deliberation we flip a coin in order to make the final decision, we should (according to purely 
procedural standards) conclude that this procedure has legitimacy-generating potential. After all, it 
is a fair procedure since it gives everyone an equal chance to influence the final outcome, and it 
respects the purely procedural value of public deliberation. However, we are not ready to claim that 
deliberative procedure with coin-flipping at the end represents a good way of arriving at legitimate 
decisions. When we favor democratic deliberation, we do so because we believe that deliberation 
has some instrumental epistemic value—decisions made through public deliberation should 
generally have greater epistemic value than those produced by coin-flipping. This is not to say that 
epistemic value of public deliberation can be only instrumental (Estlund 1997, 2008); it can have 
both the intrinsic and the instrumental epistemic value (Marti 2006). However, this implies that 
 Though Gutmann and Thompson claim that public deliberation has an intrinsic value for realizing the mutual respect 7
and concern among citizens, they do not claim that this is the only value of deliberation. It also has an instrumental 
(procedure-independent) value since it represents an epistemically good way of arriving at correct or just outcomes. 
Though Gutmann and Thompson claim that deliberation has an intrinsic (purely procedural) value, they embrace non-
monistic view typical for rational proceduralism. 
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instrumental epistemic value of public deliberation is a necessary (though not sufficient) 
requirement for the legitimacy-generating potential of any decision-making procedure.  
 Though we do not agree on the value of the desired end state nor do we have equal 
standards for evaluating the quality of the outcomes of political procedures we should, 
acknowledging the conditions of reasonable pluralism, still be able to reasonably agree that the 
results produced by deliberative democratic procedure should, in reasonably favorable conditions, 
be better (according to some procedure-independent standards) than the results produced by coin-
flipping. We do not have to share the same conception of the good in order to recognize that 
democratic deliberation yields better decisions than coin-flipping. Therefore, though it seems that 
we still cannot appeal to the truth (or some other procedure-independent standard) of a particular 
decision to establish its legitimacy, we can appeal to the truth-tracking qualities (or some other 
procedure-independent standard) of a decision-making procedure to establish its legitimacy-
generating potential. 
2.1.d. Conclusion 
This chapter started with a difficult question: is the truth of political decisions relevant for 
establishing their legitimacy? Is the ability of a decision-making procedure to produce outcomes of 
certain substantive (procedure-independent) quality a necessary component of this procedure's 
legitimacy-generating potential? There are two ways to reject this idea. One is to claim that political 
decisions have no truth-value (consequently cannot be neither true nor false) and thus the ability of 
decision-making procedures to produce true or correct decisions is null. The other way is to claim 
that, though political decisions might have truth-value, we cannot have a public agreement on their 
truth-value, and thus cannot agree that any decision-making procedure is better or worse at 
producing true or correct decisions (since we cannot publicly agree which decisions are true or 
correct).  
 I have sketched two possible replies to the abovementioned objections. The first objection is 
rejected by the appeal to general psychology and folk epistemology—when we disagree about 
important political issues, we implicitly hold that we are right and the other side is wrong. However, 
the fact that we consider ourselves to be right (to have the true belief) does not prevent us from 
engaging with others in public deliberation—it is precisely because we think that we are right, and 
the others are wrong, that we enter the process of deliberation and reason-exchange. The second 
objection is rejected by using the coin-flipping example—though both (deliberative) democracy and 
coin-flipping represent fair decision-making procedures, we do not think that coin-flipping is a good 
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decision-making procedure, nor that decisions produced by coin-flipping should be legitimate. We 
are (at least partly) concerned about the quality of the decisions and think that the ability of a 
procedure to produce substantively good outcomes should constitute a part of procedure's 
legitimacy-generating potential. Though we cannot publicly agree on the substantive quality of any 
particular decision, we can publicly agree that there are some decision-making procedures that are 
better in producing substantively good outcomes than the others. We cannot publicly agree on the 
substantive (procedure-independent) quality of any particular democratic decision, but we can 
publicly agree that democracy is generally better than coin-flipping in producing decisions of good 
substantive (procedure-independent) quality.  
 In the next two parts of this chapter I discuss two important examples of the 
abovementioned objections. Pure Epistemic Proceduralism, a position defended by Fabienne Peter, 
can be seen as a very sophisticated version of political nihilism. However, unlike Hannah Arendt, 
Peter believes that epistemic quality of decision-making procedures is a central part of their 
legitimacy-generating potential (Peter 2011). It is important to emphasize that this epistemic quality 
is intrinsic and not instrumental—decision-making procedures have epistemic quality because they 
realize and respect some purely procedural epistemic values, and not because they have a tendency 
of producing some (procedurally-independent) good outcomes. She embraces proceduralist and 
hybrid epistemology, and claims that there are no procedure-independent standards, not even 
procedure-independent truth. Peter's position is thus a form of pure proceduralism—no procedure-
independent standard is involved in the evaluation of the legitimacy-generating potential of the 
procedure. Thomas Christiano's Pure Deliberative Proceduralism can be seen as an example of the 
epistemic abstinence view. He justifies and defends democracy from the standpoint of public 
equality, and argues that we cannot ground democratic legitimacy in its ability to produce outcomes 
or end states of substantive (procedure-independent) quality (Christiano 2008). This type of 
justification would violate the publicity requirement since not everyone would be able to see that 
the results or end states treat everyone as an equal, and consequently not everyone could accept the 
instrumental justification of democratic procedure.  
 I reject both Peter's and Christiano's view. The first one embraces very controversial and 
contested epistemology and cannot be used as a stable conception of democratic legitimacy , while 8
the other puts significant emphasis on the outcomes of a democratic process, and thus ends up as a 
form of rational (and not pure) proceduralism.  
 Fabienne Peter arrived at the same conclusion and abandoned this position in 2012. Her new position, one focusing on 8
the idea of epistemic peers, is discussed in the third chapter. 
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2.2. PURE EPISTEMIC PROCEDURALISM 
Pure Proceduralism generally focuses on intrinsic moral qualities of decision-making procedures 
when evaluating their legitimacy-generating potential. A collective decision-making procedure has 
legitimacy-generating potential if it embodies certain moral value (or values). Many positions 
discussed in the first part of this chapter (Rawls 1993, Habermas 1990, Arendt 1967, Gutmann and 
Thompson 2002) use some variation of this argumentative strategy. Introducing epistemology into 
discussions on legitimacy usually leads towards some form of Rational Proceduralism, one that (at 
least partially) uses the instrumentalist approach and emphasizes the importance of the quality of 
outcomes for evaluation of the legitimacy-generating potential of decision-making procedures. 
Position presented by Fabienne Peter is an important exception (Peter 2011). She claims that there 
are some important epistemic values that are intrinsically justified and concludes that, in order to 
produce legitimate decisions, a collective decision-making procedure has to embody these epistemic 
values. This is a unique form of Pure Proceduralism because it introduces epistemology into 
discussion on political legitimacy, but nonetheless does not take an instrumentalist approach, one 
that would lead towards Rational Proceduralism. My goal in this part of the chapter is to reject this 
form of Pure Proceduralism. 
2.2.a. Introduction 
Authors that perceive epistemic qualities of a democratic process as a necessary (though not 
sufficient) requirement for its legitimacy-generating potential disagree when discussing what 
represents this epistemic value, as well as what is the best institutional arrangement for achieving it. 
Most authors believe that the best way for the development of epistemic qualities of democracy can 
be found in the context of deliberative democracy. However, they disagree on the epistemic value of 
collective deliberation. For some authors (Estlund 2008, Talisse 2009), epistemically valuable 
procedures are those that have a high probability of producing correct outcomes. The epistemic 
quality of a procedure is determined by its ability to ‘track the truth’ (consequentialist 
epistemology), and it is this ability that gives legitimacy-generating potential to already fair 
procedures. On the other hand, some authors (Peter 2009) have argued that collective deliberation 
has both instrumental and procedural value; however, they emphasized procedural value as the 
source of legitimacy-generating potential.  
 This part of the chapter addresses the debate on instrumental and procedural epistemic value 
of collective deliberation. It takes as a starting point the epistemic value of a democratic process and 
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deliberative democracy as a proper institutional arrangement for the realization of this epistemic 
value. I will not discuss these theories in the rest of this part of the chapter, focusing instead on 
Fabienne Peter’s proceduralist approach to epistemic democracy (a form of Pure Proceduralism), as 
well as to objections Peter rises against standard account of epistemic democracy (a form of 
Rational Proceduralism).  
2.2.b. Pure Epistemic Proceduralism 
Peter builds her position on proceduralist epistemology that focuses exclusively on intrinsic 
qualities of procedures to judge their epistemic worth. She rejects the idea that the procedure-
independent standard is neccesary to assess the quality of knowledge-producing procedures. Her 
position rests on Helen Longino's hybrid epistemology that combines usually descriptive 
proceduralist epistemology with normative elements. Longino holds that cognition is an inherently 
social process, rooted in a set of knowledge producing practices to which certain normative criteria 
apply. She starts from proceduralist epistemology, one that uses very different concepts and 
standards than the mainstream consequentialist epistemology. Knowledge is thus defined as a belief 
accepted by an individual, when both the belief in question and the fact that the subject accepts that 
belief are acceptable in the relevant community. Proceduralist epistemology is a form of descriptive 
epistemology, one that describes existing cognitive and social practices, without evaluating them 
according to any standard. Longino develops a hybrid view and argues that it is possible to locate 
normativity in the social practices themselves (Longino 2002a). The result is some kind of a 
normative account, but one that does not evaluate epistemic practices according to their ability to 
produce some (procedurally independent) true or correct beliefs, but according to their coherence 
with some intrinsically valuable epistemic practices. It is important to notice, however, that these 
normative elements are not procedure-independent (and outcome-oriented), but reside in the process 
itself.  
Table 2.1. 
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Epistemology DESCRIPTIVE NORMATIVE OUTCOME-ORIENTED
CONSEQUENTIONALIST NO YES YES
PROCEDURALIST YES NO NO
HYBRID YES YES NO
Longino holds that justification is not just in testing the hypothesis against data, but also in 
subjecting hypothesis, data, reasoning and background assumptions to criticisms from a variety of 
perspectives (Longino 2002a). This clearly represents some kind of deliberative or discursive 
procedure. However, not every deliberative procedure is justified; in order to be considered as an 
intrinsically good epistemic procedure (and thus a procedure that has legitimacy-generating 
qualities), there are several normative conditions that the knowledge-producing process ought to 
satisfy. As I have emphasized earlier, these conditions are purely procedural, and they do not 
depend on the ability of the procedure to generate true or correct outcomes (that would be a form of 
consequentialist epistemology, which Peter rejects). (i) Publicly recognized forum for the criticism 
of evidence, methods, assumptions and reasoning should be formed, thus creating space for the 
critical discourse. (ii) Deliberation should have transformative potential and people should be 
responsive to one another’s arguments. (iii) Publicly recognized standards should be made by 
reference to which theories and observational practices should be evaluated, thus securing that 
critical discourse is orderly and constructive. (iv) Finally, tempered equality of intellectual authority 
should be established, thus enabling all citizens to actively participate in public deliberation 
(Longino 2002a, Peter 2011). Only if deliberative procedure can satisfy these four normative 
conditions it can be considered fair and epistemically valuable, regardless of the epistemic quality 
of the outcomes it produces. Epistemic values are irreducibly procedural—there is nothing beyond 
critically engaging with one another in a transparent and non-authoritarian way.  
 Peter believes that pure epistemic proceduralism gives us good reasons for rejecting coin-
flipping and some other fair decision-making procedures: beside moral requirement for equal 
participation of each citizen in decision-making process (procedural moral fairness), pure epistemic 
proceduralism requires from the procedure to include public deliberation among equal citizens 
(procedural epistemic fairness) in order to have legitimacy-generating potential. Peter holds that 
moral and epistemic fairness are inseparable, and her account (being monistic, but still recognizing 
epistemic values) is thus superior to other monistic positions that do not recognize epistemic values 
(e.g. Christiano's account of democratic legitimacy) and non-monistic positions that clearly separate 
moral and epistemic qualities of a procedure (e.g. Estlund's Rational Epistemic Proceduralism).  
2.2.c. Rejecting Pure Epistemic Proceduralism  
There are several objections that can be raised against Pure Epistemic Proceduralism. Cheryl Misak 
emphasizes the problem of distinction between deliberating well and deliberating badly. No account 
of deliberative democracy can ignore the call to make this distinction. The trouble is that, in saying 
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what good, as opposed to poor, deliberation amounts to, one finds oneself facing a justificatory 
problem: how can we specify what a good deliberation is without simply assuming that our current 
standards of deliberation and inquiry are the gold standards (Misak 2009: 35)? Consequentialist 
epistemology (and accounts of democratic legitimacy built on it) won't have a problem with this 
distinction; deliberative procedures are justified because they lead us to more accurate beliefs. 
Misak and Talisse walk the same path; virtues are justified because they lead to true belief. 
Listening to others is not merely the polite thing to do, but it is also good because we might learn 
something. The virtues are justified because they have epistemic value—they will tend to lead us to 
the right answer to our questions (Misak 2009, Talisse 2005). 
 The problem for Peter is how to defend four normative conditions set up by Longino if she 
cannot refer to a procedure-independent standard, the correctness of outcomes? It may be possible 
to try to deduce them from the idea of political fairness, following the idea that political and 
epistemic fairness are just two sides of the same coin. This does not seem as a move Peter would 
do, considering her intentions to do just the opposite, i.e. to deduce political fairness from epistemic 
fairness. However, both this argumentation and the (epistemic) defense of Longino's normative 
conditions are not presented in the book, though they seem necessary for Peter's argument.  
  There are reasons for one to believe that constructing purely procedural justification can be 
very difficult, if not impossible. Misak warns us that any substantive account of our epistemic 
virtues will rest rather heavily on what we currently take to be rational or virtuous. We may be 
simply confirming our prejudices or digging ourselves deeper in the same epistemic rut (Misak 
2009: 37). We thus must not take for granted our epistemic values, we need some procedure-
independent standard to evaluate them. 
 It would be wrong to see Peter's position as simply giving us the list of epistemic values and 
social conditions necessary for their development. On the contrary, great value of her account is the 
requirement asking us to constantly evaluate our epistemic practices. She sees justification not just 
as subjecting data and hypothesis to criticism from a variety of perspectives—our reasoning and 
background assumptions are also constantly subjected to criticism, and it seems that conditions that 
constitute good epistemic procedure can also be modified in the light of good reasons and 
arguments. This is why Peter writes that discursive practices are both constructive and justificatory 
(Peter 2011). They are not fixed and unchangeable, but are themselves subject to deliberation.  
 It seems that, according to Peter's view, our epistemic practices can be improved, and that is 
precisely one of the tasks of democratic deliberation—to evaluate and improve the epistemic quality 
of deliberation itself. However, it is very difficult to talk about improvement without knowing the 
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good toward which the practice aims . Unless we can identify the ends that epistemic utility 9
promotes, our demand for justification may be futile (Elgin 1999; 99).  
 Rational Epistemic Proceduralism has no problem with this objection; since its veritistic 
consequentialist epistemology has a procedure-independent standard for assessing the quality of 
epistemic procedures (namely, whether they lead to correct outcomes), we can easily say what 
represents an improvement for a certain epistemic procedure. It also seems very easy to defend 
normative conditions necessary for good deliberation; they are epistemically good because they 
improve the quality of outcomes the procedure produces, while some other conditions may be 
epistemically bad because they reduce the quality of outcomes. If we want to introduce a 
convincing epistemic dimension into discussions on political legitimacy, we should abandon 
proceduralist and hybrid epistemology and take consequentialist epistemology as a starting point. 
This view is held by many scholars who defend epistemic democracy, including Festenstein, who 
writes that we need to think of epistemic virtues as requirements of truth-seeking (Festenstain 
2009), Talisse, who puts forward a pragmatist account and argues that the virtues are justified 
because they lead to true beliefs (Talisse 2009a, 2009b), and similar position is taken by Misak, 
who claims that epistemic virtue is justified if it is part of reliable method—one that is likely to lead 
to a true belief (Misak 2009). Pure epistemic proceduralism, however, fails to give a plausible 
account of improvement of our deliberative practices. Consequently, it fails to give a plausible 
account of democratic legitimacy and should be rejected. 
2.2.d. Defending Rational Proceduralism 
Standard account of epistemic democracy is characterized by three main features (Cohen 1986): 
first, it presupposes an independent standard of correct decisions, insisting that a correct outcome 
exists prior to and outside of actual democratic process. Second, it establishes a cognitive account 
of voting by making voters express beliefs about what correct policies are, not merely personal 
preferences for policies. Finally, it perceives an account of decision-making as a process of 
adjustment of beliefs, requiring from individuals to adjust their beliefs in light of the available 
evidence. We can clearly see that the Standard account of democratic legitimacy represents a form 
of Rational Proceduralism, one emphasizing both the fairness of the procedure and the quality of 
 Imagine you have a car and want to improve it—you want to have a better car than the one you have now. You come 9
to a mechanic and say that you want the car to be improved. The first thing the mechanic will ask you is how you want 
it improved. Do you want it to go faster? To be safer? To be more comfortable from the inside? To be more economic 
and consume less fuel? All of the above? You need to have a certain independent standard according to which you can 
evaluate and improve your car, and similarly, you need some procedure-independent standard according to which you 
can evaluate and improve your epistemic practices. 
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outcomes. Peter (following Longino) clearly rejects the first feature (one that makes it a form of 
Rational Proceduralism), the idea that there is an independent standard of correct decisions and that 
this standard should be relevant when we evaluate the legitimacy-generating potential of a 
collective decision-making procedure.  
 In the rest of this part of the chapter I want to defend the standard account of epistemic 
democracy (as defined by Joshua Cohen (Cohen 1986), and further developed by David Estlund 
(Estlund 2008, 2009)) from the critics from Pure Epistemic Proceduralism. The standard account 
holds that there exists, independently of an actual decision-making process, a correct decision and 
that legitimacy of democratic decisions depends, at least in part, on the ability of decision-making 
process to generate the correct outcome. It invokes veritistic consequentialist epistemology, 
according to which we evaluate the epistemic value of a certain cognitive practice by evaluating its 
ability to track the truth, i.e. to produce a correct outcome.  
 Standard account of epistemic democracy emphasizes that the first condition for the 
legitimacy of a particular decision is the fairness of the process that produced it. Even if correct, a 
decision cannot be legitimate unless it is produced by a fair procedure. However, alternative 
institutionalizations of fair democratic process will differ in their truth-tracking potential (Estlund 
2008). I defend the idea that a decision is legitimate if (and only if) it is a product of epistemically 
the best procedure among those that fall within the set of fair procedures. This is clearly a non-
monistic account; in order to be legitimacy-generating, a procedure must have both political and 
epistemic qualities.  
 Unlike democratic instrumentalists, I believe that democracy has an intrinsic value (for 
being a fair procedure), but hold that fairness can be satisfied in various forms of democracy. We 
are to discriminate among different forms of democracy according to their ability to produce correct 
outcomes. Therefore, follow Estlund in defending deliberative over aggregative democracy, but the 
justification of deliberative procedures is instrumental; deliberation is seen as the best means to 
achieve the desired end—to have correct outcomes in most cases.  
 Fabienne Peter rises a series of objections against the standard account of epistemic 
democracy, targeting its truth-tracking requirement for democratic legitimacy and instrumentalist 
approach to the value of public deliberation (Peter 2009). I will now briefly present three main 
arguments Peter raises against the standard account of epistemic democracy, as well as potential 
replies in favor of the standard account.  
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Objection 1: Standard Account of Epistemic Democracy is not a practicable conception of 
legitimacy 
Peter objects that a standard account of epistemic democracy is not a practicable conception of 
democratic legitimacy (Peter 2009: 133). Correctness is difficult, if not impossible, to determine. 
After all, Estlund has rejected democratic instrumentalism by arguing that in the conditions of 
reasonable pluralism interests and perspectives of the members of the democratic constituency 
inevitably diverge. When different people consider different outcomes as correct (and consequently 
legitimate), it is impossible to have a political decision that can be reasonably accepted by all 
community members. How can we expect that in the conditions of reasonable pluralism the 
members of the democratic constituency will agree upon a single procedure that all will see as 
epistemically the best, i.e. see it as the procedure that tracks the truth better than all others? If we 
cannot agree what the truth is and what propositions are correct (or at least justified), it is very 
unlikely that we can agree upon a single procedure that leads us towards truth. Consequently, we 
should not try to justify democratic deliberation by relying on the quality of its outcomes (since we 
cannot have a public agreement on this quality of outcomes), but by relying on the intrinsic 
(procedural) value of deliberation. 
 Recent work of both Robert Talisse and Cheryl Misak can be used to answer this objection. 
Though they use slightly different approaches and starting points (Talisse argues using folk 
epistemology while Misak adopts Peirce’s pragmatist epistemology), both follow argumentative 
strategies typical for American pragmatism and want to show that there is a reason for anyone to 
accept deliberative democracy as the best procedure for coming to correct answers. Epistemic 
pragmatism does not answer when a proposition is true of false, but which method we should use in 
order to determine the truth value of a proposition. The method we should use is a form of 
deliberation in which we examine all the relevant reasons, arguments and evidence for and against a 
certain belief—we accept it as true if it is well-supported with arguments and evidence, and we 
reject it as false if it is not adequately supported, or if there are strong arguments and evidence 
pointing towards its negation. This is clearly very similar to a scientific method we can all see as a 
reliable truth-seeker—we do not doubt in the truth of the results of mainstream science, and we are 
ready to accept and use its products and outcomes (e.g. a GPS device, medicines that cure serious 
diseases) (Kitcher 2011). Therefore, when we want to check whether (descriptive) proposition 
'Trieste is south of Munich' is true, we examine the relevant arguments, reasons and evidence for 
this claim. We look at maps, use compass or GPS, drive south of Munich to see whether we will end 
up near Trieste... The same holds for checking the truth value of (normative) proposition 'UN should 
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stop the genocide in Syria'—we examine the relevant arguments, reasons and evidence (e.g. the 
legal documents and declarations of UN, the situation in Syria, alternative options and their 
results...) (Misak 2009). We can publicly evaluate the quality of end states produced by a decision-
making procedure and agree whether a decision was a good or a bad one . A decision that improves 10
the economic situation in the country, improves health or education of citizens, or ensures the 
environmental sustainability, is a good decision and all qualified citizens should be able to 
recognize it as such . Of course, this recognition need not happen immediately after the decision 11
has been made—sometimes it can take several years, or even several decades, for the people to have 
a public agreement on the quality of a particular political decision. However, this does not represent 
a problem for its legitimacy, since the decision is justified on the basis of procedural, and not on the 
basis of substantive reasons. The recognition of the quality of decisions is needed for the 
justification of instrumental qualities of a procedure (and not of a particular decision). Peter claims 
that no political decision can be publicly accepted as correct or just on the basis of substantive 
reasons. This is why she rejects the idea that procedure has certain instrumental qualities (e.g. 
ability to produce substantively correct or just decisions), and argues that the procedure should be 
justified on the basis of its intrinsic (procedural) qualities instead. However, it seems that we can, 
even in the conditions of reasonable pluralism, recognize some political decisions as correct or just, 
and some decisions as wrong or unjust. Sometimes we will need years or decades to reach such an 
agreement, but the quality of most decisions can eventually be evaluated, and this implies that the 
instrumental qualities of the procedures that have produced them can be evaluated as well.  
 Furthermore, there are serious implications this objection may have on Peter’s new theory of 
democratic legitimacy (Peter 2012). Shortly after publishing Democratic Legitimacy, Peter 
abandoned pure epistemic proceduralism and hybrid epistemology of Helen Longino, and started 
using recent debate on peer disagreement as a new starting point in her argumentation. However, by 
taking Elga’s definition of epistemic peers as people who take each other as equally likely to make a 
mistake (Elga 2007), Peter reintroduced correctness in the debate on political legitimacy. Similar 
objection can thus be raised against her as well; if correctness is difficult to determine, and we 
cannot agree on a single decision-making procedure as the right one (epistemically the best among 
the set of fair procedures), how can we determine the common criteria for whether someone should 
 A detailed argumentation on this positions can be found in Talisse (2009) and Misak (2009).10
 These are some of the relevant dimensions recognized and measured by Democracy Ranking Association. This 11
association shares the idea that the quality of political decisions can be measured and that there are dimensions whose 
importance no qualified person would deny (Campbell and Sükösd 2002).
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be classified as our epistemic peer or not? And if we cannot have common criteria for determining 
epistemic peerhood, we cannot have a practicable conception of legitimacy. It seems that, along 
with her theory based on hybrid epistemology, Peter should also withdraw the first objection raised 
against the standard account of epistemic democracy.  
Objection 2: The Standard Account of Epistemic Democracy Makes Unnecessary Demands 
Peter raises a second objection by asserting that the standard account of epistemic democracy makes 
unnecessary demands (Peter 2009: 133). I claimed earlier that two fair decision-making procedures 
can have different outcomes; one can usually lead to correct outcomes, while the other can usually 
lead to biased decisions. The conclusion was that the fair procedure that tends to give correct 
outcomes will be legitimate, while fair procedure that tends to give biased outcomes will not be 
legitimate. However, since a fair procedure should ensure that everyone is able to participate in the 
process as an equal, it should also enable all those opposed to certain bias (racism, sexism) to 
efficiently challenge these premises. If a procedure is fair, one would not expect a biased proposal 
to go through. Peter thus claims that only unfair procedures can lead to biased outcomes. She 
concludes that the assumption of a procedure-independent standard of correctness is unnecessary 
since biased outcome can only be attributed to unfair procedures. We do not need rational epistemic 
proceduralism; pure epistemic version will suffice.  
 There are several ways to answer this objection from the standpoint of rational epistemic 
proceduralism. I will first present a reply by Jose Marti (2013) and argue against it, claiming that it 
does not have a sufficient strength to bring down Peter’s objection. I will than refer to Estlund work 
and try to show that this objection can be answered by carefully going through his articles.  
 Cass Sunstein’s recent work on the statistical regularity known as group polarization can 
seem like a good answer to Peter’s objection. Group polarization means that "[...] members of a 
deliberating group predictably move toward a more extreme point in the direction indicated by the 
members’ predeliberation tendencies." (Sunstein 2003: 81) Like-minded people, after discussing 
with their peers, tend to end up thinking a more extreme version of what they thought before they 
started to talk. When the group polarizes, the members adopt more extreme versions of their former 
positions, and this movement is not driven by new or better arguments. Following Sunstein, Marti 
wants to show that deliberative bodies of like-minded persons are epistemically unstable. 
Consequently, it seems that it is possible to have a fair and simultaneously biased procedure, what 
indicates that Estlund’s procedure-independent standard of correctness is necessary after all. I find 
this answer problematic not because of Sunstein’s work, but because of the conditions Peter 
 33
(following Longino) imposes on deliberation in order to call it fair and ascribe it procedural 
epistemic value. Namely, four procedural conditions that the knowledge producing process ought to 
satisfy seem rigorous enough to exclude any form of group polarization (Longino 2002). First 
condition is the existence of publicly recognized forums for criticism of evidence, methods, 
assumptions and reasoning. Group polarization usually occurs in deliberative enclaves and they are 
rarely either public or publicly recognized. Longino’s second condition requires people being 
responsive to one another’s arguments. In the case of group polarization, as we have seen earlier, 
the movement is not driven by new or better arguments. Peter can thus reject Marti’s answer by 
simply asserting that no procedure-independent criterion is necessary since Longino’s second 
procedural condition alone can eliminate the case of group polarization by describing it as 
epistemically unfair. Finally, Longino’s fourth condition asks for tempered equality of intellectual 
authority. This means that every person should have an equal (effective) ability to participate in 
deliberative process. Since we are discussing public deliberation, and in the context of reasonable 
pluralism there is a variety of propositions, theories and perspectives that can be asserted, it seems 
impossible to have a public deliberation of completely like-minded persons. While comparing it 
with his position, Estlund himself writes that in fair deliberative proceduralism " [...] inputs are not 
merely to be tallied: they are first to be considered and accommodated by other participants, and, 
likewise, revised in view of the arguments of others." (Estlund 1997: 178) It seems that even 
according to Estlund’s version of fair deliberative proceduralism group polarization is not a good 
answer to Peter’s objection, since his version of fair deliberative proceduralism is immune to 
Marti’s answer as well. Group polarization is a problem that targets the third feature of what Joshua 
Cohen calls the standard account of epistemic democracy—the requirement that individuals should 
adjust their beliefs in the light of the available evidence. Since the movement toward the extreme in 
group polarization is not driven by new or better arguments (evidence), it fails to satisfy this 
requirement. However, the debate between Estlund and Peter is not about the third, but about the 
first feature of the standard account of epistemic democracy—the question is whether an 
independent standard of correct decision exists and whether the approximation of correctness is 
necessary for legitimacy. This is why Marti’s argument fails to answer Peter’s objection; group 
polarization can be an argument against some forms of deliberation, but it fails when confronted 
with legitimacy-generating procedural requirements imposed by Peter and Longino. We can have a 
procedure without procedure-independent standard of correctness that can nonetheless resist the 
argument of group polarization. It can resist group polarization by asserting that it represents an 
unfair state in which decision-making process takes places, and the procedure therefore does not 
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have legitimacy-generating potential, not because of the bad quality of its results, but because of 
unfair (purely procedural) conditions in which the decision-making took place.  
 I believe there can be an alternative response to Peter’s second objection. Her argument 
stresses that the standard account of epistemic democracy makes unnecessary demands; it is 
unnecessary to make a distinction between fair (or pure) deliberative proceduralism and (rational) 
epistemic deliberative proceduralism since it is quite clear that both positions will have potential to 
bring about correct (or at least unbiased) outcomes. It is almost inconceivable to think of a fair 
deliberative procedure that, as its result, will have a biased outcome. However, I believe this cannot 
be a serious objection since scholars arguing for the standard account of epistemic democracy 
emphasize the same idea. Estlund thus writes that "[...] post-deliberative voting probably has 
considerable (instrumental ) epistemic value", however the problem is that " [...] fair deliberative 12
proceduralism must be indifferent between it and a coin flip." (Estlund 1997: 179) The idea that 
every deliberative procedure that incorporates the third feature of Cohen’s epistemic democracy (i.e. 
represents a process of adjustment of beliefs, requiring from individuals to adjust their beliefs in 
light of the available evidence) has an instrumental epistemic value seems uncontestable. The 
question remains whether this epistemic feature of public deliberation should play a role when 
determining legitimacy of decisions produced by it. Following fair deliberative proceduralism, 
instrumental epistemic value of the procedure should be of no importance when evaluating its 
legitimacy-generating potential. The problem is that fair deliberative proceduralism must then be 
indifferent between post-deliberative voting and post-deliberative coin flip . If we take into 13
consideration only intrinsic epistemic value of public deliberation when discussing political 
legitimacy (i.e. if we claim that public deliberation has instrumental epistemic value, but that this 
instrumental epistemic value is not important for political legitimacy of a procedure), then it makes 
no difference for us between post-deliberative voting and post-deliberative coin flip. If we prefer 
post-deliberative voting to post-deliberative coin-flip, it cannot be because of the intrinsic 
(procedural) value of public deliberation (both decision-making procedures have this intrinsic value 
 Fabienne Peter makes a useful distinction between instrumental and procedural epistemic value (Peter 2012). 12
Instrumental epistemic value of a procedure regards its ability to increase or decrease the accuracy of the beliefs of the 
participants. When he writes about epistemic value of a procedure, Estlund thinks exclusively on its instrumental 
qualities. On the other hand, procedural epistemic value is typically captured in terms of mutual accountability, equal 
respect and relationship of reciprocity. In Democratic Legitimacy, Peter wants to constitute political legitimacy on 
procedural epistemic value.
 Estlund uses the coin flip argument because he takes it for a fair decision-making procedure with no epistemic value 13
(Estlund 2009: 18). There is a reason to believe that Peter would not consider coin flip as a fair procedure. However, no 
additional argumentation supporting this idea can be found in her book (Peter 2009). It seems, nonetheless, that she has 
to include it in her second argument against Estlund in order to adequately challenge his position.
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to the same extent), but because of its instrumental value (we believe that post-deliberative voting 
will produce better outcomes than coin-flip). Fair deliberative proceduralism is a bad position not 
because it involves deliberation with no instrumental epistemic value (Peter clearly states that 
public deliberation has an instrumental value), but because it places insufficient emphasis on its 
instrumental epistemic value when determining legitimacy conditions. Procedure-independent 
standard of correctness can be a good reason for arguing against coin flip and for public deliberation 
as a legitimate decision-making procedure.  
Objection 3: Standard Account of Epistemic Democracy is Normatively Misleading 
The third and final objection emphasizes that the standard account of epistemic democracy is 
normatively misleading (Peter 2009: 135). While proponents of the standard account treat 
democratic process as having knowledge-producing potential, they do not have a convincing 
account of what the epistemic value of sustained democratic deliberation is. Their position relies on 
the constructive function of democratic decision-making, but does not have a good account of this 
function. Standard account of epistemic democracy reduces deliberation to a process of selecting a 
particular outcome—it does not acknowledge the learning process that deliberative democracy 
enables. Deliberation contributes to how participants form their preferences and how the political 
agenda is determined, but defenders of the standard account of epistemic democracy see it only as 
means for coming to a correct decision. They fail to acknowledge the intrinsic (moral and 
epistemic) value of public deliberation.  
 This argument makes two related points against the standard account of epistemic 
democracy. First, it emphasizes the lack of adequate account of constructive function of democratic 
decision-making. Second, it claims that the standard account overstresses the epistemic function of 
deliberation as a selection device, simultaneously neglecting the learning process that collective 
deliberation enables. Both can be summarized in the following way: if we could find a semiperfect 
coin, one that brings about correct decisions in vast majority of cases (not always, yet still more 
often than deliberative democratic procedure), following the standard account of epistemic 
democracy we would have to characterize it as a valid legitimacy-generating procedure. It is fair, 
after all, since all the members of a political constituency have an equal chance to influence the 
final outcome (i.e. no chance at all), and it is epistemically superior to a deliberative democratic 
procedure. Peter wants to challenge the latter idea; semiperfect coin may have a greater 
instrumental epistemic value than collective deliberation, but it does not have a superior procedural 
epistemic value. This is a very plausible idea and one has to acknowledge this as a flaw in the 
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standard account of epistemic democracy. However, I believe that there is a reason why this ‘flaw’ 
was included in the account.  
 In a world characterized by reasonable pluralism deep commitments and values of the 
members of a democratic community are in a constant moral conflict. When their values and moral 
commitments are challenged or threatened, citizens want a good reason why they should 
acknowledge the legitimacy of a certain policy, law or political decision. Both rational and pure 
epistemic proceduralism agree that no substantive reason can do this task; deep pluralism renders 
the consensus on substantive reasons impossible. Furthermore, both positions agree that only 
procedural reasons can be used when arguing for the legitimacy of a certain decision. A decision is 
legitimate because it is produced by a legitimacy-generating procedure, not because of the 
substantive qualities of the decision itself. The distinction between their accounts comes in when we 
have to decide what are the features of a legitimacy-generating procedure; the standard account 
claims that such a procedure should be evaluated due to a procedure-independent standard, the 
(substantive) quality of outcomes it produces, while Peter defines the legitimacy-generating 
procedure as a procedure that satisfies certain purely procedural standards (one of such standards 
can be knowledge-producing potential of a procedure).  
 When facing a law or political decision that regards their deep commitments and values, 
citizens want it to be correct. Since these issues play an important role in their moral lives, they 
don’t want them to be regulated by a law that itself has no substantive epistemic value. However, 
they cannot agree upon a law that all will have a substantive reason to accept. The best they can get 
is a procedural reason to acknowledge the legitimacy of a law regulating these important issues; 
however, in order to be acceptable, this procedural reason will have to guarantee some kind of 
substantive epistemic quality of the outcome . It seems that, when facing a moral dilemma of great 14
importance (affirmative action, abortion, LGBT rights etc.), citizens would rather embrace and 
consider as a source of legitimate decisions a fair procedure that has a significant chance of 
producing correct answer than a procedure that emphasizes the learning process  while neglecting 15
the (substantive) epistemic value of its outcomes.  
 Detailed argumentation on the importance of truth when considering important moral issues can be found in Robert 14
Talisse's Democracy and Moral Conflict (Talisse 2009)
 Furthermore, 'learning process' emphasized by Peter and Longino has nothing to do with consequentialist 15
epistemology. This implies that the learning process is not a process of improving our beliefs and making them more 
true or correct, but a process of making them better related to normative epistemic practices in our community (Peter 
2009, Longino 2002).
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2.2.e. Conclusion 
Epistemic democracy still represents a contested position, with arguments raised both against its 
normative content and its utopian form. This part of the chapter, set deep inside the debate on 
epistemic democracy, differentiates between two important conceptions of epistemic proceduralism, 
trying to detect the one better supported by reasons and arguments. Pure Epistemic Proceduralism 
locates the legitimacy-generating potential of a decision-making procedure in its intrinsic 
(procedural) epistemic qualities, while Rational Epistemic Proceduralism (the standard account of 
epistemic democracy) locates this potential in the procedure’s instrumental (outcome-oriented) 
epistemic qualities. Building on proceduralist and hybrid epistemology that rejects the idea of 
procedure-independent truth, pure epistemic proceduralism fails to give sufficient foundations for 
the epistemic evaluation of democratic practices, making epistemic practices arbitrary. The standard 
account of epistemic democracy is, on the other hand, capable of answering this objection, thus 
representing the stronger version of epistemic proceduralism. 
2.3. PURE DELIBERATIVE PROCEDURALISM  
One way of defending Pure Proceduralism is by referring to some political ideal whose content and 
implementation will be contested in the conditions of reasonable pluralism. Since we cannot 
reasonably agree on whether certain result or end state represents an adequate realization of this 
ideal, we should conclude that the quality of results or end states should not influence the 
legitimacy-generating potential of procedures that produced them. This ideal end state is often a 
certain ideal distribution of resources, one on which we will certainly not be able to agree in the 
conditions of reasonable pluralism. Since we cannot agree on whether a certain end state represents 
an adequate realization of some ideal, we can try to find public agreement in a certain collective 
decision-making procedure that realizes this ideal. Consequently, all decisions produced by this 
collective decision-making procedure will be legitimate because all can reasonably see that the 
procedure is an adequate realization of the desired ideal. This is a form of Pure Proceduralism—
political decisions are legitimate because (and only because) they are the product of a procedure 
that represents a realization of a certain political ideal. There is nothing outside the procedure that 
we use to evaluate the legitimacy of decisions or the legitimacy-generating potential of the 
procedure (no appeal to the quality of results or end states).  
 Thomas Christiano's position is probably one of the best examples of this argumentative 
strategy: he uses an egalitarian argument based on the principle of public equality to demonstrate 
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that, since we cannot have public agreement on desirable end states, we should focus on the internal 
qualities of decision-making procedures in order to establish their legitimacy-generating potential. 
In this part of the chapter I shall use Christiano's position to demonstrate that this is not a good 
argumentative strategy—the principle of public equality will, at least to a certain degree, 
incorporate the quality of results or end states produced by collective decision-making procedures 
in order to evaluate their legitimacy-generating potential. Consequently, arguments based on the 
principle of public equality and other similar principles will not support Pure Proceduralism, but 
instead some version of Rational Proceduralism. 
2.3.a. Introduction 
What makes a collective decision (i.e. a decision that affects and is bounding on all members of a 
political community) legitimate? We usually try to answer this question by referring to certain 
qualities a decision has. Some claim that substantive qualities of a decision constitute its legitimacy 
(Arneson 2003a 2003b, Wall 2007). According to this instrumentalist position, if a decision is true, 
correct or just (or represents a realization of a true, correct or just ideal), it is legitimate. Even more 
so, such a decision is legitimate because it is true, correct or just. A more compelling version of this 
position might introduce a procedure as a legitimizing element, but the procedure itself will be 
justified solely on its ability to produce true or just decisions, or to bring about a desired end state 
(one that is perceived as good or just). Faced with conditions of reasonable pluralism where people 
can, acting in good faith and employing their epistemic capabilities to the best of their abilities, 
reasonably hold different decisions to be correct or just, and different end states to be good or 
desirable, many scholars have rejected the idea that the substantive qualities of a decision can 
constitute its legitimacy. They decided to focus on procedural (and not substantive) qualities of the 
decision in question—we can say whether a decision is legitimate or not by examining the process 
by which it was made (proceduralism). They do not evaluate a decision-making procedure by its 
ability to produce some desired (just or true) end state, but instead by it being run in a certain 
desired (fair or epistemically favorable) state. It is no longer what the procedure will produce as an 
outcome, but how will this outcome be produced. Consequently, substantively untrue, incorrect or 
unjust decision can be legitimate if it is produced by a legitimacy-generating decision-making 
process, one that focuses on the fairness (or some other intrinsic quality) of the procedure, and not 
on the substantive qualities of the outcomes it produces.  
 Many will see this move as a retreat from substance—by disregarding the substantive 
qualities of a collective decision, we neglect the outcomes of a political process and focus only on 
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its intrinsic value. According to pure proceduralism, there are no procedure-independent criteria for 
evaluating legitimacy of collective decisions or the legitimacy-generating potential of procedures 
creating them. David Estlund rejected this idea by claiming that we can have a form of non-pure 
proceduralism that takes into consideration both the fairness of the procedure and the quality of the 
decisions produced by a decision-making process when assessing its legitimacy-generating 
potential. He named this position epistemic proceduralism (Estlund 1997: 174), and distinguished it 
from other purely procedural (monistic) positions, including fair proceduralism and fair deliberative 
proceduralism .  16
Table 2.2. 
In discussions on democratic legitimacy, Christiano's position is often characterized as a monistic 
position, i.e. a strong and persuasive version of fair deliberative proceduralism (Estlund 1997, 2009, 
Peter 2005, 2010). Developing very complex, but, nonetheless, well-structured argument, 
Christiano founds both the authority of democracy and its limits in the principle of public equality. 
This principle, together with the demands of social justice, requires a collective decision-making 
process for the whole society, one in which each person has by right an equal say in the collective 
decision-making (Christiano 2008). Democracy is thus seen as a realization of public equality in 
 A further distinction between rational and pure epistemic proceduralism is introduced by Fabienne Peter. She calls 16
Estlund's position Rational Epistemic Proceduralism, and describes it as a non-monistic position that relies on both 
fairness of the procedure and the procedure-independent quality of outcomes when establishing political legitimacy. 
Peter calls her own position Pure Epistemic Proceduralism—she claims that a procedure can have epistemic qualities 
that are not procedure-independent and outcome-oriented (e.g. epistemic fairness), and that these qualities are sufficient 
for establishing the procedure's legitimacy-generating feature. Though this is a form of epistemic democracy, it is 
claimed to be purely procedural (monistic) since no procedure-independent standards have been introduced (Peter 
2009). 
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When assessing the legitimacy-generating potential of a 
procedure, we focus on: 
State in which a decision-
making procedure takes place
State that is the result of a 
decision-making procedure
MONISTIC  
POSITIONS
Instrumentalism No Yes
Pure (Fair) 
Proceduralism
Yes No
NON-
MONISTIC 
POSITIONS
Rational 
Proceduralism
Yes Yes
collective decision-making. The presented case for democracy is non-instrumental, and the quality 
of outcomes produced by a democratic decision-making process does not constitute or in any way 
influence the legitimacy-generating features of that decision-making process.  
 I have some doubts regarding the abovementioned characterization of Christiano's position. 
Namely, I argue that the quality of political decisions produced by a democratic decision-making 
process should play an important (though not decisive) role in Christiano's argument. Consequently, 
it seems to me that his case for democracy should be (at least somewhat) instrumental, i.e. that he 
should reject Pure Proceduralism and accept some form of Rational Proceduralism. In order to 
elaborate this claim, in the first part I present some of the important premises of Christiano's 
argument. I also relate the original text with notable interpretations by Estlund and Peter, pointing 
out the parts that indicate that Christiano's position is a form of fair deliberative proceduralism. In 
the second part, I consider four cases from Christiano's The Constitution of Equality that show how 
outcomes of democratic procedures are very important to Christiano. Furthermore, I argue that 
these outcomes are so important that, when deciding between two or more fair decision-making 
procedures, one that produces the best outcomes should be considered legitimate. This is closely 
related to Christiano's idea of the fundamental value of well-being, as well as to the principle of 
public equality. I end by concluding that Christiano should reject Pure Proceduralism and 
characterize his position as a form of Rational Proceduralism. One cannot use argumentative 
strategy employed by Christiano and try to defend Pure Proceduralism.  
2.3.b. Christiano's Argument for Democracy 
Christiano offers a very detailed argumentation and any attempt to summarize it unavoidably risks 
omitting some of the important parts of the argument. I will nonetheless try to summarize some key 
concepts relevant for further discussion, emphasizing once more that many important ideas will 
unfortunately be omitted.  
 Christiano starts his argument by defining human beings as authorities in the realm of value, 
and well-being as a happy exercise of this distinctive authority. We honor this authority by 
promoting the well-being of human beings, and since every person represents an authority in the 
realm of value, well-being is due each person. Christiano than introduces two basic ideas about 
justice: the principle of propriety (each person should receive his or her due) and the generic 
principle of justice (relevantly alike cases should be treated alike, and relatively unlike cases 
unlike). Since human beings all have essentially the same basic capabilities to be authorities in the 
realm of value (there is no morally relevant difference), well-being should be distributed and 
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promoted equally by the institutions of society (principle of equality). Furthermore, since well-
being should be cherished and promoted, we should favor those states of equality with more well-
being, and even states of inequality where everyone's well-being is promoted better than in some 
other state of equality (though this does not imply that such state of inequality is just).  
Diagram 2.1.
#  
The principle of equality, furthermore, grounds the idea that equality should be publicly recognized 
by all human beings—everyone must be able to see that he or she is treated as equal. However, 
there are certain facts about citizens and society that make this very difficult. We have diverse 
interests and often cannot perceive or understand interests of others, we are often cognitively biased 
and more sensitive to our own interests than those of others, and finally, we even tend to differently 
interpret the idea or the demands of equality. We thus cannot agree whether some political decision 
substantively respects the demands of the principle of equality, i.e. whether it equally promotes the 
well-being of all persons. If someone still tries to impose the conception of equality he believes to 
be a correct one, he or she will, because of the abovementioned facts about citizens and society, set 
back the interests and well-being of those who are imposed upon. From this Christiano concludes 
that it is impossible to achieve equality without equal participation of all citizens in a public 
decision-making process. Democracy is seen as an essential component of public realization of 
equality (other essential components are liberal rights and decent economic minimum), and is 
therefore intrinsically just. They are public realization of equality because we can (despite the 
abovementioned facts about citizens and society) reach agreement on democracy, liberal rights and 
decent economic minimum from the egalitarian standpoint, and we cannot do the same for justice of 
the outcomes of the democratic decision-making or the goodness of the exercise of our liberal rights 
(Christiano 2008). We thus have public substantive reasons for accepting democracy, liberal rights 
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and economic minimum, and we have public procedural reasons for accepting the authority of a 
particular democratic decision and particular exercise of liberal rights. Since substantive reasons for 
democratic procedures do not regard some ideal end state (ideal equality cannot be a desired end 
state since we cannot agree upon what ideal equality is) or the quality of the outcomes of a decision-
making process (we cannot agree on the quality of the outcomes either), democracy is non-
instrumentally justified.  
 This line of argumentation has led many scholars to interpret Christiano's position as a form 
of Fair Deliberative Proceduralism. Estlund classifies Christiano's position this way in more than 
one occasion (Estlund 1997: 200; 2009: 244), sometimes referring to it as Publicly Equal 
Proceduralism. Peter supports this classification, further stressing that, according to Christiano, 
substantive quality of outcomes of political decisions does not play any role in legitimizing the 
decision-making procedure or the decisions themselves.  
According to Pure Deliberative Proceduralism, legitimacy is ensured as long as the demands of 
procedural fairness are satisfied. In analogy to Pure Aggregative Proceduralism, outcomes do not matter 
for political legitimacy under the regime of Pure Deliberative Proceduralism. All that matters for 
democratic legitimacy in such a regime is that collective decision-making proceeds through public 
deliberation among all those affected under conditions of political equality. This view is defended by 
Thomas Christiano [...] (Peter 2007: 340-341) 
Some scholars disagree with the presented classification: Marti argues that Christiano's view is an 
easy case of a mixed position that combines intrinsic with instrumental values (Marti 2006: 37), and 
Rostbøll points out that, by relying on a kind of instrumentalism about democratic institutions, 
Christiano's argument for democracy cannot avoid invoking procedure-independent epistemic 
standards (Rostbøll 2015: 272-274). I fully agree with Marti and Rostbøll, and in the rest of the 
chapter I shall try to further support this interpretation of Christiano's work. His position, I believe, 
should give at least some weight to the substantive quality of decisions produced by a collective 
decision-making process when discussing the legitimacy of political decisions and legitimacy-
generating features of collective decision-making procedures. 
  
2.3.c. Why Should Outcomes Be Important for Christiano's Position? 
Though the importance of the quality of outcomes of political decisions can partly be assumed from 
the first parts of Christiano's argument, it is later in the argument that we can more clearly see how 
outcomes can be important for the legitimacy of political decisions. In this part of the chapter I shall 
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discuss four separate cases taken from Christiano's argument that, when properly understood, point 
out why the outcomes of a collective decision-making procedure are important for its legitimacy-
generating potential. Before that, however, we should focus on the reason why Christiano, in the 
first part of his argument, claims that democracy is (solely) non-instrumentally justified, and 
consequently, why outcomes and end states should not play any role in its justification (Christiano 
1996, 2008).  
 Democracy, as a public realization of equality, is intrinsically just. It is important to note, 
however, that this does not exclude that democracy can be instrumentally justified as well. Estlund's 
view is a clear example of such position; democracy is intrinsically justified because it is a fair 
procedure, and it is instrumentally justified because of its epistemic qualities (to be more precise, its 
truth-tracking potential) (Estlund 2008). Christiano's position rests to a great extent on the intrinsic 
justification of democracy—however, claiming that Christiano should include instrumental 
justification of democracy does not, in any way, undermine its intrinsic justification.  
 Christiano is, however, not willing to include the instrumental qualities of democracy in its 
justification. Namely, by introducing instrumental qualities in the process of justification, the 
justification will no longer be public because some of the reasonable citizens will not be able to 
recognize or approve these instrumental qualities. To say that a decision-making procedure is 
instrumentally justified implies that there is some intrinsically valuable end state that the use of this 
procedure helps bring about (Christiano 2008). Consequently, when we say that a decision-making 
procedure is instrumentally justified, we are implying that we know what this intrinsically valuable 
end state (one that the procedures helps us achieve) is. However, because of facts of judgment, we 
do not agree and cannot agree on what this intrinsically valuable end state is. Instrumental 
justification of democracy (one that rests on a certain end state that democracy helps achieve) 
cannot therefore be public since there is no public agreement on such valuable end state. 
Instrumentalist accounts of Richard Arneson and Steven Wall are what Christiano has in mind when 
he rejects the instrumental justification of democracy. Both Arneson and Wall refer to some ideal 
egalitarian distribution as a desirable (intrinsically valuable) end state. The legitimacy-generating 
potential of decision-making procedures and the legitimacy of decisions made by them depend on 
how closely these decisions approximate the ideal egalitarian distribution (Arneson 2003, Arneson 
2003b, Wall 2007). Since there is no public agreement on this ideal egalitarian distribution (not 
everyone can see that he or she is treated as equal), by imposing this conception of equality we will 
set back the interests and well-being of those who are imposed upon. We cannot have a public 
instrumental justification of democracy when we do not have a public agreement on the intrinsic 
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value of the desired end state that democracy is supposed to achieve (Christiano 2008).  
 I think Christiano is right when he rejects instrumentalist positions of Arneson and Wall. 
However, I claim that there can be public agreement on the value of some end states, and 
furthermore, that Christiano's argument presupposes this agreement at several important points. In 
the rest of this part of the chapter I discuss four such examples. 
(i) Leveling-down Objection 
Equality is, as we have seen, very important for Christiano. This makes his position (as well as any 
other egalitarian position) vulnerable to a famous leveling-down objection. This intuitive objection 
shows that the principle of equality can have extremely implausible implications. The objection 
invites us to imagine two alternative states: S1 and S2. In S1, everyone is equally well-off, while in 
S2 everyone is better than in S1, but some are better-off than others. According to some, the fact 
that the principle of equality would favor S1 represents a departure from equality. It would, then, 
imply that we should make everyone worse-off. Proponents of leveling-down objection then 
conclude that there must be something wrong with the principle of equality.  
Table 2.3. 
Furthermore, if we introduce an alternative state S3, in which everyone is equally well-off, and 
everyone is better-off than in S1, it might seem that the principle of equality should be indifferent 
towards S1 and S3. They both represent states of equal distribution of well-being, and from the 
standpoint of equality there is no relevant difference between them. Christiano disagrees with this 
conclusion, pointing out that egalitarians should prefer S3 to S1. He rightfully claims that there is 
an internal connection between rationale for equality and the value of relevant fundamental good 
that is equalized. People are indifferent to quantitative distribution of letters in their names, mostly 
because a necessary condition for equality mattering is that it is better to have more than less of the 
thing being equalized (Christiano 2008). Importance of well-being is thus built in the principle of 
equality, and so egalitarians should differentiate between S1 and S3 (i.e. egalitarians should favor 
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S1 S2 S3
A 2 3 5
B 2 7 5
S3). Christiano continues his argumentation by claiming that egalitarians must acknowledge that S2 
fails justice, though this does not imply that they should prefer S1 to S2. Namely, S1 also fails 
justice (even more than S2, though S1 is a state of equality) by failing to address the principle of 
well-being, an essential component of the principle of equality. Of course, S3 is superior to both S1 
and S2, and if S3 is not feasible, than we must favor state of inequality in which everyone is better-
off than in the state of best feasible equality (Christiano 2008).  
  Though Christiano introduces very detailed and valuable argumentation for the discussions 
on equality, the key point for the purpose of this chapter is that S3 is better than S1 (and this follows 
from the principle of equality). We can, at least at this abstract level, say that one state of affairs is 
better (or more just) than the other.  
 Now consider two alternative decision-making procedures: P1 and P3 are egalitarian 
procedures that give every person equal chance to participate in a decision-making process. They 
are both fair procedures, and it might even seem that they are both intrinsically justified as public 
realizations of equality (everyone can see that he or she is treated as an equal). However, the well-
being produced by P1 is considerably lesser than well-being produced by P3. This can be for many 
reasons, but let us say that this is because P3 is better in organizing the existing virtues and good 
qualities of the people in a way that promotes their well-being . Since S3, end state produced by 17
P3, is better in improving the well-being of each citizen, it should be favored by the principle of 
well-being over S1 (produced by P1), and consequently favored by the principle of equality. It 
seems that, considering the principle of equality, P3 should be favored over P1, though they are 
both fair and both give each citizen an equal chance to participate in the decision-making process 
and influence the final decision. However, P1 and P3 have the same purely procedural qualities —18
what differentiates them is their ability to produce a state that improves the well-being of citizens, 
i.e. the difference between P1 and P3 is not in the procedural fairness, but in the substantive quality 
 This is a variation of Mill's second criteria for legitimacy of any form of government (Mill 1977).17
 This does not imply that all qualities the two procedures have are the same. If that were the case, it would not be 18
possible to explain why the results they have produced are different. The two procedures have the same relevant purely 
procedural qualities (e.g. they give everyone an equal chance to participate in decision-making process). We refer to 
these qualities as purely procedural since they are intrinsically justified. The difference can be in other qualities (e.g. 
whether the procedure incorporates the division of labor, whether decisions are made by pre-deliberation or post-
deliberation voting), but these qualities are not intrinsically, but instrumentally justified. There is nothing 'good in itself' 
in division of labor or public deliberation—these qualities are considered good because of the good outcomes they 
produce. The problem with fair proceduralism is that it must remain indifferent towards these qualities, since it 
attributes legitimacy-generating potential only to intrinsically justified qualities. So the problem is that it focuses only 
on intrinsic qualities of a procedure (e.g. those in the square on the sketch below), and not on other relevant 
(instrumentally justified) qualities of a procedure (e.g. those outside of the square on the sketch below). For a fair 
proceduralist there is no relevant difference between procedures P1 and P3 because a fair proceduralists characterize 
only certain intrinsic qualities as 'relevant'. 
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of the outcomes they produce. It seems that the outcomes of political decisions should play a certain 
role in constituting the legitimacy-generating potential of the procedures that have produced them, 
and it also seems that this claim is supported by the principle of equality.  
 One way of answering this objection is claiming that S1 and S3 are very abstract states: 
society is not divided in two well-distinguished groups and the well-being of individuals is not 
possible to measure that easily. If we try to put these states in political practice, specifying them by 
various laws, policies and resources that are distributed, the idea that S3 is better than S1 would fail 
the publicity test. Because of the facts of judgment, not everyone would think of S3 as better in 
improving the well-being than S1, and referring to end states S1 and S3 could not be a public 
justification of P1 or P3. Christiano's answer to leveling-down objection should then be seen as a 
theoretical project without any direct consequences on real-life laws and policies . It seems to me, 19
however, that that would not be a correct interpretation. When Christiano discusses the quality of 
decisions produced by equal lotteries or coin-flipping, or when he argues in favor of deliberative 
and representative democracy, he seems to be endorsing the idea that these practices are somehow 
better in increasing the well-being of citizens, and this seems to follow from the public principle of 
equality. Let us then discuss the remaining three cases to support this claim. 
(ii) Christiano Rejects Equal Lotteries 
If procedural fairness is the only criterion for the legitimacy-generating potential of a decision-
making procedure (i.e. if the only relevant state is one in which decision-making process takes 
place, and not the one that is an outcome of such a decision-making process), there is more than one 
procedure that can satisfy it. Coin-flipping can be one such procedure: if we flip a coin every time 
we have to make a political decision, we seem to be using a fair decision-making procedure, since 
 Though I agree that, because of facts of judgment, we cannot have public agreement on some important moral issues 19
and issues regarding our well-being, I believe there can be an important difference between S1 and S3 that everyone 
should (despite facts of judgment) be able to perceive. In order to elaborate this difference, we can use results gathered 
by Democracy Ranking Association which produces an annual global ranking of democracies. According to the ranking, 
democracy consists of six dimensions (one political, five non-political), with different weights for the overall quality of 
democracy. Their weights are distributed accordingly: politics (or the political system) 50%; gender (gender equality in 
socioeconomic and educational terms) 10%; economy (or the economic system) 10%; knowledge (knowledge society, 
research and education) 10%; health (or the health system and health status) 10%; and environment (environmental 
sustainability) 10% (Campbell and Sükösd 2002). The first dimension (politics) focuses on procedural fairness of a 
democratic system (whether everyone has a right to participate in decision-making process, whether there are 
discriminated individuals or groups of people), while other five focus on results or outcomes of the political process 
(these results, like economy, knowledge, health and environment, are very important for the well-being of persons). We 
can imagine situations when two countries have the same score for politics, but differ significantly regarding other five 
dimensions. This is exactly the situation with S1 and S3: they both respect procedural fairness and give every citizen 
equal chance to participate in decision-making, but the results that affect the well-being of people (economy, health, 
education, environment) are different because of some other qualities of decision-making procedures (e.g. whether they 
implement division of labor and encourage public deliberation). I believe Christiano acknowledges this when he 
discusses and rejects direct and aggregative democracy.
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everyone has an equal chance to influence the final decision, i.e. no chance at all (Nelson 1980, 
Estlund 2008). We can also randomly select one person who will make a political decision that will 
be binding on all of us, or we can have a voting system where a single vote is randomly selected to 
be decisive. In all of these cases, everyone has an equal chance to influence the final decision (equal 
chance to be selected as a 'queen for a day', or equal chance that his or her vote will be selected as 
decisive) (Estlund 2008). It seems that all these procedures stand in accordance with the principle of 
public equality; everyone is treated as an equal, and everyone can see and accept that. 
 Democracy is a fair decision-making procedure as well—but why should we favor 
democracy over coin-flipping, queen for a day or equal lotteries? Christiano is convinced there is a 
relevant difference between these procedures: fair but non-democratic decision-making procedures 
represent a very thin form of equality that does not go beyond initial distribution. They all fail to 
realize equality adequately (Christiano 2008). Christiano introduces an analogous case of 
substituting equal distribution of chance for material resources for equal distribution of resources 
(Christiano 2008: 108-112). This is a very useful analogy that points out that, when we can publicly 
determine what an equal distribution is (as we can with wages), results and end states are very 
important. Furthermore, principle of public equality directs us to use a distributing mechanism that 
will produce a desired outcome or end state, and it directs us to use a decision-making procedure 
that will produce the same desired outcome or end state. Democracy will be better in achieving this 
desired end state (equality of well-being) than equal lotteries or coin-flipping, just like equal 
distribution of resources will be better in achieving the same end state than equal chance for 
material resources. In democracy, Christiano claims, equality does reach beyond initial distribution 
because people have capacities to negotiate, deliberate and exchange political power, ‘and these are 
activities that are highly advantageous to all the participants’ (Christiano 2008: 110). The main 
problem with lotteries is that they do not enable us to engage in deliberation, negotiation and 
exchange, i.e. in activities that help us improve our interests and our well-being. One could argue 
that deliberation, negotiation and exchange are advantageous from the standpoint of procedural 
equality (Peter 2011, Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 2000), but Christiano rejects this idea, first 
when he rejects tradable equal chances at wages (Christiano 2008: 109), and then when he argues 
that public deliberation is instrumentally justified (Christiano 2008: 192). Finally, Christiano admits 
the importance of outcomes when he rejects equal lotteries:  
In an egalitarian system of decision-making one would want the agenda for decision-making to be 
determined in an egalitarian way as well since this is crucial to the outcome of decision-making. 
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(Christiano 2008: 111, [emphasis added]) 
It seems that the argument against equal lotteries and other fair but non-democratic decision making 
procedures is (at least partly) outcome based—even if they give every person equal chance to 
influence the final decision, they do not produce outcomes as good as democracy. 
(iii) Christiano Rejects Direct Democracy 
As we have seen in the earlier case, Christiano rejects coin-flipping, equal lotteries and other fair 
but non-democratic decision-making procedures. He claims that democracy is the only adequate 
public realization of equality. However, democracy is not a single, precisely defined decision-
making procedure; there are many forms of democracy and many different decision-making 
procedures can be referred to as democratic. Is there (and can there be) any relevant difference 
between these democratic decision-making procedures? How are we to decide which democratic 
decision-making procedure is the one that creates legitimate decisions? 
 Christiano accepts a form of representative democracy, and argues that direct democracy 
should be rejected on the grounds of principle of equality. Some might find this very problematic. If 
equality is the basis for democracy, then a more equal but far less effective system of collective 
decision-making would be superior to an unequal system that was more effective at advancing 
everyone's interests. Christiano indirectly accepts the idea that direct democracy is more equal than 
representative democracy, but argues that the latter should be accepted because of its efficiency 
(Christiano 2008: 104-105). This efficiency is the product of the division of (epistemic) labor in 
modern states—citizens are thus to define the aims the society is to pursue, while legislators 
(political representatives and experts) are charged with a task of implementing and devising the 
means for those aims through legislation. Of course, requirement of political equality is met if (and 
only if) legislative assembly proportionately represents the aims citizens have chosen.  
 Even if there is some inequality under representative democracy (and more inequality than 
in direct democracy), it is still preferable on the principle of equality. Because of the division of 
labor, representative democracy will constitute a Pareto improvement over direct democracy. 
Consequently, representative democracy would be more just even if direct democracy would be 
more equal. The advantages of the division of labor are so clear that this can qualify as a publicly 
clear improvement (Christiano 2008: 105).  
 When we evaluate the legitimacy-generating potential of representative and direct 
democracy, Christiano claims that we should, at least partly, focus on their ability to increase the 
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well-being of citizens (this follows from the principle of well-being, and consequently from the 
principle of equality). And this implies that we should focus on the procedure's ability to produce 
certain desirable outcomes and end states, and it is this ability that (at least to a certain degree) gives 
a decision-making procedure legitimacy-generating qualities. Representative democracy is thus (at 
least partly) instrumentally justified—it is better than direct democracy because of its ability to 
produce certain intrinsically valuable end state .  20
(iv) Christiano Rejects Aggregative Democracy 
In the previous case we have seen that, according to Christiano, representative democracy can be 
publicly justified and preferred from the standpoint of equality over direct democracy. However, we 
are faced with the same problem once again: there are various forms of representative democracy 
and, though we have narrowed the list of legitimacy-generating democratic procedures, we still 
have to select over different alternatives. It seems that interests of every person can be publicly 
treated equally in both aggregative and deliberative democracy. Do then both aggregative and 
deliberative model, as long as they are both representative and democratic, produce a legitimate 
decision? 
 Christiano disagrees—though it might seem that both procedures publicly treat everyone's 
interests equally, there are strong reasons for rejecting aggregative democracy. However, Christiano 
explicitly argues that these reasons are instrumental (Christiano 2008: 190-197). Deliberation is 
instrumentally justified because it improves the understanding of the interests of the members of 
community, it enables us to root out policies based on prejudices and it enhances certain desirable 
qualities in citizens (e.g. autonomy, morality and rationality). Furthermore, it helps us to promote 
some of our fundamental interests (e.g. correcting for cognitive biases in others and acquiring true 
 This chapter tries to demonstrate why Christiano should accept the idea that, from the standpoint of equality, 20
democracy is at least partly instrumentally justified. As I have noted earlier, I do not want to claim that democracy is 
solely instrumentally justified. However, Christiano's preference towards efficiency in improving the well-being of 
citizens can even lead some to argue that his view is actually an instrumentalist position. If the procedure's ability to 
produce a desirable end state is more important than its purely procedural fairness (its ability to treat everyone as an 
equal and give everyone an equal chance to influence the final decision), then Christiano can give a procedure this 
legitimacy-generating potential solely on the basis of its ability to produce good outcomes. This might be a view very 
similar to J.S. Mill's instrumentalist position—a form of government is justified only on the basis of its ability to 
improve the well-being of citizens, and democracy (or scholocracy) is thus better than monarchy (or epistemocracy) 
because it is better in detecting and satisfying interests and the well-being of the people (it is partly better in satisfying 
the interests of people because it improves moral and intellectual capabilities of people, but this improvement is again 
instrumentally justified because it helps us to produce better decisions and better improve our well-being). There is no 
doubt, however, that democracy is instrumentally justified. Furthermore, Mill also introduces the publicity requirement, 
especially when suggesting the plural voting proposal (Mill 1977). I do not want to press this analogy further in this 
chapter, though I believe that it could be expanded and might even lead us to conclude that Christiano is suggesting an 
instrumentalist position, something very different from fair deliberative proceduralism, as his position was characterized 
by Estlund and Peter. 
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and justified beliefs) that are used in the justification of democracy. This implies that we cannot 
consider these cases separately and argue that democracy is solely intrinsically, and deliberation 
solely instrumentally justified (as far as I can see, this is exactly what Christiano does) (Christiano 
2008: 71, 193), since the same argument is used to justify both of them, and deep down it is an 
instrumental argument (correcting for cognitive biases in others and acquiring true and justified 
beliefs are not, as far as I understand Christiano's argument, self-standing epistemic virtues , but 21
instead good means to achieve a desired end state, one with the greatest level of well-being for 
everyone).  
 Let us then summarize the second part of this chapter. Christiano argues that democracy is 
solely intrinsically justified since it is a public realization of equality, and argues that it cannot be 
instrumentally justified since that would include calling some end state intrinsically valuable, and 
we cannot have a public agreement on how that end state should look like (Christiano 2008: 71-74). 
He defends representative deliberative democracy and claims it is, from the standpoint of equality, 
superior to other fair decision-making procedures, including coin-flipping, queen for a day, equal 
lotteries, direct democracy and aggregative democracy. Representative deliberative democracy is 
superior because of its ability to produce desirable outcomes and end states, those with more well-
being for everyone. Furthermore, Christiano claims that this follows from the principle of public 
equality, since everyone can see not only that he or she is being treated as an equal, but also that 
representative deliberative democracy will be better in producing the desired end state (more well-
being for everyone) than other fair decision-making procedures. This is clearly a form of 
instrumental justification. It seems that, from the egalitarian standpoint and the principle of public 
equality, democracy is (at least partly) instrumentally justified. Consequently, democratic decisions 
are legitimate because of democracy's legitimacy-generating qualities, and these qualities include 
both its procedural fairness and its ability to produce good outcomes (to best improve the well-
being of all citizens).  
2.3.d. Conclusion 
This part of the chapter tries to show that Christiano's view should not be regarded as a monistic 
position in discussions on political legitimacy. Though many have described his position as a form 
of pure (fair) deliberative proceduralism, and though Christiano himself emphasizes that the results 
 Fabiene Peter would probably argue something like this. She calls her position Pure Epistemic Proceduralism since 21
she justifies deliberative democracy on the basis of its self-standing (purely procedural) epistemic values, and not on the 
basis of consequentialist epistemology (like Estlund and Christiano). (Peter 2011)
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or end states of decision-making procedures should not play any role in constituting their 
legitimacy-generating potential, it seems to me that a form of non-monism follows from the 
principle of public equality. Namely, the principle of well-being (which is an important element of 
the principle of public equality) asks us to evaluate the ability of decision-making procedures to 
improve the well-being of human beings. If there is more than one procedure that treats everyone as 
an equal, we should differentiate between them on the basis of their ability to improve our well-
being, as well as well-being of other human beings. I believe this is why Christiano rejects coin-
flipping, equal lotteries, direct and aggregative democracy (though they are all fair decision-making 
procedures) in favor of representative deliberative democracy. Quality of the outcomes (or end 
states) of political decisions thus seems to play an important role in constructing the legitimacy-
generating potential of a decision-making procedure, and this seems to follow from the principle of 
public equality. We thus cannot use Christiano's argument founded on the principle of public 
equality in order to defend Pure Proceduralism—the abovementioned principle supports Rational, 
and not Pure Proceduralism.  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CHAPTER III  
THE KNOWLEDGE TENET 
This chapter discusses the second tenet of the epistemic justification of decision-making 
procedures. More precisely, unlike the second chapter, the third one discusses positions that 
acknowledge the truth tenet and claim that political decisions can be correct or incorrect, true or 
false. Furthermore, these positions claim that the ability of a procedure to produce decisions and 
beliefs that have some procedure-independent (substantial) quality should play an important role in 
determining its legitimacy-generating potential. Some will take a monistic (instrumentalist) 
approach and claim that it is only the quality of the result that matters (pragmatist deliberative 
democracy here represented by Robert Talisse and Cheryl Misak), and some will take non-monistic 
approach and argue that both intrinsic (purely procedural) and instrumental (substantive) qualities 
of a procedure matter (Fabienne Peter's new account of democratic legitimacy). However, all 
positions discussed in this chapter accept the idea that substantive quality of outcomes represents a 
necessary (though not always sufficient) condition for legitimacy-generating potential of procedures 
that have produced them.  
 Positions that acknowledge the truth tenet but reject the knowledge tenet generally claim 
that, though there are procedure-independent standards (truths) in politics, there is no group of 
people who are better in producing decisions and beliefs that satisfy these procedure-independent 
standards. In other words, though political decisions might be right or wrong, no individual or 
group of people is better in making right decisions. There are no experts in politics. These positions 
endorse the idea of epistemic equality of all citizens, claiming that citizens should be regarded as 
epistemic peers (Talisse 2009a, Peter 2012). Some embrace the stronger interpretation of epistemic 
peerhood, according to which epistemic peers represent people who are equally likely to make a 
mistake (Elga 2007, Peter 2012), and some follow the weaker interpretation according to which 
epistemic peers represent people who owe reasons to each other (Talisse 2009a). Nonetheless, all 
positions discussed in this chapter embrace the idea of epistemic equality of citizens, as well as 
some form of epistemic peerhood that follows from it.  
 In the first part of this chapter I discuss pragmatist deliberative democracy, an 
instrumentalist position that perceives democracy as the best means to achieve the desired end, i.e. 
to honor our epistemic commitments and help us have true (or justified) beliefs. This position is 
discussed through the work of Robert Talisse and Cheryl Misak, American pragmatist philosophers 
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who argue that democracy can be justified solely by the appeal to our epistemic values and 
principles (Misak 2000, 2009, Talisse 2007, 2009a, 2009b). They claim that there are some basic 
epistemic principles that everyone can endorse, and one of these central principles is the idea that "a 
belief, in order to be a belief, is such that it is responsive to or answerable to reasons and 
evidence" (Misak 2004: 12), or the idea that "to believe p is to hold that p is supported by best 
arguments, reasons and evidence." (Talisse 2009a: 91) In other words, by having a belief we are 
committing ourselves to certain epistemic duties, like the duty to articulate the reasons and evidence 
that support our belief when someone asks us to do so, and the duty to enter the social process of 
reason-exchange. Pragmatist idea of epistemic peerhood implies that no one can avoid deliberation 
and refuse to present his or her reasons and evidence: we are epistemic peers we owe reasons to 
each other. Finally, these epistemic duties can only be performed under favorable political 
conditions, and since democracy (together with liberal rights of freedom of thought, speech, press 
and assembly) represents the best political arrangement for improving and upholding our epistemic 
duties and practices, it is instrumentally justified. 
  Though I recognize and acknowledge many advantages of this view, I do not think that it 
represents a convincing case for democratic legitimacy. First of all, I do not follow the pragmatist 
idea that, in order to be proper believers, we should constantly and actively search for and strive to 
listen to all arguments, reasons and evidence for and against some proposition. This commitment is 
too demanding: someone can be a proper believer and still (at least sometimes) refuse to deliberate 
with some individuals or groups. If these strong epistemic commitments do not follow from our 
basic epistemic principles (or at least not everyone can see that they follow), the pragmatist 
argument for democracy is seriously crippled. However, I think that the pragmatist account faces an 
even greater problem—namely, I do not think that these strong epistemic commitments (even if we 
grant them) can adequately justify democratic decision-making procedures. The pragmatist account 
presents a convincing argument for public deliberation, but not necessarily for democracy—some 
non-democratic procedures, such as Mill's scholocracy or consultative epistocracy that allow (or 
even encourage) deliberation, can follow from our strong epistemic commitments. In order to 
justify deliberative democracy and establish its legitimacy-generating potential we have to reject 
pragmatist instrumentalism and adopt some non-monistic position, one that acknowledges both the 
intrinsic (purely procedural) and instrumental (substantive) qualities of a decision-making 
procedure. Fabienne Peter's second-personal epistemic democracy, discussed in the second part of 
this chapter, is one such non-monistic position (Peter 2012, 2013).  
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 The second part of this chapter analyses Fabienne Peter's new account, here referred to as 
the second-personal epistemic democracy. This is a non-monistic position that emphasizes both the 
intrinsic (purely procedural) qualities of decision-making procedures and their instrumental 
(substantive) qualities. Unlike her earlier view, Peter now holds that the quality of the results is 
important for the legitimacy-generating potential of the decision-making procedure (Peter 2012, 
2013). However, just like her earlier view (and unlike the standard account of epistemic 
democracy), Peter claims that relevant purely procedural qualities of decision-making procedures 
are epistemic, and not moral in nature. Following Adam Elga, she introduces the strong 
interpretation of epistemic peerhood, claiming that epistemic peers are people who are equally 
likely to make a mistake (or to have a true or correct belief) (Elga 2007, Peter 2012). This 
introduces a strong version of epistemic equality: just like in the case of morality, epistemic 
authority of our peers becomes second-personal. We recognize our epistemic peers as sources of 
valid epistemic claims, and democracy is thus intrinsically (purely procedurally) justified since it 
represents a decision-making procedure that embodies epistemic equality (of course, it is justified 
instrumentally as well, since it helps us produce correct or true decisions).  
 I reject Peter's view, first by arguing that her introduction of second-personal authority is not 
appropriate for epistemology (epistemic authority is necessarily third-personal), and then by 
criticizing her strong version of epistemic peerhood. Namely, I claim that such a strong 
interpretation of epistemic peerhood might be appropriate for the academic, but is not appropriate 
for the political community. Our background and education at least partly define our ability to 
produce good (correct of true) beliefs. Since we have different backgrounds and education, we 
should expect people to more or less capable of producing good decisions. This does not imply that 
those who perform better should rule (that would be the authority tenet, and not the knowledge 
tenet). All that the knowledge tenet claims is that there are some individuals and groups that are 
better at producing correct decisions than other individuals or groups. In the final part of this 
chapter I argue that the knowledge tenet should be granted and that strong interpretation of 
epistemic peerhood should be rejected. We can make a convincing case for democracy by 
acknowledging the truth tenet and the knowledge tenet—all we have to do is to reject the authority 
tenet.  
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3.1. PRAGMATIST DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
The pragmatic account of deliberative democracy  represents an innovative approach to the 22
discussion on justification of democracy. This account generally takes instrumentalist form by 
claiming that political decisions are legitimate solely because they are the product of a truth-
tracking decision-making procedure. There are no relevant purely procedural qualities of democracy
—it has its legitimacy-generating potential because it represents the best means for achieving a 
desired end (i.e. having outcomes of considerate substantial and procedure-independent quality). 
The pragmatic account recognizes the truth tenet, but generally rejects the knowledge tenet. The 
argument is based on three central claims: (i) there are some fundamental epistemic principles that 
can be publicly recognized and endorsed by all reasonable citizens , (ii) there are some epistemic 23
duties and commitments that follow from these fundamental epistemic principles, and finally (iii) 
these epistemic duties and commitments introduce and justify deliberative and democratic decision-
making procedures.  
 Though I recognize and affirm the importance of the pragmatic account of deliberative 
democracy (and I used part of Talisse's argumentation to criticize Arendt's position in the second 
chapter), I reject part of the second and most of the third claim of the pragmatic deliberative 
democracy. I believe that knowledge tenet should be granted, and therefore that deliberative 
democracy cannot be justified solely on epistemic (instrumental) grounds.  
3.1.a. Introduction  
We live in a world characterized by the plurality of reasonable moral and religious comprehensive 
doctrines and conceptions of the good. That world is, at least partly, made possible by the 
democratic and liberal rights that guarantee every citizen certain liberties, including freedom of 
thought and conscience as well as freedom of speech, press and assembly. These liberties (and the 
absence of inquisition or some other coercive organization or mechanism that would limit them) 
support and facilitate the creation of pluralist societies, but also introduce the liberal criterion of 
 Matthew Festenstein introduced this common name for numerous accounts of democratic legitimacy that draw upon 22
pragmatist epistemology (Festenstein 2007, 2010).
 A possible objection to the pragmatist view might bring into question whether there are such fundamental, publicly-23
recognized epistemic principles. If one can demonstrate that there are no epistemic principles and values that everyone 
(or at least every reasonable citizen, when "reasonable" is defined in an epistemic way) can affirm, the entire pragmatist 
argument can be rejected from the start. I generally agree with the defenders of the pragmatist deliberative democracy 
regarding the publicity of some epistemic principles, so I shall not use this argumentative strategy to reject the 
pragmatist view. Instead, I shall focus on the second and the third claim of the pragmatist deliberative democracy.
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legitimacy (which is often seen as an extension of freedom of conscience ): in order to be 24
legitimate, a form of government (or a decision-making procedure) has to be justifiable to all 
reasonable citizens. The problem is that, since in the conditions of reasonable pluralism we embrace 
numerous different and incompatible, but still reasonable comprehensive moral doctrines, we 
cannot agree on what represents a good moral justification of democracy. It seems that the same 
freedoms and liberties that constitute a democratic regime simultaneously prevent us from 
achieving a public justification of democracy. This problem is sometimes called the paradox of 
democratic legitimacy (Talisse 2009a, 2009b) and is used as a starting point for rejecting the idea 
that democracy should be justified on moral grounds.  
 In most cases Pure Proceduralism takes a form of moral justification of democracy (with 
Fabienne Peter's Pure Epistemic Proceduralism being an important exception): we should all 
embrace the results of democratic procedures (regardless of their substantive quality) because they 
are produced by a decision-making procedure that treats interests of each and every citizen as 
equally important, and gives every citizen an equal chance to participate in the decision-making 
process. We thus have a clear moral case for (deliberative) democracy: it is a procedure with 
legitimacy-generating potential because it embodies certain moral value(s)—it publicly treats 
everyone's interests as equally important (Christiano 2008), it represents an essential part of the 
good life for an individual (Arendt 1963), or it realizes mutual respect and concern among citizens 
(Gutmann and Thompson 2004). Democracy cannot guarantee that everyone will agree about the 
substantial quality of the outcome, but it can guarantee procedural justice, peace and social stability.  
 We have already seen a possible argument that can be raised against this view—David 
Estlund introduces alternative fair decision-making procedures (e.g. coin-flipping, equal lotteries, 
queen for a day) and argues that Pure Proceduralism lacks a method to differentiate between 
democracy and other fair procedures (Estlund 1997, 2008, 2009). Scholars who defend pragmatic 
deliberative democracy believe that there is a further objection to Pure Proceduralism—it 
presupposes that citizens view their deepest moral and religious commitments as desires, interests 
 This is pointed out by David Estlund, who argues that political liberalism extends liberal concern for some basic 24
rights into the realm of political justification. Freedom of conscience thus entails the idea that no one can legitimately 
be coerced unless sufficient reasons that do not violate his reasonable moral beliefs can be given. Hence the liberal 
principle of legitimacy—in order to be legitimate, a form of government has to be justifiable to all reasonable citizens 
(Estlund 2008).
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and preferences that can be traded and exchanged in the democratic process . However, many 25
(reasonable) citizens do not see their moral commitments as simple interests or preferences, but as 
categorical duties or God's commandments. Such reasonable citizens see their moral or religious 
duties as non-negotiable and non-quantifiable. They might even conclude that truth or religion are 
more important than procedural fairness, social stability and peace (Talisse 2009a). For many 
citizens, their moral duties and their understanding of freedom, equality, justice, dignity and the 
good precede their democratic duties in a way that derives democratic legitimacy from their other 
moral duties. As a result, when democratic procedure results with a decision that one finds 
incompatible with one's moral beliefs and values, we cannot justify such a decisions simply by 
appealing to the procedural fairness of the procedure that produced it. Namely, the procedure is 
justified on the basis of some moral values one has, and if the procedure (or its results) undermines 
one’s moral values, it undermines its own justification (Talisse 2009a, 2009b). In the end, citizens 
start believing that the government has to promote their moral or religious values (or at least enact 
laws and policies that are compatible with their moral values)—if it fails to do so, the government 
loses its legitimacy.  
 A possible solution of the paradox of democratic legitimacy is to refrain from introducing 
moral values in discussion on legitimacy. Since we live in a society characterized by the pluralism 
of reasonable comprehensive moral doctrines, we cannot have a public moral justification of 
democratic legitimacy . Defenders of pragmatic deliberative democracy argue that we should 26
instead turn to our epistemic values—since we cannot have public justification of democracy on the 
basis of common moral values, we should instead try to justify it by appealing to our common 
epistemic values (Talisse 2009a, 2009b, Misak 2009, Festenstein 2009). They argue that there are 
such epistemic values and principles that can simultaneously satisfy the requirement of publicity 
 Talisse argues that, according to Pure Proceduralism, democracy guarantees that in most cases most people will get 25
roughly what they want. This can hardly be acceptable to some (reasonable) religious people who hold their duties as 
non-negotiable and non-quantifiable (Talisse 2009a). Though this is a good point, I do not think that it targets only Pure 
Proceduralist (after all, if one is concerned about the outcome of a procedure, he or she is no longer a pure 
proceduralist), but some Rational Proceduralists as well. I shall further discuss this point later in the chapter.
 Rawls' political liberalism, which introduces the idea of public reason to constrain the type of reasons that can be 26
used in public deliberation, aspires to exclude controversial moral reasons from the debate on political legitimacy 
(Rawls 1993). It is not completely successful because some moral values are nonetheless introduced—liberal values of 
freedom and equality precede the debate on political legitimacy. Rawls' theory is devoted to those who already accept 
these values—it gives suggestions on how people (who want to continue conversation on some public issue they 
disagree upon) should deliberate. Those who do not accept these values will not be persuaded by Rawls' argument. 
Though we can characterize such people as unreasonable, we cannot deny that political liberalism lies on some moral 
values and ideas (Talisse 2009a). Cheryl Misak shares the same thought when she writes that 'Rawls does not provide us 
with an independent or neutral justification of the liberal or democratic virtues; he just assumes those virtues' (Misak 
2000).
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(all citizens share and accept these values and principles) and ground the justification of a 
democratic procedure.  
3.1.b. Pragmatist Epistemology 
Talisse, Misak and other proponents of pragmatist deliberative democracy found their 
argumentation on some key elements of pragmatist epistemology (Talisse 2007, 2009a, 2009b, 
Misak 2000, 2009, Festenstein 2009). They want to find some basic, pre-theoretical epistemic 
values that can be accepted by all reasonable citizens  in a society characterized by moral and 27
religious pluralism. Pragmatist deliberative democrats want to avoid the complex metaphysical 
issues regarding the nature of knowledge and truth, and focus instead on what constitutes a good 
epistemic justification of a belief. Pragmatists thus do not want to specify what makes a belief true 
or untrue (whether it is a correspondence to the states and relations in the world, or the coherence 
among our beliefs, or something else)—they just want to specify which method we should use to 
find out whether it is true. If a belief cannot be refuted by good reasons, arguments and evidence, 
and if it satisfies the requirements of good inquiry (empirical adequacy, coherence with other 
beliefs, simplicity, explanatory power, fruitfulness for other research etc.), then it should be 
considered true or correct. This can be said for both empirical and political claims. We verify 
whether the claim 'Trieste is south of Munich' is true by checking the available evidence, reasons 
and arguments for and against that claim (e.g. we consult maps and a compass, we travel south of 
Munich and check whether we have arrived near Trieste, etc.). Similarly, we check whether the 
claim 'UN should stop the genocide in Syria' by checking the available evidence, reasons and 
arguments for and against that claim (e.g. we access and evaluate the situation in Syria, examine the 
arguments claiming that genocide is something morally wrong and impermissible, we check 
whether the UN has adequate means to stop the genocide, etc.). Entering the deliberation and reason 
exchange with others thus represents the best way of having true and justified beliefs, since only in 
the process of reason exchange can we adequately evaluate our own reasons and arguments. 
Therefore, if we want to have true and justified beliefs, we should enter public deliberation and 
reason exchange, as well as argue that some basic liberties (freedom of thought and speech, 
 Unlike Rawls, who defines reasonable citizens in moral terms, as those who accept the idea of persons as free and 27
equal and the idea of society as a fair system of social cooperation (Rawls 2001), defenders of pragmatist deliberative 
democracy define reasonable citizens in epistemic terms, as those who are responsive to reasons, arguments and 
evidence (Talisse 2009b). Therefore, unlike Rawls, who defines reasonable people by referring to the content of their 
beliefs and views, pragmatist deliberative democrats define reasonable people by referring to the process of reasoning 
and argumentation people use to justify their beliefs and views. 
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freedom of association) should be protected. Since there are no moral experts  and everyone's view 28
can be refuted by better reasons, arguments and evidence, deliberative democracy is the best 
institutional arrangement for having true beliefs (Misak 2000, 2009). This is why it has legitimacy-
generating potential: deliberative democracy is the best decision-making procedure for making 
correct or true decisions. This is not a purely procedural justification of democracy—in fact, it is not 
even non-monistic justification (like rational proceduralism), but instead a monistic, purely 
instrumental justification. Democracy represents the best decision-making procedure for having 
good outcomes, and it is only the quality of outcomes that matters—there are no purely procedural 
qualities of a democratic procedure. Finally, this view clearly accepts the truth tenet (political 
decisions can be right or wrong, correct or incorrect), but rejects the knowledge tenet (there are no 
experts in moral and political issues).  
 Robert Talisse's argumentation grounded in folk epistemology (and partly discussed in the 
second chapter) represents a sophisticated version of pragmatist deliberative democracy . Folk 29
epistemology represents pre-theoretical and intuitive epistemic practices and commitments of the 
man-on-the-street that are deeply embedded in our cognitive lives (Talisse 2009b). In fact, these 
epistemic commitments are so intuitive and widespread that they can, unlike our moral or religious 
commitments, be used as a public foundation for the justification and legitimacy-generating 
potential of decision-making procedures. Talisse starts his argumentation with a claim that he 
considers a truism: (i) 'To believe that p is to hold that p is true'. To point out that this claim goes in 
accordance with our common sense, he invites us to imagine how the negation of the previous claim 
would look like. It would make little sense to say that we believe that p, but we do not hold that p is 
true (or even hold that p is untrue). Talisse than introduces a pragmatic claim: (ii) 'To hold that p is 
true is to hold that p is supported by best arguments, reasons and evidence'. Let us again imagine 
how the negation of this claim would look like—it is very strange to say that we hold that p is true, 
but we do not think that p is supported by the best reasons, arguments and evidence. Even those 
people who we generally do not see as good epistemic agents (e.g. religious fanatics, conspiracy 
theorists) behave in accordance with this claim. It is not that they hold that best arguments and 
 Misak’s argument against experts in politics has two main claims: the first one asserts that there are no experts in 28
politics, and the second one asserts that, even if there were such experts, it would not be possible to publicly identify 
them. Both claims point in the direction of deliberative democracy, but the first one also denies the knowledge tenet 
(Misak 2009). Even clearer rejection of the knowledge tenet can be seen in Talisse's argumentation (Talisse 2009). 
 Talisse calls his view 'discursive democracy' in order to differentiate it from democracy in which public deliberation 29
is justified purely procedurally, which he calls 'deliberative democracy'. I shall refer to his account as a form of 
epistemic or pragmatist deliberative democracy, in order to emphasize that public deliberation is instrumentally 
justified. 
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evidence point against their beliefs, and they hold these beliefs nonetheless—on the contrary, they 
believe that their beliefs are supported by best reasons and evidence (e.g. direct communion with 
God or claims by some (pseudo) scientists), and simultaneously hold that the reasons and evidence 
others have are weak or misguiding (e.g. fake evidence produced by non-believers or even planted 
by the Devil himself, news in the mainstream media controlled by secret organizations and lodges). 
Though we might disagree what reasons and evidence are the best, and consequently disagree on 
which political decisions are correct, and which are incorrect, we all hold (at least to a certain 
degree) that solutions and decisions we propose are supported by best reasons and evidence. Further 
support for the second claim can be seen in the absence of epistemic volitionism. Although we may 
strongly desire that some proposition is true, we cannot simply decide to believe it because our 
belief is responsive to reasons . This inability to choose is not an indication of weakness, but the 30
conceptual requirement that, since beliefs aim at truth, they must be reason-responsive (Talisse 
2009a). Furthermore, Talisse claims that (iii) 'To hold that p is supported by best reasons and 
evidence is to hold that p is assertable'. To assert that p is to express the belief that p. As a 
consequence, asserting and believing are both ways of committing to the truth of p. However, when 
we assert that p, we are publicly expressing our belief that p, and we are committing ourselves not 
only to having reasons and evidence that support p, but also to having reasons and evidence that can 
be publicly articulated and defended against criticism. To assert that p is to hold that one’s reasons 
can withstand the scrutiny of one’s audience. Therefore, asserting that p but refusing scrutiny of 
intelligent critics represents an epistemic failure. Next claim of folk epistemology follows: (iv) 'To 
articulate one's reasons is to enter into a social process of reason exchange'. When we commit 
ourselves to having good reasons and evidence for beliefs we have asserted, we are also committing 
ourselves to answering the objections and criticism raised by others. Though it is not strictly 
untenable, to say that we believe that p, but have insulated ourselves from all possible critics of p, 
represents an epistemic failure and indicates a kind of epistemic bad faith (Talisse 2009a). The final 
claim of folk epistemology is that this process of reason exchange has to be ordered to best promote 
epistemic qualities: (v) 'To engage in social process of reason exchange is to at least implicitly 
 Even in typical cases of self-deception, one does not simply believe some (false) proposition simply because he or 30
she wants to, against all reasons and evidence. One actually tries to find adequate reasons for believing a false 
proposition, and self-deception is precisely this process of reasoning to support a false proposition. When a bald man 
arranges his (remaining) hair to cover the bald parts, and ends up looking in mirror and believing that he is not that bald, 
he is self-deceiving himself, but he is not believing with no reason at all. He has an (epistemically flawed) reason to 
believe that he is not bald (since his hair is arranged in such a way to cover bald parts), and he is clearly responsive to 
reasons. If he were not responsive to reasons, he would not arranges his (remaining) hair to cover the bald parts 
(Davidson 1985).
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adopt certain cognitive and dispositional norms related to one's epistemic character' (Talisse 
2009a, 2009b).  
3.1.c. Pragmatist Deliberative Democracy 
In the previous section some basic claims of folk epistemology (and more generally, pragmatist 
epistemology) have been elaborated. Supporters of pragmatist deliberative democracy proceed by 
claiming that good epistemic practices can only take place in a democratic system. Our epistemic 
values can be improved and our good epistemic practices can be maintained only when some basic 
rights and liberties are guaranteed. 
In order to engage in activities of reason exchange and argument, not only must individuals be afforded 
the protections and liberties associated with freedom of thought and expression, they must also have 
access to a variety of reliable sources of information. Accordingly, a political order under which 
information is strictly controlled and the exchange of arguments and reasons is suppressed is 
incompatible with proper believing (Talisse 2009a: 122).  
It makes little sense to claim that we believe that p, but that our belief is the result of propaganda, or 
the result of epistemically corrupt reasons, or the result of unreliable sources of information. We 
want our beliefs to be formed under epistemically favorable conditions. Since liberal democracy 
represents a form of government that gives us favorable conditions for our epistemic activities, we 
all have good (epistemic) reason to embrace democratic system.  
In short, proper believing requires a social context in which reasons can be freely exchanged, compared, criticized, and 
challenged; this in turn requires a political order in which individuals can be confident that they have access to reliable 
sources of information. Minimally this suggests that proper believing requires that familiar democratic institutions 
should be in place (Talisse 2009a: 123). 
Pragmatists find this argumentation superior to the one offered by Rawls, since they ground the 
justification of democracy on epistemic, and Rawls on moral grounds. While radical anti-democrats 
could argue that they do not see how democracy can be justified on moral grounds since they do not 
embrace moral values of freedom and equality, as long as they hold that their beliefs are true (first 
claim of folk epistemology), and as long as they want to have true beliefs, they should end up 
thinking that epistemic practices that lead us towards true beliefs can be exercised only in 
democratic society. This is clearly a form of instrumental justification of democracy: unlike rational 
proceduralism, where (instrumental) epistemic qualities of a procedure are combined with its 
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(procedural) moral qualities (Estlund 2008, 2009), supporters of pragmatist deliberative democracy 
hold that only (instrumental) epistemic qualities should be considered (Talisse 2009a, 2009b, Misak 
2000, 2009) . 31
 In order to defend democracy on purely instrumental grounds, without introducing moral 
values and any procedural qualities, supporters of pragmatist deliberative democracy have to 
answer the challenge of epistocracy. Why should we deliberate with others, consider their 
objections and evaluate their reasons, if we consider ourselves epistemically superior? Rational 
proceduralists can easily answer this question: there is a moral value of equality and we should treat 
all citizens equally even if we think that we are epistemically superior. The mere notion of 
epistemic superiority does not give us greater political power. Rational proceduralists reject the 
authority tenet, and this move is available to them because they are willing to acknowledge some 
moral (procedural and non-instrumental) values that contribute to democracy's legitimacy-
generating potential. Pragmatists cannot use the same argumentative strategy since they want to 
justify democracy on purely epistemic grounds (without any appeal to moral values, like moral 
equality of all citizens), so they have to embrace some form of epistemic equality of citizens. This is 
why they have to reject the knowledge tenet—they have to claim that there are no relevant 
differences in epistemic capacities of citizens, at least no such differences that could undermine 
democratic accountability of all citizens. They introduce the idea of epistemic peerhood: 
The activities of believing and asserting require us to acknowledge each other as equal participants in the 
epistemic enterprise of justification. To be clear: the requirement that we acknowledge each other as equal 
participants in the enterprise of justification does not entail that we must view each other as equally 
informed, or as equally informed in our judgments. Rather, it requires that we treat each other as 
epistemic peers. Epistemic peers recognize that they owe to each other reasons, and acknowledge that 
cogent criticism may come from anyone (Talisse 2009a: 124) 
Proponents of pragmatic deliberative democracy thus reject the knowledge tenet and introduce the 
idea of epistemic (and not moral) equality of all citizens. Democracy is justified by appeal to our 
epistemic commitments and the idea of epistemic peerhood. In the rest of this part of the chapter I 
want to argue that the idea of epistemic peerhood can be rejected, as well as to show that there is a 
gap between basic epistemic principles and our epistemic commitments, as well as between our 
 In their recent paper, Misak and Talisse argue that moral qualities of a procedure (along with epistemic qualities) 31
might influence the legitimacy-generating potential of a procedure (Misak and Talisse 2014). This idea was not 
introduced in their earlier work, and most scholars agree that their earlier work represents a clear case of Democratic 
Instrumentalism (Erman and Möller 2016).
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epistemic commitments and deliberative and democratic decision-making procedures. Though 
pragmatist deliberative democracy introduced many useful arguments in favor of epistemic 
democracy, it does not represent a convincing account of democratic legitimacy. Many of these 
arguments can, however, be used to support a form of rational (epistemic) proceduralism I am 
advocating.  
3.1.d. Rejecting the Pragmatic View  
Pragmatic account of deliberative democracy asserts that we cannot have public justification of 
democracy by relying on moral values—in the conditions of reasonable pluralism of moral and 
religious doctrines, we cannot establish a freestanding justification of democracy that will be 
acceptable to all citizens. In order to achieve a public justification of democratic practices, we 
should focus on our epistemic (and not moral) values and commitments. These epistemic positions 
start from the idea that beliefs should be supported by reasons, arguments and evidence, and 
continue to the idea that good epistemic agents are those who are willing to submit their beliefs (as 
well as reasons, arguments and evidence they think support these beliefs) to the scrutiny of their 
epistemic peers. Finally, those institutional arrangements and decision-making procedures that 
support these epistemic values and practices should be adopted, since they are the best guarantee for 
us having true or justified beliefs (this is clearly an instrumentalist position).  
 There are (at least) two argumentative strategies that can be used to reject the central claims 
of pragmatist deliberative democracy. Granted that we can all publicly accept some basic epistemic 
principles, a question remains whether epistemic duties and commitments presented by Misak and 
Talisse follow from these epistemic principles. Therefore, the first worry is that the epistemic 
commitments introduced by the defenders of pragmatist deliberative democracy simply do not 
follow from the epistemic principles we can all publicly endorse. The pragmatist account is too 
demanding, invoking excessive and sometimes unnecessary epistemic commitments. However, 
even if we agree that the epistemic commitments portrayed by Misak and Talisse follow from basic 
epistemic principles, another worry remains—does democratic decision-making procedure follow 
from these epistemic commitments? Is the idea of epistemic peerhood and the commitment to enter 
the process of public reason-exchange with others enough to justify democratic decision-making 
procedures and give them legitimacy-generating potential?  
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(i) Pragmatist Epistemic Commitments Are Too Demanding 
Standard (non-monistic) account of epistemic democracy claims that democracy is epistemically the 
best procedure among fair decision-making procedures (Estlund 2008, 2009). Weak epistemic value 
is sufficient for democratic legitimacy since epistocracy and other (possibly very epistemically 
reliable) decision-making procedures are eliminated from the eligible set for being unfair (i.e. for 
not giving everyone an equal say or an equal chance to participate in the decision-making process). 
Therefore, according to the standard account of epistemic democracy, democracy has to show that it 
is more epistemically reliable than other fair decision-making procedures, like coin-flipping, equal 
lotteries or queen for a day. This does not seem as a difficult task since the real epistemic challenges 
(e.g. epistocracy) are eliminated for not having some moral quality (i.e. for not being fair 
procedures).  
 Pragmatist deliberative democracy rejects the idea that moral qualities of a procedure could 
give it legitimacy-generating potential—reasonable pluralism of moral and religious doctrines 
prevents public agreement on some moral values that could be endorsed and accepted by all citizens 
(Talisse 2009a, 2009b). Since there are no moral values (e.g. fairness) that can be used for 
justification of collective decision-making procedures, epistocracy and other (unfair but 
epistemically reliable) procedures are not excluded from the eligible set. Democracy has to face 
these real epistemic challenges (and not merely other fair procedures, like coin-flipping and equal 
lotteries) and prove to be epistemically superior, which is no easy task. This is one of the reasons 
why Misak and Talisse (and other defenders of pragmatist deliberative democracy) have to 
introduce the idea of epistemic peerhood and impose rather strong epistemic commitments on 
citizens—they cannot use a moral argument to disqualify epistocracy, and therefore democracy has 
to show that it is epistemically (and not morally) superior to epistocracy .  32
 In order to be good epistemic agents, or even to be proper believers (Talisse 2009a), we 
should not only be ready to defend our own beliefs, but also search for and strive to listen to all 
arguments, reasons and evidence for and against some proposition. This commitment, according to 
 The debate between those arguing in favor of epistocracy and those arguing in favor of pragmatist deliberative 32
democracy is similar to the debate between Plato and Aristotle. Plato argued that the wise should rule (philosopher 
kings), and he supported this idea using instrumentalist argumentation: kings should become philosophers (or 
philosophers should become kings) in order to rule the Republic successfully (Plato 2000). Aristotle rejected 
epistocracy, but his argument against the rule of the wise was not a moral one—he did not claim that epistocracy 
represents an unfair decision-making procedure. Aristotle argued that democracy would be better in producing good 
outcomes since it includes many perspectives and enables public deliberation (Aristotle 1984). His argument had an 
instrumentalist form, just like Plato's: none of them appealed to moral values or purely procedural qualities of a 
decision-making procedure. The dispute was focused on which decision-making procedure (democracy or epistocracy) 
epistemically performs better than the other. This distinction is nicely explained in David Estlund's paper Why Not 
Epistocracy (Estlund 2003). Defenders of pragmatist deliberative democracy thus follow Aristotle in claiming that 
democracy is epistemically superior to epistocracy. 
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Misak and Talisse, derives from our basic epistemic principles and our desire to have true and 
justified beliefs. Eva Erman and Niklas Möller challenge this idea using the following example: 
Professor Winifred, a brilliant chemist, spends almost all of her time in the laboratory. However, she lives 
in a college where there is an influential group of antifeminists who lobby for the college to stop 
admitting women, arguing that women’s place is in the home and that higher education is not for them. 
Now, while Winifred always attempts to revise her beliefs in light of what she takes to be the best reasons 
available, she is very sensitive to what she takes to be nonsense and simply cannot stand the antifeminists, 
refusing to stop or even listen when they address her on the way to the lab. Moreover, Winifred has very 
limited interests outside of chemistry, most of the time neglecting to even read the daily newspaper or 
meet friends. (Erman and Möller 2016) 
  
Though we might argue that Winifred is not a model democratic citizen and that she should (at least 
to a certain degree) be interested in what is going on in her political community, it is difficult to 
claim that she is not a good epistemic agent, or that she is not a proper believer. In fact, as an expert 
in chemistry, she is more than ready to defend her work in the field and to deliberate and discuss her 
results and methods with her colleagues. Defenders of pragmatist deliberative democracy have 
imposed an epistemic commitment which is too strong—the idea that we should constantly aim for 
the truth and enter the reason-exchange whenever we can seems too demanding. We can consider 
someone a good (or at least decent) epistemic agent without her constantly searching for additional 
reasons and evidence, or constantly entering the reason-exchange processes. First, our commitment 
to truth is not absolute—sometimes it is more appropriate to avoid the process of deliberation and 
reason-exchange, even when we think that the other person is wrong or holds a false belief. One 
such example could be when someone has lost a loved one and is comforting himself/herself by 
holding a false (but not dangerous or encumbering) belief. In such situations, giving and asking for 
further reasons could show lack of respect for others (Tsai 2014). Second, it is one thing to claim 
that we should change or consider revising our belief when we hear a convincing argument against 
it, and quite another to claim that we must search for and strive to listen to all arguments, reasons 
and evidence regarding that belief (Erman and Möller 2016). Similarly, it is one thing to say that we 
should generally be responsive to reasons, arguments and evidence, and quite another to say that it 
is our epistemic duty to search for and listen to all available arguments, reasons and evidence. The 
problem with pragmatist deliberative democracy is that it invokes the stronger epistemic 
commitment. It has to invoke strong epistemic commitments because it cannot rely on moral values 
(e.g. fairness and moral equality of people) to defend democracy, and it simultaneously has to show 
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why we should be responsive to everyone's arguments and reasons, and not only to arguments and 
reasons presented by some small group of people (e.g. group of experts).  
 There are numerous reasons why people restrict their epistemic access. Some do not want to 
deliberate with religious fundamentalists and extremists, others with racists or chauvinists. Most 
people are reluctant to uphold the deliberative processes with people they think are unlikely to 
contribute anything of worth (Erman and Möller 2016). Taking into consideration that we have 
limited time to deliberate on some important issues, this can (even from the epistemic point of 
view) be seen as a good practice (at least to a certain degree). Furthermore, people sometimes think 
that, regarding some topics, we should not aim for the truth, but instead for mutual respect or some 
other moral value. Consequently, people are not always aiming for the truth, nor are they always 
ready to enter and uphold the process of deliberation. This does not, however, imply that they are 
not proper believers or good epistemic agents. They might still aim for the truth and be ready to 
enter and uphold the deliberation process in most cases. These people recognize the value and 
importance of the basic epistemic principles, but nonetheless do not think that such strong epistemic 
commitments (as those described by Misak and Talisse) follow from these basic epistemic 
principles.  
 The first argument against pragmatist deliberative democracy thus targets its inference of 
too strong epistemic commitments from basic epistemic principles. These strong epistemic 
commitments do not follow from our basic epistemic principles, and even if they did, not everyone 
could recognize this (the inference is not publicly acceptable to all citizens). The second argument 
goes a step further and argues that, even if these strong epistemic commitments follow from our 
basic epistemic principles, they are not sufficient to ground public justification of democratic 
decision-making procedures. Democracy simply does not follow from these strong epistemic 
commitments.  
(ii) Democracy Does not Follow from Strong Epistemic Commitments 
Defenders of pragmatist deliberative democracy claim that holding a belief commits us to certain 
epistemic duties, some of which are social in nature. Since these social epistemic duties can be 
better realized in certain political arrangements, the mere fact of holding a belief commits us to 
those political arrangements that are better in realizing our epistemic duties. Democracy is seen as 
the best political arrangement for upholding our epistemic practices—"[...] democracy is the 
political entailment—indeed the political manifestation—of the folk epistemic commitments each 
of us already endorses." (Talisse 2009a: 121) Misak and Talisse recognize and approve the 
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democratic ideas of equality and participation, but think that they should be grounded in epistemic, 
and not in moral terms (Misak 2000, Talisse 2009a). This is why they introduce the idea of 
epistemic peerhood—it is the basis for epistemic equality of people, which is then seen as the basis 
for political equality of citizens. In the rest of this part of the chapter I want to argue that strong 
epistemic commitments put forward by Misak and Talisse, as well as the idea of epistemic 
peerhood, do not justify or support democratic decision-making procedures. These ideas 
undoubtedly support public deliberation and deliberative accountability, but they do not support 
democratic decision-making procedures. Some forms of scholocracy, epistocracy or even 
consultative monarchy might follow from our strong epistemic commitments and from the idea of 
epistemic peerhood.  
 Epistemic equality plays an important role in pragmatist argumentation: though we might 
think that we are not equally wise or well informed, we should all recognize each other as epistemic 
peers, i.e. we should recognize that we owe reasons to each other, and we should be responsive to 
criticism from any citizen (Talisse 2009a). Furthermore, our liberal rights should be equally 
protected and promoted: freedom of thought and speech, as well as freedom of association and 
press, should be guaranteed equally to each and every citizen. I agree with Misak and Talisse and 
accept the idea that our epistemic commitments, together with the idea of epistemic peerhood (as 
understood by Talisse), support and justify public deliberation. However, I do not share their claim 
that our epistemic commitments, together with the idea of epistemic peerhood, support or justify 
democratic procedures.  
 Imagine a society in which liberal rights (freedom of thought, speech, association and press) 
are guaranteed to all citizens, and in which citizens are encouraged to deliberate and exchange 
reasons, arguments and evidence. Since citizens' epistemic commitments are supported under such a 
regime, we can say that this regime can be justified on the epistemic grounds. However, we have 
not yet said anything about how the decisions are made under that regime—it is possible that 
decisions are made by a wise monarch or a small group of experts who are willing to deliberate with 
common citizens and exchange reasons and arguments, but nonetheless the final decisions are made 
by a small group of people after the public deliberation. Alternatively, imagine a form of Mill's 
scholocracy, a decision-making procedure that entails the idea that everyone should participate in 
public deliberation, but does not entail the idea that everyone should have an equal say in the 
decision-making process . Though everyone has equal deliberative rights (everyone is protected 33
 This position is discussed in detail in the fourth chapter. 33
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from censorship, everyone can dissent from the majority view), citizens have different voting power 
(everyone has at least one vote, but better educated can have more than one). Consequently, though 
consultative epistocracy and Mill's scholocracy can embody the idea of epistemic equality, they do 
not embody the idea of political equality. Our epistemic commitments say nothing about who 
should rule or how our decision-making system should look like (as long as our liberal rights are 
protected and public deliberation and exchange of reasons is ensured). The idea that everyone's 
reasons should be considered and discussed is not incompatible with a decision-making procedure 
in which only a minority of citizens participate in the decision-making process and the process of 
authorization of political decisions. Talisse might try to remedy this problem by introducing a 
stronger interpretation of epistemic peerhood, where epistemic peers are not only accountable to 
each other and owe each other reasons, but where they are considered as equally likely to be right or 
wrong. This stronger interpretation of epistemic equality might be better for constituting political 
equality of citizens, but it also introduces new problems into the discussion. Fabienne Peter 
embraces this interpretation of epistemic peerhood (Peter 2012, 2013), and her work is discussed 
(and rejected) in detail in the second part of this chapter. Namely, this stronger interpretation of 
epistemic equality is rather questionable since there are many indications that some people are (at 
least generally) better in producing correct political decisions than others. We do not even have to 
publicly agree on who those people are—it is enough to claim that there are such people in order to 
accept the knowledge tenet. The weaker version of epistemic peerhood, one endorsed by Talisse and 
Misak, is not enough to justify democratic decision-making. Similarly, our (strong) epistemic 
commitments are also not sufficient to justify democracy—they justify public deliberation, but not 
democratic procedures.  
3.1.e. Conclusion 
In order to be public and to be acceptable to all citizens, the justification of a decision-making 
procedure has to be grounded in some values and principles everyone can endorse and affirm. 
Defenders of pragmatist deliberative democracy claim that the justification of democracy cannot be 
grounded in moral values and principles (since in the conditions of reasonable pluralism of moral 
and religious doctrines we cannot agree on common moral values and principles), but should 
instead be grounded in epistemic values and principles. They deploy an instrumentalist argument 
for democracy, claiming that democracy represents the best political arrangement for improving our 
epistemic capacities and coming to correct (or justified) beliefs. Pragmatist deliberative democrats 
acknowledge the truth tenet (since they believe that political decisions can be true or false, and 
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evaluate decision-making procedures by their ability to produce true or correct decisions), but reject 
the knowledge tenet (since they believe that citizens should be regarded as epistemic peers, and 
since they deduce political equality from epistemic equality). The pragmatist argument starts from 
some epistemic principles everyone could endorse and proceeds to argue that certain epistemic 
duties and commitments follow from these epistemic principles. Our duty to consider arguments, 
reasons and evidence of people who disagree with us (or even those who agree with us, but use 
different reasons to support their claim) and to enter public deliberation and reason exchange with 
our epistemic peers is thus grounded in the basic epistemic principles we all can endorse. I have 
argued that, even if we accept these epistemic principles, such strong and demanding epistemic 
commitments simply do not follow from them, or, at least, it is not publicly clear that they follow. 
Therefore, the pragmatist inference from basic epistemic principles to epistemic duties and 
commitments is brought into question. Defenders of pragmatist deliberative democracy proceed by 
claiming that democratic arrangement and democratic decision-making procedures follow from our 
epistemic duties and commitments. I have rejected this claim by arguing that, even if we accept that 
these epistemic commitments follow from basic epistemic principles, there is no reason to think that 
these epistemic commitments imply any kind of democratic decision-making procedure. Though 
our epistemic commitments entail and encourage some form of public deliberation and epistemic 
accountability of citizens, they could be realized under different decision-making systems, 
including scholocracy and consultative epistocracy.  
 Pragmatist deliberative democracy represents a monistic account that appeals only to 
procedure-independent (instrumental) standards for justifying a decision-making procedure. 
However, it fails to give a satisfying justification of democracy. Purely procedural qualities should 
be included in the account of justification of democracy, but instrumental qualities of a procedure 
should be included as well (thus making the account non-monistic). This can be done by rejecting 
the knowledge tenet (Fabienne Peter's recent work represents such a non-monistic position that 
incorporates the idea of epistemic peerhood and epistemic equality of citizens) (Peter 2012, 2013), 
but also by affirming the knowledge tenet, and rejecting the authority tenet (David Estlund's work is 
an example of such a non-monistic account) (Estlund 1997, 2008, 2009).  
3.2. SECOND-PERSONAL EPISTEMIC DEMOCRACY 
Scholars who recognize the truth tenet, but reject the knowledge tenet, generally reject Pure 
Proceduralism and accept some form of Rational Proceduralism or even Instrumentalism. Since 
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they have recognized that the legitimacy-generating potential of collective decision-making 
procedures depends (at least partly) on their ability to produce correct (or true) outcomes, they have 
also accepted the introduction of some procedure-independent criteria when evaluating legitimacy-
generating potential of a decision-making procedure. These scholars answer the threat of 
epistocracy by denying the knowledge tenet—they claim that no individual or group of people 
know what true or correct decisions are better than others. Since there is no such epistemically 
privileged individual or group, and since everyone has an equal chance to be right or wrong, 
democracy is the most plausible collective decision-making procedure.  
 The recent work by Fabienne Peter (papers published in 2012 and thereafter) represents a 
good example of this position. She introduces the idea of epistemic peers and rejects the knowledge 
tenet (though she now accepts the truth tenet) (Peter 2012, 2015). Unlike Peter, I believe that the 
knowledge tenet should be granted, as well as that the idea of epistemic peerhood should not be 
introduced in discussions on democratic legitimacy. In the first part of this chapter I discuss and 
reject her new position.  
3.2.a. Introduction 
In the years following the publication of her book Democratic Legitimacy Peter has received 
criticism because of her attitude towards the instrumental epistemic value of deliberation, as well as 
because of her appeal to controversial proceduralist epistemology. Peter has now abandoned some 
of these views in favor of less controversial literature on peer disagreement. When Democratic 
Legitimacy was published, Longino’s hybrid epistemology provided the best available background 
for Peter's pure epistemic proceduralism; things have changed, however, and nowadays the best 
available epistemic background for her position are recent writings on peer disagreement (Peter 
2013). Peter’s new thesis is that deliberation may be valued not just instrumentally, but also for its 
procedural features. She now acknowledges the instrumental value of deliberation, but still finds 
that the epistemic value of a procedure should not be reduced only to its instrumental qualities. 
Peter adopts a form of epistemic dualism; she holds that a procedure can have both (procedure-
independent) instrumental value as well as procedural value. This view differs significantly from 
her former position based on hybrid and proceduralist epistemology that placed strong emphasis on 
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procedural values and completely ignored the instrumental epistemic value of collective 
deliberation . Her epistemic shift can be seen in the scheme below: 34
Diagram 3.1. 
  
3.2.b. Epistemic Peers and Democratic Legitimacy 
In her recent work, Peter defines procedural epistemic value as the relationship of mutual 
accountability among epistemic agents. Following the distinction between instrumental and 
procedural epistemic value, Peter claims that the accuracy of beliefs is not the only source of 
epistemic reasons in favor of some decision-making procedure—some form of mutual 
accountability between deliberative parties becomes an additional epistemic factor. This mutual 
accountability invokes the second-person standpoint, thus making the epistemic value of 
deliberation not merely instrumental, but procedural as well (Peter 2012).  
 Peter focuses on deliberation among epistemic peers. Following Adam Elga, she thinks of 
epistemic peers as people who take each other to be equally likely to make a mistake (Elga 2007). 
Peter uses this weak definition so she can accommodate the term not only to academic and expert 
inquiry, but also to large social collectives when the issues are too wide-ranging and complex, or 
when relevant information is dispersed. The central question for Peter is what we should do when 
an epistemic peer disagrees with us. Rational response would be to reduce confidence in our 
original beliefs proportionally to (i) our own ability to come to the correct conclusion and (ii) the 
fact that someone holding a different conclusion is regarded as a peer. Peter agrees with Christensen 
 Procedural epistemology interprets all three senses of knowledge in social terms; (i) knowledge-producing practices 34
are a set of social practices that shape the evaluation of propositions in a relevant community, (ii) knowing is a state in 
which epistemic subject accepts a proposition, and both the proposition itself and the fact that epistemic subject accepts 
that proposition are acceptable in a relevant community, while (iii) the content of knowledge refers to what is thus 
known by epistemic subjects (Peter 2009: 122). All three senses of knowledge are procedure-related, so there can be no 
procedure-independent epistemic value of an outcome. Peter later writes that " [...] Longino’s view of the knowledge-
producing process supports the idea that the epistemic value resides in the process itself, not in its outcome." (Peter 
2009: 123) This is clearly a form of epistemic monism. 
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when he writes that " [...] rationality requires that we take seriously evidence of our own possible 
cognitive malfunction in arriving at our beliefs. We must evaluate the evidence for that possibility in 
a way that is (at least somewhat) independent of some of our own reasoning." (Christensen 2011) 
Sometimes there are good epistemic reasons for epistemic peers to be responsive toward each 
other’s claims and to consider some revision of their original claims. Peter emphasizes that these 
reasons are second-personal; it is not the first order evidence about the object considered, but the 
claim of our peers, that gives us a reason to adjust our own beliefs.  
 The distinction between the second-person and the third-person standpoint is introduced by 
Darwall; he believes that the second-person standpoint is appropriate for our moral reasoning since 
it locates the source of normativity in the relationship between moral agents (the second-person 
standpoint), and not outside this relationship (the third-person standpoint) (Darwall 2006). Thus, 
when discussing moral issues, all we can have are second-personal reasons. Things look different, 
Darwall argues, when we discuss epistemic issues; the third-person standpoint is now appropriate 
since the source of normativity is third-personal truth. Epistemic reasons are primarily third-
personal reasons. We can, however, have derivatively second-personal epistemic reasons (e.g. in the 
case of testimony, when the testifier gives us second-personal reason to change our belief, but his 
epistemic authority is third-personal—the source of normativity is still the truth, and it is because of 
our desire to have true beliefs that we change our belief) (Darwall 2006).  
 Peter accepts Darwall’s argumentation, but makes a few modifications; she agrees that truth 
is third-personal, but this does not imply that epistemic authority is necessarily third-personal. She 
argues the opposite, towards the idea that epistemic authority is necessarily second-personal. Since 
we acknowledge our epistemic peer as a source of valid epistemic claims, if a disagreement persists 
each epistemic peer has an (epistemic) reason to adjust his belief in the direction of the other. Peter 
finds that deliberation among epistemic peers is located in between the practical (moral) case and 
testimony, as described by Darwall. She writes that "[...] there is a triangulation between third-
personal truth and the claims that agents make on each other—they are accountable both to each 
other and to truth. Second-person authority is thus necessary but not sufficient for epistemic 
authority." (Peter 2012) The difference between testimony, practical case and deliberation among 
peers can be sketched in the following way: 
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Diagram 3.2. 
#  
#  
#  
It is important to stress that for Peter second-person authority is necessary but not sufficient for 
epistemic authority. Unlike the practical case, in epistemic case we are accountable to the truth as 
well, so the value of deliberation does not take a form of pure proceduralism, but a form of 
imperfect rational proceduralism (Peter 2012)! Peter has thus switched sides; now she is with the 
standard account of epistemic democracy, claiming that epistemic value of deliberation cannot be 
purely procedural. However, unlike the standard account of epistemic democracy, she holds that 
epistemic value of deliberation cannot be completely instrumental either. A procedure has to satisfy 
both epistemic procedural and epistemic procedure-independent standards in order to have 
legitimacy-generating potential. When epistemic peers find themselves in a permanent 
disagreement the (procedural) value of their mutual accountability comes into view. The following 
scheme displays the shift in Peter’s position: 
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Diagram 3.3. 
#  
Finally, Peter provides three conditions for procedural value of deliberation. (i) Respect for 
epistemic equality states that it is not permissible to put extra weight on one’s beliefs simply 
because they are one’s own. (ii) Willingness to enter deliberation asks participants to spell out 
evidence for their beliefs and, since they aim at truth, to evaluate the beliefs they each hold. (iii) 
Uptake keeps deliberation going by ensuring that participants adequately respond to each other. 
Peter claims that these are all clearly procedural conditions. They specify the relationship of mutual 
accountability between the deliberative parties and they do not reduce the value of this relationship 
to the outcome it produces (Peter 2012).  
 In the next section I shall argue against Peter's new account and raise four objections, 
claiming that the knowledge tenet should be granted. We should not argue against epistocracy by 
arguing there are no individuals or groups who epistemically perform better than others.  
3.2.c. Rejecting the Idea of Epistemic Peerhood 
Having presented her new account, I want to argue against dualist epistemology Peter employs. In 
the following section I will put forward four separate objections. The first and the second objection 
grant (for the sake of the argument) that the idea of epistemic peers is applicable in the context of 
political community, and question whether the account of democratic legitimacy built upon the idea 
of epistemic peerhood is adequately supported, as well as whether it is purely procedural. The third 
and the fourth objection reject the idea of epistemic peerhood and explore some of the implausible 
implications that the use of epistemology of peer disagreement in discussion on political legitimacy 
might produce. 
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 First of all, it may be a good starting point to wonder whether Peter’s epistemology is dualist 
in the first place. It seems to me that, by putting such a strong emphasis on correctness when 
explaining and justifying mutual accountability among epistemic peers, Peter derives procedural 
epistemic value from procedure-independent (third-personal) idea of correctness (or truth). The 
question is whether procedural epistemic value can be as fundamental as instrumental epistemic 
value—it seems to me that it cannot, and that it can only be derived from instrumental epistemic 
value. My second objection emphasizes that collective deliberation cannot be justified as a 
procedure with a legitimacy-generation potential by using procedural epistemic value—only by 
appealing to instrumental epistemic value can we justify pubic deliberation as a legitimate decision-
making procedure. The third objection points out that the idea of epistemic peerhood should not be 
applied to political communities, as well as that it is an unnecessary tool for rejecting epistocracy 
(i.e. epistocracy can be rejected even when we recognize the knowledge tenet). The fourth objection 
analyses possible implications of implementing Peter's new account and argues that her position 
makes unnecessary epistemic demands (e.g. the problem of deference of judgment) on people 
participating in a deliberative decision-making process.  
(i) Is Dualist Epistemology Defensible? 
One of the central claims of Peter’s epistemology is the idea that there is a second-person authority 
between epistemic peers. Epistemic peers are accountable both to the truth and to each other, and 
thus claims of each have a second-person authority over the other. We grant our epistemic peers this 
authority because we acknowledge them as a source of valid epistemic claims. Peter defines 
epistemic peers as people who take each other as equally likely to make a mistake (or, on the other 
hand, to have a true or correct belief). It is this chance of having correct beliefs that makes them 
epistemic peers, and it is because of their ability to come to the truth that they have epistemic 
authority (Peter 2012). But, is epistemic authority they have second-personal or third-personal? 
Consider Peter's interpretation of the testimony example borrowed from Darwall:  
In testimony, the testifier is accountable to truth and his or her epistemic authority is third-personal. Qua 
his authority, the testifier has a claim on the person to whom the testimony is addressed, and the addressee 
has a second-personal reason to adjust his belief (Peter 2012) 
When considering disagreement between epistemic peers, Peter says: 
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[...] there is a link to third-personal truth, but the chain of command does not flow unidirectionally from 
truth to the first agent involved in deliberation, and then to the other participant. Instead, we have a case 
when epistemic peers are mutually accountable to each other. Each has a claim to an epistemic authority 
and each has reason to give some weight to the claims of the other. (Peter 2012) 
Finally, she holds that there is some similarity in disagreement among epistemic peers and the 
practical (moral) case.  
Authority—practical in one case and epistemic in the other—is vested in the agents and each does, and 
should, acknowledge the potential authority of the other. (Peter 2012) 
The problem I see in this argumentation is the transition from third-personal authority in the case of 
testimony to the second-personal authority in the case of peer disagreement. Should we not treat 
peer disagreement as a testimony case where both agents are simultaneously testifiers and 
addressees? If we would use this interpretation, epistemic authority of each would still be third-
personal, but they would give each other second-personal reasons. There is an argument in favor of 
this interpretation. Peter’s claim that authority is vested in the agents seems justified when 
considering Darwall’s practical (moral) case; however, an epistemic peer has its authority because 
he or she is as likely to be correct as we are. It is because of instrumental epistemic value of his 
beliefs that he has epistemic authority, just like a testifier has his epistemic authority because of the 
instrumental epistemic value of his testimony . Peter does not explain in detail how the third-35
personal authority from the case of testimony is transformed into second-personal authority in the 
peer disagreement case. It seems that, at least in epistemology, only the third-personal authority is 
fundamental; other forms of authority can be derived from it, but are not fundamental themselves. 
Though procedural values and mutual accountability among epistemic peers can still play a 
significant role when determining how a legitimacy-producing procedure must look like, they 
should be justified on procedure-independent grounds. This would call for a monistic epistemology 
that could incorporate deliberative values and mutual accountability. It seems to me that Robert 
Talisse has aspirations of this kind; in his book Democracy and Moral Conflict he defends 
deliberative democracy by appealing only to instrumental epistemic values, thus trying to derive 
political fairness from epistemology (Talisse 2009a). 
 This interpretation does not imply that one can have instrumental epistemic authority only when his beliefs are 35
correct; one can have instrumental epistemic authority even when some of his beliefs are incorrect—the source of his 
authority is the fact that he or she had correct beliefs in most cases. 
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 We can (for the sake of the argument) imagine that everyone is equally capable of producing 
correct decisions. This does not, however, imply that political authority of our epistemic peers is 
second-personal—we have defined who epistemic peers are by calling upon their ability to come to 
a third-personal truth, and thus their authority should be third-personal, though they give us second-
personal reasons. Consequently, even if the idea of epistemic peerhood is accepted, it should be 
discussed in the framework of monistic (consequentialist) epistemology, and not in the framework 
of dualist epistemology.  
(ii) Epistemic Peerhood Does not Imply Public Deliberation 
Assume, however, that procedural epistemic values can be justified and that dualist epistemology 
should be deployed. Epistemic peers are mutually accountable and every person is aware that there 
are others that are equally likely to make a mistake as he or she is. Everyone is aware that the fact 
that someone we ex ante regard as a peer disagrees with us is not a sufficient reason to dismiss his 
or her belief. The question arises: What should we do when an epistemic peer disagrees with us? 
Peter believes that we should enter a deliberative process and adjust our beliefs accordingly. She 
also believes that this deliberative move is justified by our mutual accountability, not only by the 
instrumental epistemic value of deliberation. I tend to disagree. The fact that an epistemic peer 
disagrees with us gives us a reason to treat his belief seriously, and probably to give it equal 
epistemic relevance as we gave to our own belief or to beliefs of our other epistemic peers. When 
applied to political philosophy, peer disagreement seems to imply the liberal principle of legitimacy: 
the exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a 
constitution, the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to 
endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason (Rawls 1993; 
137). Theories on peer disagreement certainly justify some form of a fair democratic system; I 
doubt, however, that they are sufficient for the justification of deliberative democracy. It seems to 
me that from the idea of mutual accountability an account of aggregative democracy can follow as 
well: since we all have an equal epistemic authority why should we not treat our beliefs as equally 
valuable and consequently have a fair and simple voting procedure that will determine what course 
of action should we take, what decisions should we make and what laws should we put forward? 
Why should we, as epistemic peers, prefer deliberative over aggregative democracy? 
 The answer is simple; we prefer deliberative democracy because it tends to improve the 
(instrumental) quality of the decisions we make. Deliberation enables us to see what beliefs are 
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supported by the best evidence, reasons and arguments, to learn from each other and to bring about 
better outcomes than those produced by other fair procedures.  
(iii) Epistemic Peerhood and Political Philosophy 
In the first two objections we have granted (for the sake of the argument) that the idea of epistemic 
peerhood can be applied to a political community. Now I want to challenge this assumption. I do 
not want to argue against the idea of epistemic peerhood as it was introduced by Adam Elga, who 
used it primarily to describe relations among experts and academics (Elga 2007). Instead, I claim 
that this idea cannot be used to describe relations between all members of a political community.  
 Imagine that A and B went for a lunch together. One week later, they are discussing what 
they had for lunch and cannot agree whether they had sushi or sandwiches. Neither A nor B has any 
reason to believe that the other has some unusually unreliable short-term memory. It seems that in 
this case we can say that A and B are epistemic peers. However, imagine another scenario, one in 
which A and B are discussing the merits of a socialized healthcare system. Though A and B have 
different backgrounds, they can both conclude that each of their views is (at least internally) 
consistent. Should they conclude that they are epistemic peers, like they did in the lunch scenario ?  36
 Peter seems to argue that they should conclude that they are epistemic peers in both the 
lunch scenario and the healthcare system scenario. She claims that political issues are often too 
wide-ranging or complex, or that relevant information is dispersed among the members of political 
community (Peter 2012). Consequently, there are no experts in politics—we are all equally capable 
of producing good (correct or true) political decisions.  
 However, the knowledge tenet does not say that there are experts in politics, nor that some 
individuals or groups have some high degree of knowledge. The knowledge tenet simply states that 
there is some degree of superiority in knowledge, and this seems very difficult to deny (Estlund 
2008, Simpson 2013). There are numerous reasons that can lead us to conclude that A and B are not 
epistemic peers when discussing the merits of a socialized healthcare system—their education, 
professional background, prior involvements with the abovementioned healthcare system, etc. This 
does not imply that we can easily or publicly identify who has superior degree of knowledge, nor 
that people who are identified as those with superior degree of knowledge have any special political 
authority over people who are identified as those with inferior degree of knowledge (that would be 
the authority tenet, and not the knowledge tenet). Accepting the knowledge tenet does not lead to 
 This is a modified version of the argument used by Robert Simpson, who uses an even more demanding analogy and 36
demonstrates that the idea of epistemic peerhood is not applicable on most political questions (Simpson 2013). 
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the violation of moral equality of all people. To say that all people are morally owned equal respect 
is not incompatible with the idea that people's ability to produce good or bad decisions can be 
differently affected by their upbringing, education and social environment (Estlund 2008). The 
knowledge tenet does not introduce moral inequality or epistocracy, nor does it claim that those 
with superior degree of knowledge can be (or should be) publicly recognized. It only states that our 
background (our upbringing, education and environment) affects our ability to produce good 
decisions, and since we do not have the same background, we have different degrees of knowledge 
regarding some public issues. Once it is properly understood, it is very difficult to deny the 
knowledge tenet.  
(iv) The Problem of Deference of Judgment 
The final objection to the idea of introducing epistemology of peer disagreement into debates on 
political legitimacy regards some of its implausible implications. Peter holds that, if a disagreement 
among epistemic peers persists, each epistemic peer has an (epistemic) reason to adjust his belief in 
direction of the other (Peter 2012). Furthermore, one has an epistemic duty to adjust his belief in the 
direction of his epistemic peers. A minority voter thus has strong epistemic reasons to change or 
adjust his beliefs, since the majority of his epistemic peers hold different or opposite beliefs. This 
does not, of course, imply that majority voters do not have to adjust their beliefs as well, but it 
seems that this duty is especially strong for minority voters, since most of their epistemic peers 
disagree with them. A minority voter, therefore, must not only obey the political decision produced 
by the majority of his epistemic peers, but also change or adjust his moral and epistemic judgment 
according to the beliefs of other epistemic peers. He must say to himself that, although it seems to 
him that a certain decision is wrong or unjust, the fact that most of his epistemic peers disagree with 
him points (at least partly) that he was in error.  
 Rawls is very clear when he rejects this kind of deference of judgment: 
Although in given circumstances it is justified that the majority has the constitutional right to make law, 
this does not imply that the laws enacted are just. [...] While citizens normally submit their conduct to 
democratic authority, that is, recognize the outcome of a vote as establishing a binding rule, other things 
equal, they do not submit their judgment to it. (Rawls 1971: 356-357) 
Unlike Rousseau, who believes that the minority should always accept the opinion of the majority 
as the truth and change its opinion accordingly (Rousseau 1968), Peter does not ask for a complete 
deference of judgment. However, just like Rousseau, Peter introduces the epistemic duty of 
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changing or adjusting our beliefs in the discussion on political legitimacy, and this seems to me as 
an unnecessary and a too demanding move. To say that disagreeing with an epistemic peer should 
motivate us to double check our beliefs is one thing, and to say that disagreeing with an epistemic 
peer should motivate us to change or adjust our beliefs (just because an epistemic peer disagrees 
with us) is another.  
 Furthermore, if we reject the idea that all citizens in a political community are epistemic 
peers (as the third objection suggests), we no longer have to adjust our beliefs to meet those who are 
not our epistemic peers (who are epistemically less reliable than we are). If I consider myself as an 
expert regarding healthcare systems, it is clear that I do not have to adjust my beliefs about 
healthcare systems according to those who I consider ignorant regarding this issue. Consequently, 
there is no epistemic duty that requires me to adjust my beliefs according to their opinions (simply 
because I do not see them as epistemic peers). The idea that we should adjust our opinions on public 
decisions might stand only in the conditions of peer disagreement: if the idea of epistemic peerhood 
is rejected, so is the requirement that we should adjust our beliefs according to the beliefs of others.  
 Finally, imagine that we live in a society where everyone is either our epistemic peer or is 
epistemically more reliable than we are. Does this imply that we have to adjust our beliefs 
according to our epistemic peers and our epistemic superiors? I do not think so. To introduce such a 
requirement is to make the expert—boss fallacy (Rawls 1993). It seems that I can consistently say 
that I accept a doctor as an expert in the field of medicine, but that I shall not follow his advice 
regarding a medical condition I have. I might believe that the doctor is generally right or is 
generally an epistemically better agent than I am (at least regarding medical issues), but this does 
not prevent me from claiming that, in this particular example, I do not think that the doctor is right, 
nor that I should adjust my belief according to his.  
 Peter's introduction of epistemology of peer disagreement into debate on political legitimacy 
rises too demanding requirements. We should try to answer why one should accept certain political 
decision as legitimate, and not why one should accept it as true (or why he or she should adjust his 
or her belief according to his or her epistemic peers). We can have a satisfying account of epistemic 
democracy that gives us epistemic reasons for accepting the legitimacy of a certain decision (e.g. 
the fact that this decision was produced by a procedure that has some epistemic qualities), and 
simultaneously does not give us epistemic reasons for accepting it as true or correct (e.g. the 
procedure is not the best epistemic procedure we could have, it only has some epistemic qualities). 
This clear distinction between truth (or our epistemic duties regarding substantive political 
decisions) on the one side, and authority and legitimacy (or our moral duties regarding substantive 
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political decisions) on the other, is one of the important advantages of the standard account of 
epistemic democracy.  
3.2.d. Conclusion 
Peter's new position represents a clear shift towards non-monistic views of democratic legitimacy—
she recognizes both epistemic procedure-independent standards (i.e. the ability to produce true or 
correct decisions) and epistemic procedural standards (respect for epistemic equality, willingness to 
enter deliberation etc.) for evaluating legitimacy-generating potential of decision-making 
procedures. We must notice that Peter does not use any non-epistemic standards: while the standard 
account of epistemic democracy requires of a procedure to have a certain moral quality (to be fair, 
to treat everyone's interests as equally important, to give everyone an equal say), Peter's new 
account of democratic legitimacy holds that these moral qualities are part of the epistemic 
procedural standards (Peter 2009, 2012). Since moral equality is, according to Peter's view, 
indistinguishable from epistemic equality, she has to deny the knowledge tenet, one that would 
imply that not all people are epistemically (and thus morally) equal. Peter's denial of the knowledge 
tenet introduces several problems for her position, and the most obvious one is the fact that we, 
because of our different educational, professional and environmental backgrounds, tend to perform 
differently when faced with difficult political questions. Nonetheless, Peter has to keep denying the 
knowledge tenet since the recognition of epistemic differences among citizens would lead to the 
recognition of moral differences among them, and this would introduce some form of epistocracy.  
 The standard account of epistemic democracy does not face this problem: by differentiating 
between moral and epistemic qualities of a procedure, defenders of the standard account can accept 
the knowledge tenet without fear that this will introduce moral inequalities into discussion on 
political legitimacy. We can reject epistocracy without rejecting the knowledge tenet, i.e. we can say 
that, though there are those who know better, they do not have moral or political authority over us. 
Consequently, we do not need to be epistemic peers in order to be morally equal. Our equal moral 
status is not the result of us having equal degree of epistemic capabilities, but the result of us having 
certain moral (or minimally epistemic) capabilities above some minimal degree or threshold (Rawls 
2001). We can have unequal epistemic capabilities (i.e. accept the knowledge tenet) and still be 
morally equal (reject the authority tenet). This fact, together with four objections to Peter's theory 
discussed above, leads us to conclude that the knowledge tenet should be granted.  
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CHAPTER IV 
THE AUTHORITY TENET 
If a political decision can be correct or incorrect, and if there are those who are better in producing 
correct political decisions (experts), should they have political authority over others? This is the 
central question of this chapter—does expertise imply political authority? Some important 
philosophers, including Plato (2000) and John Stuart Mill (1977a), supported and endorsed the idea 
that political authority must be (at least partly) related to wisdom and expertise. Since there are 
some relevant differences among citizens regarding their wisdom and expertise (the knowledge 
tenet), not everyone should have equal political authority and participate as an equal in the process 
of making and authorizing collective decisions (the authority tenet).  
 The authority tenet is seen here as a natural extension of the truth tenet and the knowledge 
tenet. If indeed there are those who are wiser and generally better in producing correct or true 
decisions, who else should rule but them ? In this chapter I want to challenge this conclusion. 37
Following Estlund, my intention is to acknowledge the truth tenet and the knowledge tenet, and to 
argue that (even if we think that political decisions can be true or untrue and that there are experts in 
politics) this does not entail the authority tenet (i.e. the claim that the experts should rule). We can 
dismiss epistocracy without rejecting the truth tenet and the knowledge tenet. This will be crucial 
for my central claim presented in the fifth chapter, where I argue that the justification of democratic 
legitimacy should partly be constituted in its (weak) epistemic value. Namely, democracy's (weak) 
epistemic value rests on the acknowledgment of the truth tenet and the knowledge tenet . However, 38
before the (partially) epistemic justification of democratic legitimacy can be properly constituted, 
epistocratic challenge has to be answered. In this chapter I discuss and reject several forms of 
 Epistocracy should not be confused with representative democracy. While in a representative democracy citizens 37
elect representatives (who can, but do not have to, be experts in their field) to make laws and policies, the authority of 
elected representatives does not come from their expertise, but from the fact that they were elected by citizens through a 
fair procedure that everyone had reason to consent to. On the other hand, political authority in epistocracy comes from 
the wisdom and expertise, regardless of the elections or the (normative) consent of the people (or the lack of such 
consent).
 As I indicated earlier, my view follows the standard account of epistemic democracy and is rather different from 38
Fabienne Peter's Pure Epistemic Proceduralism. Peter also argues that the legitimacy-generating potential of democratic 
procedures comes from its epistemic value, but she defines this epistemic value in purely procedural terms. Therefore, 
Peter (2011) rejects both the truth tenet and the knowledge tenet. However, her view represents a non-standard approach 
to epistemic democracy, and I have argued against it in the second and third chapter. I have concluded that the truth 
tenet and the knowledge tenet should be granted—epistemic democracy should be based on the rejection of the 
authority tenet, and not on the rejection of the truth tenet or the knowledge tenet.
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epistocracy and argue that no decision-making procedure that accepts the authority tenet can have 
legitimacy-generating potential.  
 The chapter is divided in two parts. In the first part I present basic epistocratic claims and 
emphasize that epistocracy can take different forms, not all of which can be easily rejected. 
Following David Estlund (2008) and John Rawls (1993), I raise two basic objections against 
epistocracy: first, it commits the expert-boss fallacy by arguing that political authority follows from 
expertise, and second, even if political authority somehow follows from expertise, we cannot have a 
public justification of any particular epistocratic government since people will disagree upon who 
the experts are (invidious comparison objection). Both objections are grounded in the liberal 
criterion of legitimacy (Rawls 1993) or the acceptability requirement (Estlund 2008)—in order to 
have legitimacy-generating potential, a decision-making procedure (usually specified in the 
constitutional essentials) has to be acceptable to all qualified (or reasonable) citizens. Therefore, the 
inference from expertise to authority (expert-boss fallacy) fails—experts can rule and have political 
authority only if all reasonable citizens have normative reason to accept this form of government. 
This means that the expert's political authority is not grounded in his or her expertise, independent 
of citizens' (normative) consent—as epistocrats would have it—but can instead only be achieved 
through citizens' (normative) consent. Furthermore, the idea that, in the conditions of reasonable 
pluralism, citizens will not (and cannot) publicly agree on who the experts are also rests heavily on 
the liberal criterion of legitimacy (or the acceptability requirement)—in order to be able to produce 
legitimate decisions, the experts who participate in the process of making and authorizing political 
decisions should be publicly recognized as experts by all reasonable (or qualified) citizens. Even if 
all citizens accept epistocracy as a decision-making procedure with legitimacy-generating potential, 
they will still have a problem of publicly agreeing on who the experts are and who should rule. An 
epistocratic government composed of experts whose expertise some reasonable citizens cannot 
recognize thus fails the liberal criterion of legitimacy since some citizens (though they generally 
accept epistocracy) do not see this particular government as an instantiation of a legitimate 
epistocratic government (because they consider some other people as experts who should rule).  
 In the second part of this chapter I discuss John Stuart Mill's weak epistocracy (scholocracy) 
characterized by the plural voting system. I find Mill's position to be very sophisticated and 
consider it to be the best political implementation of the authority tenet. Mill emphasizes both the 
democratic value of participation of all citizens (which has considerable epistemic value since it 
enables introduction of new perspectives and arguments into discussion) and the epistocratic value 
of experts having greater political authority (which also has considerable epistemic value since it 
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introduces knowledge and expertise into politics and gives experts the privileged status). Finally, 
Mill avoids the invidious comparisons objection since he himself stresses that experts can have 
political authority only if everyone can recognize their expertise.  
 Two further (but more specific) objections can be raised on the basis of the expert - boss 
fallacy and invidious comparisons objection, and these objection target all form of epistocracy, 
including Mill's scholocracy. The first one is a moral objection claiming that, in order to have 
legitimacy-generating potential, a decision-making procedure has to be fair, i.e. it has to treat 
everyone's interests equally and give everyone an equal chance to participate in the decision-making 
process. This can be in order to promote publicly equal promotion of everyone's interests 
(Christiano 1996, 2008), or in order to prevent domination among citizens or between citizens and 
the state (Pettit 1999, 2012). This argument rests on the expert - boss fallacy objection since it 
incorporates the idea that some form of consent, and not expertise alone, generates political 
authority, but it also rests on the invidious comparisons objection since it incorporates the idea that 
people will not be able to agree on who the expert is, nor which end states are desirable. The second 
one is the epistemic objection claiming that, even if we acknowledge that some are wiser and more 
competent, giving such people political authority does not have to result with the best possible 
decisions. Demographic objections points out that it is not unreasonable to think that experts can be 
biased precisely because they are experts (and have some common trait typical for the backgrounds 
of educated people). Since it is not unreasonable to think that there are biases related to education 
and expertise that can make some experts' decisions worse than democratic decisions (or even 
worse than coin-flipping), the liberal principle of legitimacy implies that (at least regarding some 
decisions) epistocratic government has no legitimacy-generating potential. Furthermore, since we 
cannot always detect nor agree on these biases, we cannot agree upon decisions and policies 
regarding which epistocratic government is (or is not) reliable (a variation of invidious comparisons 
objection), and therefore epistocratic government cannot be reasonably acceptable to all citizens 
regarding any particular decision . 39
 Imagine someone suspecting that the educated are disproportionately liberal or conservative (and that this has 39
negative epistemic effects) even before there was any way to check it empirically. This person might reasonably think 
that the educated should not participate in the process of making and authorizing decisions which can be epistemically 
damaged by their liberal or conservative biases. Furthermore, this person recognizes the educated as generally wiser and 
more capable of producing correct decisions, and agrees that the educated should decide about many things (i.e. this 
person accepts the truth tenet, the knowledge tenet and generally the authority tenet), but he or she nonetheless thinks 
that, at least regarding some political decisions, it is better that the non-educated participate in the process of making 
and authorizing these decisions. However, if this can be done for a single empirically latent feature, it can be done for 
numerous others, and people will end up reasonably disagreeing when it is appropriate to follow the publicly-
recognized experts, and when the experts’ opinion should be disregarded as biased (Estlund 2003, 2008). 
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Diagram 4.1. 
#  
These two objections further support the claim that the authority tenet should be rejected, and that 
epistocracy cannot be a decision-making procedure with legitimacy-generating potential. Though 
the knowledge and wisdom of some small group of people (experts) represents an important 
resource that no decision-making procedure should ignore, this resource is not (and cannot be) 
sufficient for some to gain political authority over others.  
4.1. EPISTOCRACY 
In the previous two chapters I have argued that we should endorse both the truth tenet and the 
knowledge tenet. There are procedure-independent standards against which political decisions can 
be evaluated, and the decision-making procedure's ability to produce decisions of substantial quality 
should influence its legitimacy-generating potential. Furthermore, not everyone is equally capable 
of producing good decisions: some individuals or groups are better in producing decisions of greater 
substantive quality than some other individuals or groups. Some philosophers think that the 
authority tenet is a natural consequence of the truth tenet and the knowledge tenet: since political 
decisions can be right and wrong, and since there are some individuals and groups that are better in 
producing right decisions, these individuals or groups should have greater political power and 
authority (both epistemic and political) over those who are worse in producing right decisions (Plato 
2000). They are authorized to rule because they are epistemically superior to others.  
4.1.a. The Rule of the Wise 
The argument for epistocracy was first articulated in the ancient Greece and Plato used it in his The 
Republic to argue against democracy. When important decisions have to be made, why should 
everyone participate in the decision-making process, regardless of his or her knowledge or 
competence? What gives a non-educated, unwise and easily manipulated citizen an equal right to 
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participate in the decision-making process as well as a well-educated, wise and independent citizen? 
To further support this claim, consider the following analogy: medical decisions can be right or 
wrong, and there are individuals who are better in producing right decisions (doctors or physicians)
—when we are facing a difficult medical decision, should we ask our doctor (or medical staff in 
general) to do what is best, or should we start a decision-making procedure in which everyone can 
say what he or she thinks is right, with everyone's vote having equal political power? It seems clear 
that we should ask our doctor (or several doctors and members of medical staff) what should be 
done, and we should not use the decision-making procedure that gives every citizen (regardless of 
his or her competences) an equal say. Same can be said for politics: political decisions can be right 
or wrong (the truth tenet), and there are individuals who are better in producing right decisions (the 
knowledge tenet)—when we are facing a difficult (and important) political decision, we should 
favor a decision-making procedure which recognizes differences in competence and which gives 
political power to experts, and not to everyone (the authority tenet).  
 There are several variations of the epistocratic rule and they all accept the authority tenet, 
though to a different degree .  40
 Strong epistocracy entails the idea that some privileged group of experts (and no one else) 
should participate in the creation and authorization of all political decisions. Plato's idea that 
philosopher kings should rule could be one such example, and radical Christians or Muslims 
claiming that their religious leaders should rule could be another. Strong epistocracy is 
characterized by the idea that all political decisions, regardless of their content and area of 
application (healthcare, education, ecology, economy, agriculture, etc.), should be made by the same 
group of experts.  
 Moderate epistocracy entails the idea that some people are better than others in producing 
correct decisions in some areas or fields they have studied and specialized during their lifetime. 
This form of government (sometimes characterized as technocracy) advocates the idea that 
economists (and no one else) should participate in the process of making and authorizing economic 
policies, doctors and medical staff (and no one else) should participate in the process of making and 
authorizing policies regarding healthcare and medicine, etc. (Holst 2012, Lippert-Rasmussen 2012). 
Political power can (but does not have to) be widely distributed, and one can be considered an 
 The idea of dividing epistocratic rule into two models (strong and moderate epistocracy) has been introduced by 40
many scholars, and I follow the classification presented by Lippert-Rasmussen (2012). However, I introduce a further 
distinction between moderate and weak epistocracy since, though both models do not represent a clear despotic rule of 
the knowers (as strong epistocracy does), they are differently capable of answering two basic objections to epistocracy. 
Unlike moderate epistocracy, weak epistocracy can avoid the invidious comparisons objection. Both, however, have 
problems with answering the demographic objection. 
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expert (and have political power and authority) regarding some political decisions, but not regarding 
many other political decisions.  
 Weak (or sophisticated) epistocracy allows everyone (or at least everyone who has some 
basic and minimal competences) to participate in the decision-making process. This means that 
every citizen has a say, though not that every citizen has an equal say. Mill's scholocracy, 
characterized by the plural voting system, can be a good example of this type of epistocracy. People 
are allowed (and encouraged) to participate in the decision-making process regardless of their 
competences, but those who are better educated have greater political power than those who are not 
(Mill 1977a).  
 In this part of the chapter I shall discuss strong and moderate epistocracy. My intention is to 
demonstrate that neither of them can meet the liberal criterion of legitimacy, and therefore neither 
can be seen as a legitimate form of government. Weak epistocracy will be discussed (and rejected) 
in the second part of this chapter.  
(i) Strong Epistocracy 
In The Republic Plato famously argued against democracy. He clearly acknowledged that there are 
correct answers to questions about how a state should be ruled (the truth tenet), but also claimed 
that these questions are often very difficult and appropriate answers are hard to come by. Of course, 
some people will be better in coming to correct answers (the knowledge tenet), mostly owning to 
their greater wisdom (which can be seen as a result of their education or their innate abilities). Plato 
concludes that the superior wisdom of the identifiable minority justifies their having political 
authority over others (the authority tenet). Political decision-making should be left to the experts 
(Plato 2000). The ship analogy can be used to further support this claim: 
[Men ignorant of navigation] don’t understand that a true captain must pay attention to the seasons of the 
year, the sky, the stars, the winds, and all that pertains to his craft, if he’s really to be the ruler of a ship. 
And they don’t believe that there is any craft that would enable him to determine how he should steer the 
ship, whether the others want him to or not, or any possibility of mastering this alleged craft or of 
practicing it at the same time as the craft of navigation. Don’t you think that the true captain will be called 
a real stargazer, a babbler, and a good-for-nothing by those who sail in ships governed in that way? (Plato 
2000: 19-20) 
Just like one can be an expert in navigation, one can also be an expert in politics. And just like it 
would be foolish to implement the majority rule in the ship case (with many people who lack 
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relevant knowledge about navigation participating in the decision-making process), it would be 
foolish to implement the majority rule in the political community (with many people who lack 
relevant knowledge about politics participating in the decision-making process). According to Plato, 
ruling is a skill, just like navigation (Wolff 2006). Those who are to rule should specialize in this 
skill, and unlike defenders of moderate epistocracy (technocracy), Plato does not think that some 
form of division of labor is appropriate at this level. Of course, he believes that there should be a 
substantial division of labor in a political community, but no division of labor within the ruling 
class. After all, Plato claims that future rulers should be selected from among the brightest and most 
courageous children, and receive special training which begins with gymnastics, music and 
mathematics, and ends with dialectic, military service and practical city management (Plato 2000). 
Only those who have received education in all these areas can reflect on timeless values such as 
justice, beauty, truth, and moderation, and are fit to rule the political community. Therefore, unlike 
proponents of moderate epistocracy (technocracy), Plato claims that there is only one group of 
experts in politics, and members of this group are experts regarding all relevant political issues 
(Nichols 1984). There is no group of experts in economy, fit to participate in the process of 
decision-making and authorization of economic policies, group of experts in environment, fit to 
participate in the process of decision-making and authorization of environmental policies, etc. Plato 
argues for the rule of philosopher kings because he sees rulership as a single indivisible skill, and 
therefore rejects the idea of (epistemic) division of labor within the ruling class. Finally, Plato 
argues that the ruling class will always be a relatively small group: the majority of citizens will be 
producers or soldiers (Plato 2000).  
 Though Plato's argument is nowadays rarely accepted, there are people who defend some 
form of strong epistocracy. Some religious people, for example, who consider their religious leaders 
as the most reliable trackers of important moral and political truths, also consider their religious 
leaders as political authorities. Furthermore, they believe that, in order to have legitimacy-
generating potential, a decision-making procedure has to track important moral and religious truths. 
Since strong epistocracy, a decision-making procedure in which a few religious experts have all 
political power, is the best guarantee that the decisions produced will be true, correct or just, strong 
epistocracy is a decision-making procedure that has legitimacy-generating potential.  
 Many have criticized strong epistocracy for being a despotic form of government (Dewey 
2009, Estlund 2003, Popper 1971): a minority of citizens has all the political power, while the 
majority of citizens does not participate in the process of the authorization of political decisions. In 
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order to answer this objection, many different models of moderate epistocracy have been 
developed. 
(ii) Moderate Epistocracy 
To claim that everyone should participate as an equal in the decision-making process (and the 
process of authorization of political decisions) does not necessarily entail the idea that everyone 
should participate as an equal during every stage of his life, or participate as an equal regarding 
every political decision. Furthermore, even if some are disenfranchised, this does not have to entail 
(as Plato would have it) that majority of citizens are disenfranchised—political power can be 
withheld from only a minority of citizens. These are some of the moderate epistocratic positions 
developed (but not endorsed) by Lippert-Rasmussen—there is a range of intermediate positions 
between democracy and strong epistocracy that favor moderately unequal distributions of political 
authority (Lippert-Rasmussen 2012). Not every epistocratic regime has to be as despotic as the one 
described by Plato.  
 First, consider a decision-making procedure in which, for every political question, there is a 
group of citizens that are better qualified than other members of the political community, and 
therefore have political authority over others regarding that issue. It is possible that every citizen is 
thus considered an expert regarding some political issues, and though no one participates in the 
process of making and authorizing decisions regarding all political issues, everyone participates in 
the process of making and authorizing at least some political decisions (List 2005). An economist 
might thus be considered an expert regarding economic decisions and public policies, and 
consequently have political authority when political issues regarding economy are discussed. 
Similarly, doctors and medical personnel might be considered experts regarding decisions and 
public policies about health and healthcare systems, and consequently have political authority when 
political issues regarding medicine and health are discussed. Some might be considered experts 
regarding more political issues than others, and some areas of expertise might be more relevant to 
the political life than some other areas, so in the end not everyone will have equal political power, 
but nonetheless the despotic objection will pose a significantly smaller threat to this position then it 
poses to strong epistocracy.  
 Second, consider a decision-making procedure in which (at a particular point in time) only a 
small group of people are seen as experts regarding all political decisions, but nonetheless everyone 
is a member of that group during some part of his or her life. For example, only people older than 
50 and younger than 60 years are considered experts in politics, and thus only this group of people 
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has political power and authority and participates in the process of making and authorizing political 
decisions . Since most citizens are, will be or have been members of this group, this might even be 41
an egalitarian position and a fair decision-making procedure, since everyone has an equal chance to 
be a member of this privileged group (Lippert-Rasmussen 2012).  
 Third, consider a decision-making procedure in which the majority of citizens are seen as 
experts regarding all political decisions, but some minority of citizens is seen as lacking the 
necessary expertise (and their political authority is thus denied). This small minority might, for 
example, be a group of Nazis or a group of psychopaths. Though this decision-making procedure 
takes a form of majority rule, it might seem to have epistocratic elements since it disenfranchises 
citizens on the basis of their lack of expertise or their inability of produce correct or just decisions .  42
 The three decision-making procedures described above take the form of moderate 
epistocracy: they claim that some group of citizens should have greater political power because of 
their expertise, but they nonetheless do not claim that a small group of fixed citizens should make 
and authorize all political decisions (like strong epistocracy does). Consequently, these moderate 
epistocratic decision-making procedures are better able to defend against the objection claiming that 
epistocracy is necessarily despotic in character. However, three strong objections can be raised 
against both strong and moderate epistocracy.  
4.1.b. The First Basic Objection: The Expert - Boss Fallacy 
Defenders of epistocracy claim that expertise entails political authority: if some people have 
superior wisdom and greater capacity to produce correct decisions, they should have political 
authority and participate in the process of making and authorizing collective decisions. Those who 
lack this wisdom and expertise should not have political authority and should not participate in the 
process of making and authorizing collective decisions. Consider the earlier example: when we 
have to make a difficult medical decision, what could be stupider than holding a vote? Most of the 
 Of course, a group of experts does not have to be a small group, as it was suggested in the earlier example. We might 41
claim that everyone older than 18 years of age is an expert, and thus give political authority to every adult citizen. 
Though this might seem as a democratic decision-making procedure, it has some epistocratic elements: namely, those 
disenfranchised (citizens younger than 18 years of age) are denied political power because of their lack of knowledge 
and expertise.
 It is important to emphasize that most scholars who argue that terms of political justification need not be acceptable 42
to Nazis or psychopaths usually do not disqualify members of these groups because of their lack of expertise or their 
inability of produce correct or just decisions. Since Nazis and psychopaths do not want (or are unable) to live in a 
society in which they can cooperate with their fellow citizens on fair terms that are acceptable to all, they are 
disqualified for being unreasonable and not endorsing ideas of freedom and equality of all citizens (Gaus 1996, Quong 
2011, Estlund 2008, Dreben 2002, Peter 2011, Rawls 1993). This is the reason why, when discussing moderate 
epistocracy, I shall focus primarily on its first form, where it is clear that the justification for political authority is 
epistemic expertise regarding some political issue.
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people know very little about medicine, and there are some that know much better than others what 
should be done. In such situations, political authority should reside with greater expertise.  
 This example, however, suffers from a serious deficit: the doctor's right to perform 
procedures on us comes from our consent, and not from his or her expertise. We do not think that a 
doctor, no matter how qualified he or she is, has a right to tie us to a bed and perform certain 
medical procedures on us. The same can be said for politics as well: why should someone, granted 
that he or she is indeed wiser and has greater expertise, have the right to rule and make decisions 
about our lives and lives of others? Authority simply does not follow from expertise (Estlund 2008, 
2009, Rawls 1993). We can acknowledge that one is an expert (has greater expertise regarding some 
relevant issue), but this leaves a completely open question about who is to rule. You might be 
correct, but what makes you a boss? (Estlund 2009)  
 To better illustrate this point, Jonathan Quong invites us to imagine the following scenario: 
Sailboat: I would like to invest my money in the stock market with the aim of creating sufficient funds to 
buy a large sailboat when I retire. You are a friend of mine, and because you are a stockbroker, you know 
a great deal more than I do about which investments I ought to make. I can best achieve the goal of 
securing the necessary funds by investing in the stocks you tell me to, indeed we can assume my 
investments are certain to perform better if I follow your advice than if I try to make my own decisions. In 
this particular context there is little, if any, intrinsic value to my making these financial decisions on my 
own. I have a fulfilling career as a philosopher, I have no independent interest in learning the ins and outs 
of financial investments, and there is no reason to suppose my life will be significantly improved if I 
succeed in becoming an expert in the stock market; doing so would just get in the way of the fulfilling 
career I have already embarked upon. What is of central importance in this example is that my 
investments do well enough so that I can buy a sailboat. (Quong 2011: 117) 
One way of denying the idea that experts should have political authority is to claim that there is 
something intrinsically good in engaging other citizens in public deliberation on what should be 
done. That way a procedure's legitimacy-generating potential will not depend (solely) on its 
instrumental qualities (its ability to produce correct or true decisions), but on some procedural 
qualities as well—the intrinsic value of public deliberation will prevent inference from expertise to 
political authority. Hannah Arendt, for example, claims that public deliberation might be seen as an 
essential part of the good life for an individual (Arendt 1963), and Fabienne Peter sees public 
deliberation as an intrinsically valuable realization of epistemic accountability among equals (Peter 
2012). These views are usually grounded in the rejection of the truth tenet (Arendt 1963), or the 
rejection of the knowledge tenet (Peter 2011), so this argumentative strategy is not available to 
those who accept the truth and the knowledge tenet, and want to deny only the authority tenet. 
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Quong's example is very important because it points out that we have reasons to deny the inference 
from expertise to authority even if we acknowledge the truth tenet and the knowledge tenet, and 
deny any intrinsic value of public deliberation . Though you might be an expert and I ought to 43
follow your directives (from the standpoint of practical rationality), this does still not suffice to 
show that you have legitimate authority over me with regard to my financial decisions (Quong 
2011).  
 There is, of course, an important distinction between Quong's example and politics: while 
our decisions regarding investing our money in the stock market seem to affect only ourselves (and 
possibly a few people closely connected to us), political decisions affect many (often all) members 
of a political community (Zelić 2012). It is one thing to ruin our own savings, and quite another to 
ruin savings of other people. We must note, however, that the argumentative strategy employed by 
the advocates of epistocracy is the same in both cases—political authority of some citizens is 
derived from their expertise. Imagine an alternative scenario, one in which you and your nine 
friends each own 10% of a company. Consequently, each is entitled to an equal right to manage the 
company and participate as an equal in meetings where the key aspects of the business plan will be 
developed. The business plan and the decisions made in these meetings will not affect only your 
own well-being, but the well-being of all people who own a part of the company. However, even if 
one of you is recognized as an expert and is seen as most fit to make decisions regarding the 
business plan of the company, it still seems that the very fact that she is an expert does not give her 
authority over you, nor makes her the boss of the company. Expertise is simply not enough—some 
form of consent (though not necessarily actual consent) is needed in order to give one person 
political authority over others. Only actual (we all agree that one should rule) or normative (we all 
have a moral duty to obey someone's authority) consent can give one person political authority over 
others (Estlund 2008). 
 I doubt that Quong would accept (or deny) some of these qualifications regarding the truth tenet and the knowledge 43
tenet. Remaining agnostic regarding these issues would be compatible with his position. However, his example is 
precious because it denies the inference from expertise to authority regardless of whether we accept the truth tenet and 
the knowledge tenet, thus showing that the inference from expertise to authority can be rejected even if we accept the 
truth tenet and the knowledge tenet. 
 Furthermore, though Quong's argument does not have to rely on intrinsic value of public deliberation (as 
arguments by Arendt and Peter do), it still has to rely on some intrinsic (purely procedural) value. This value is the 
fairness of the procedure, or the idea that all reasonable (or qualified) citizens should be treated as equals and should 
have an equal chance to participate in the decision-making process. This value is, however, compatible with the 
acknowledgement of both the truth tenet and the knowledge tenet.
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4.1.c. Second Basic Objection: Invidious Comparisons 
Imagine, for the sake of the argument, that the authority tenet is true and that political authority 
follows from expertise. Every citizen recognizes this and believes that experts (and only experts) 
should participate in the process of making and authorizing political decisions. Can this be 
sufficient to ground the epistocratic rule? It seems that, in order to justify any particular form of 
epistocratic rule, we would need an agreement not only on the idea that the experts should rule, but 
also on the explanation of who the experts are. Unless we can have a public agreement on who the 
experts are, the rule of any particular group of people will be contested by citizens wanting to be 
ruled by the experts, but not recognizing the expertise of the particular group. Therefore, a public 
agreement on the criteria for expertise and on a particular list of experts is needed in order for 
everyone to recognize epistocratic decisions as legitimate (Estlund 2008, 2009).  
 However, in the conditions of reasonable pluralism of moral and political doctrines, having 
such public agreement on the criteria for expertise or on particular experts is impossible. Consider, 
for example, a disagreement between defenders of strong epistocracy and defenders of moderate 
epistocracy (technocracy): when discussing who are the experts regarding economic policies, strong 
epistocrats will point at philosophers, religious leaders, Nobel prize winners or some other group of 
people, and moderate epistocrats (technocrats) will point at people with an university degree in 
economy. The first will claim that political decisions (even those regarding economic policies) are 
so complex and wide-ranging that only people who are experts on justice, beauty, truth, and 
moderation (or experts in the will of God) can be regarded as wise enough to make and authorize 
them, while the second will claim philosophers or theologians are ignorant regarding many 
important economic theories, and therefore cannot be considered experts on economic policies. 
Further disagreement is unavoidable: strong epistocrats who believe that the experts in the will of 
God should rule will disagree on who those experts are, or even upon which kind of God's will 
should be done. Moderate epistocrats (technocrats) will disagree on who the experts among 
economists are, or even whether some non-economists (but successful businessmen or prominent 
scientists in interdisciplinary fields) should be considered experts on economic policies. To sum up, 
neither strong nor moderate epistocrats can publicly define who the experts are: in the conditions of 
reasonable pluralism of moral and religious doctrines, no individual or group of individuals can be 
publicly regarded as experts regarding any political decision.  
 Even if we grant that political authority follows from expertise, strong and moderate 
epistocracy fails to meet the liberal criterion of legitimacy: no form of epistocratic government can 
be acceptable to all reasonable (or qualified) citizens, simply because citizens will, in the conditions 
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of reasonable pluralism, consider different individuals and groups of people as those with sufficient 
wisdom and expertise to rule (Christiano 1996, 2008, Estlund 2008, 2009). Defenders of weak (or 
sophisticated) epistocracy might be able to avoid this objection by claiming that education in 
general makes us more capable of producing correct decisions, and therefore asserting that the 
better educated should have more than one vote (Mill 1977a, 1977b). Though weak epistocracy 
might avoid this objection, it is confronted with two additional objections: the moral objection and 
the epistemic objection, which are articulated in the second part of the chapter where I discuss 
Mill's plural voting proposal in detail.  
4.1.d. Conclusion 
Though it takes different forms, epistocracy is characterized by the idea that knowledge is more 
valuable than ignorance and that, consequently, those who know best should rule, or at least have 
greater political authority than those who are ignorant. Several objections can be raised against 
epistocracy, and I have discussed two basic critiques in this part of the chapter. I have claimed that 
defenders of epistocracy commit the expert - boss fallacy, inferring from expertise directly to 
political authority, but are also facing the problem of invidious comparisons: even if all can agree 
that the experts should rule, we would not be able to have a public agreement on who the experts 
are. These two objections target most forms of strong and moderate epistocracy. However, weak 
epistocracy (scholocracy) defended by John Stuart Mill is more difficult to object to, since it partly 
avoids the expert - boss fallacy and invidious comparisons objection. In the second part of this 
chapter I discuss Mill's position in detail, and also raise two further arguments that weak epistocracy 
cannot avoid. Of course, these two arguments can be used against most forms of strong or moderate 
epistocracy as well. 
 There is a convincing moral argument against epistocracy: this argument can be grounded in 
the principle of public equality (Christiano 1996, 2008) or in the value of non-domination (Pettit 
1999, 2012), but regardless of its origins it unmasks epistocracy as a morally deficient decision-
making procedure.  
 An epistemic argument can be raised against epistocracy as well: we can try to demonstrate 
that, even if we can reject invidious comparisons objection and all publicly agree upon who the 
experts are, there are epistemic reasons not to embrace epistocracy. Demographic objection 
discussed in the second part of this chapter is the basis for the epistemic critique of epistocracy. 
However, before we can analyze this final objection, I shall focus on Mill's scholocracy, a form of 
weak (or sophisticated) epistocracy, since I consider it to be the most convincing form of 
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epistocracy. If Mill's scholocracy can be reasonably rejected, than any form of epistocracy can 
probably be rejected as well. The epistemic argument raised against Mill's scholocracy rests on the 
objections discussed in this part of the chapter, as well as on the epistemic considerations that 
constitute the demographic objection.  
4.2. SCHOLOCRACY 
Epistocracy represents a clear and simple realization of the authority tenet. This tenet claims that 
normative political knowledge of those who know better is warrant for their having political 
authority over others, and epistocracy realizes this by giving political power only to the small 
number of experts. As we have seen in the previous part of this chapter, epistocracy has been 
criticized by both expert-boss fallacy and the 'invidious comparisons' objection, as has been rejected 
for not meeting the liberal criterion of legitimacy. Since reasonable citizens cannot agree who the 
experts regarding moral and political issues are, every form of epistocracy can be reasonably 
rejected.  
 In the second part of this chapter I discuss a more sophisticated realization of the authority 
tenet. Mill's scholocracy , the rule of the educated, seems to be able to avoid the 'invidious 44
comparisons' objection. By introducing the plural voting proposal that gives every citizen at least 
one vote, though those better educated receive more than one, Mill combines the democratic value 
of diverse perspectives with the value of greater wisdom of the few. First, I discuss Mill's account of 
political legitimacy, arguing that it represents a clear instrumentalist position. His position in 
analyzed in detail, partly to criticize interpretations that tend to overemphasize the role of political 
equality in Mill's theory, and partly to better understand the complex argumentative structure Mill 
has developed to support his position. After that, I criticize scholocracy and the plural voting 
proposal by introducing the demographic objection and claiming that, though Mill's position was 
able to avoid the 'invidious comparisons' objection, it can still be reasonably rejected. Namely, the 
plural voting proposal might introduce new epistemically damaging features into the collective 
decision-making procedure. Some reasonable citizens might object this, and that is enough to 
disqualify scholocracy and the plural voting proposal on the ground of liberal criterion of 
 Estlund was the first one to name Mill's position scholocracy. He positioned it between democracy (a form of 44
government in which everyone participates in a decision-making process as an equal) and epistocracy (a form of 
government in which only experts (or knowers) participate in a decision-making process) (Estlund 2003, 2008). 
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legitimacy. Finally, since both epistocracy and scholocracy fail to meet the liberal criterion of 
legitimacy, I conclude that the authority tenet should be rejected. 
4.2.a. Mill’s Account of Political Legitimacy 
(i) Introduction 
Many papers have been published criticizing Mill's plural voting proposal and analyzing its 
strengths and weaknesses, as well as trying to implement it (or criticize it) from the standpoint of 
contemporary western democracies. Unfortunately, it seems that Mill's original work is somehow 
neglected in favor of some notable interpretations, and the emphasis is sometimes placed on the 
implementation of Mill's ideas in contemporary society without first analyzing and understanding 
the justificatory process Mill carefully developed to support those ideas. This part of the chapter 
aims to clarify some of the contested ideas by analyzing the reasons and arguments Mill used to 
support them. Additionally, this part aims to point out and emphasize how these ideas and 
arguments supporting them are connected into a coherent system.  
 The first part of this chapter sets Mill's account in the wider explanatory framework of 
democratic legitimacy developed by Thomas Christiano. Mill's view is portrayed as a typical 
example of democratic instrumentalism—a monistic position that focuses on the results of a 
decision-making process when discussing the legitimacy of the decisions produced by this decision-
making process. Mill's understanding of political equality is discussed in the second part: by 
introducing Berlin's distinction between positive and negative liberties, I claim that Mill argued 
only for the equality of negative liberties. Positive liberties, those inherent to a participatory 
democratic process, are not to be equally distributed. Values of deliberative democracy and diverse 
perspectives are discussed in the third part. By building on these ideas, I point out why Mill 
believed that everyone should have a say in a decision-making process, though not everyone should 
have an equal say. The plural voting proposal perfectly satisfies the requirement Mill had in mind 
(unequal political power but participation of all in a decision-making process) and is discussed in 
the fourth part. There, I stress Mill's allegiance to democratic instrumentalism again by comparing 
his view on experts with the views of Thomas Christiano and Philip Kitcher. While Christiano and 
Kitcher advocate for equality in the process of setting up political aims (and give greater power to 
the experts only when discussing the implementation of the already set aims), I claim that Mill 
rejects the idea of equality both in the process of setting up aims and in the process of their 
implementation (though he has a different standard for identifying experts in these two domains). 
 97
Finally, I emphasize the importance of public justification for Mill's view, introducing the worry 
that Mill's account might seem to be acceptable even from the liberal criterion of legitimacy.  
(ii) Background 
Whenever we try to justify or argue for a certain form of government, we start by enlisting its 
virtues. Contemporary political philosophy divides these virtues depending on whether they are the 
virtues of a decision-making process or of the final outcome produced by this process. In order to 
give an account of democratic legitimacy presented by John Stuart Mill, as well as to compare his 
position with those of contemporary defenders of epistemic democracy, one first has to clarify the 
criteria listed above and set Mill’s view according to them.  
 As the name suggests, procedural virtues of some form of government refer to the virtues of 
the decision-making process; they are not related to the quality of the decision, but to the process by 
which these decisions are made. The main procedural virtue of democracy is its tendency to treat all 
participants in the decision-making process as equals and to give everyone an equal power to 
influence the final decision. In debates on legitimacy, this position places focus on procedural 
qualities of democratic decisions; the question is not whether a particular decision is correct or just, 
but whether a decision came about through a process that has certain qualities (virtues) that make it 
legitimacy-generating.  
 Non-procedural virtues are not related to the decision-making process, but to the quality of 
decisions that some form of government produces. In other words, they do not come from the 
procedure by which the decision was made, but are associated with the external world in which the 
decision shows as profitable or unprofitable, right or wrong, true or false. The main non-procedural 
virtue of democracy is its tendency to produce correct decisions. According to this view, decisions 
are legitimate if and only if they are true (or just), and democracy as a form of collective decision-
making has only instrumental value—it represents a good means to achieve a desired goal, i.e. to 
bring about correct (or just) decisions.  
 We can try to justify democratic authority by referring to one of these virtues, in which case 
we will be endorsing some monistic position, or we can try to justify democratic authority by 
referring to both virtues, in which case we will be endorsing some non-monistic position .  45
 The distinction between monistic and non-monistic positions was first introduced by Thomas Christiano (2004).45
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(iii) Mill’s Criteria for Legitimacy 
Mill asserts that the best form of government is the one that best achieves the following two goals: 
(i) improving the virtue and intelligence of the people under its jurisdiction, and (ii) organizing the 
existing virtues and good qualities of the people in a way that promotes the long-run common good.  
One criterion of the goodness of a government [is] the degree in which it tends to increase the sum of 
good qualities in the governed, collectively and individually; since, besides that their well-being is the 
sole object of government, their good qualities supply the moving force which works the machinery. The 
other constituent element of the merit of a government [is] the quality of the machinery itself; that is, the 
degree in which it is adapted to take advantage of the amount of good qualities which may at any time 
exist, and make them instrumental to the right purposes. (Mill 1977: 390-391) 
The same two criteria reappear, more or less reformulated, throughout his entire work.  
[Merit which any set of political institutions can possess] consists partly of a degree in which they 
promote the general mental advancement of the community, including [...] advancement in intellect, in 
virtue, and in practical activity and efficiency; and partly of the degree of perfection with which they 
organize the moral, intellectual and active worth already existing, so as to operate with the greatest effect 
of public affairs. (Mill 1977: 392) 
However, it seems that the basic and unifying criterion behind these two are beneficial 
consequences (Sandel 2013, Peter 2014). Following Mill's utilitarian account characterized by the 
differentiation between higher-quality and lower-quality pleasures, the best form of government is 
to be understood as the one that produces maximal aggregate long-run utility (excellence-weighted 
pleasure).  
The ideally best form of government is [...] the one which [...] is attended with the greatest amount of 
beneficial consequences, immediate and prospective. (Mill 1977: 404) 
It is rather clear that Mill uses a procedure-independent criterion for evaluating the quality of the 
outcomes, i.e. he accepts the truth tenet. A political decision can be good or bad regardless of the 
procedure that has produced it. This is particularly clear when Mill uses an epistemic argument to 
argue against despotic monarchy; even if there would be a wise benevolent despot, he would be 
unable to detect and promote the common good, as well as particular interests of different 
individuals, as efficiently as representative (democratic) government. A political decision is good or 
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bad regardless of the procedure that has produced it; its quality is evaluated in the light of its 
consequences.  
 Mill adopts the instrumentalist position: a form of government is only legitimate if it 
produces the greatest possible amount of beneficial consequences. He avoids the common 
objections against utilitarianism by introducing the differentiation between higher-quality and 
lower-quality pleasures, as well as by strongly arguing that only by preservation of individual 
liberties can we maximize utility in the long-run . However, his argumentation has an instrumental 46
form; in order to be legitimate, a form of government has to improve intellectual and moral qualities 
of its citizens, as well as to organize them in such a way as to produce the best possible outcomes 
(Peter 2014).  
 What form of government will prove itself as the best depends on the people it is exercised 
upon. Tyranny will be the best form of government for barbarian tribes, since it will best improve 
their intellectual and moral qualities (e.g. teach them to obey the laws), as well as organize them in 
a manner they, because of the lack of discipline, would otherwise be unable to do themselves. 
Democracy is preferred to tyranny, but only when discussing developed societies where certain 
preconditions have already been met. This emphasizes the instrumental approach used by Mill: 
what form of government is legitimate depends on the type of society we want to apply it upon. 
Different forms of government will yield different results when applied to different societies. 
Democracy is thus instrumentally justified: if we want to promote intellectual and moral qualities of 
individuals in our society, and if we want to organize them to produce the best possible outcomes, 
we should embrace democracy as a proper form of collective decision-making.  
(iv) Expertism and Equality  
Mill's democratic instrumentalism can sometimes be mistaken for a weak kind of (epistemic) 
proceduralism: after all, Mill does not think that a political decision is legitimate if and only if it has 
beneficial consequences. According to such view, whenever one has a reason to doubt the quality of 
consequences of a political decision, one could say that he does not recognize that particular 
decision as legitimate. This is surely not the result Mill had in mind. Furthermore, we could 
question the extent to which such view improves intellectual and moral qualities of the people 
 Mill’s famous essay ‘On Liberty’ can be viewed as a unified attempt to argue in favor of individual liberty from the 46
consequentialist (utilitarian) standpoint. All four reasons that explain why we should uphold individual liberty have an 
instrumental form—we should not silent the dissents because such an action would produce ill consequences for our 
society: we might be deprived of true or partially true belief, our own belief might harden into dogma and prejudice, 
and forcing the members of a society to embrace custom and convention is likely to deprive them of the energy and 
vitality for social improvement. For detailed argumentation see Mill 1879 and Sandel 2009.
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involved. The decision-making procedure is very important for Mill—it has to be organized in such 
a way as to satisfy two criteria of good government, i.e. to improve the intellectual and moral 
qualities of people and to organize their potentials to maximize the quality of results. A decision is 
thus legitimate if it is a product of a good decision-making procedure. Though this might seem as a 
form of democratic proceduralism, we must note that the justification of the procedure is purely 
instrumental (Peter 2014). Mill does not find democracy superior to despotic monarchy because the 
former respects the equality of all the people involved, and the latter does not. His arguments for 
democracy have instrumental form; we should prefer democracy because it produces better 
outcomes, i.e. it is better in improving our moral and intellectual qualities, as well as in producing 
better decisions. Unlike Estlund and other philosophers who adopt non-monistic positions, putting 
emphasis on both the fairness of a procedure and the quality of results it produces, Mill's view is 
monistic—only the results are important.  
 Some might argue otherwise by stressing the importance of equality in Mill's political 
thought, especially in his famous essay On Liberty. Though equality is indeed a very important idea 
for Mill, we must notice that in On Liberty Mill refers primarily on the idea of negative liberty, i.e. 
the area within which the subject—a person or group of persons—is or should be left to do or be 
what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons (Berlin 1969). Mill's thoughts on 
positive liberty, i.e. his answer to the question what, or who, is the source of control or interference 
that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than that (Berlin 1969), are quite different. Mill 
explicitly distinguishes the power that one has over oneself alone and the power one has over 
others : 47
They say that everyone has an equal interest in being well governed, and that everyone, therefore, has an 
equal claim to control over his own government. I might agree to this, if control over his own government 
were really a thing in question; but what I am asked to assent is, that every individual has an equal claim 
to control over the government of the other people. The power that suffrage gives is not over himself 
alone (i.e. negative liberty) it is power over others also (i.e. positive liberty): whatever control the voter is 
able to exercise over his own concerns, he exercises the same degree of it over those of every one else. 
Now, it can in no sort be admitted that all persons have an equal claim to power over others. (Mill 1977 b: 
323) 
It seems that equality does not play an important role in Mill's thoughts on collective decision-
making procedures; it is very important to ensure the equal protection of everyone's basic negative 
 I thank David Miller for pointing this idea and encouraging me to analyze Mill's Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform 47
in detail.
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liberties (e.g. freedom of thought, speech, press and assembly), but equality should be rejected and 
opposed when discussing positive liberties. It should instead be replaced with competence, because 
it is the key virtue needed to achieve better quality of political decisions . 48
 This particular idea is nicely implemented in the plural voting practice suggested by Mill. 
He indicates two motives for this proposal: (i) to prevent one group of people from being able to 
control the political process without having to give reasons in order to have sufficient support, and 
(ii) to avoid giving each person an equal chance to influence political decisions without regard to 
their merit, intelligence etc.  
Yet in this stage of things, the great majority of voters [...] are manual laborers; and a twofold danger, that 
of too low a standard of political intelligence, and that of class legislation, would still exist in a very 
perilous degree. (Mill 1977: 473) 
Many scholars who follow republican philosophical tradition believe that the main motive Mill had 
to suggest plural voting was to stop the tyranny of the majority in a form of class legislation 
(Brilhante and Rocha 2013). The danger of too low a standard of political intelligence is often 
neglected, and the entire plural voting proposal is regarded as a temporary solution Mill used ' in 
[his] stage of things', i.e. to answer the problem of British electorate in the 19th century. However, 
there are good reasons to consider Mill's plural voting account as a permanent solution. In fact, 
Mill's own words oppose those who think that plural voting is only a temporary solution that should 
not be considered as an important part of his political thought. 
I do not propose the plurality as a thing in itself undesirable, which, like the exclusion of a part of the 
community from the suffrage, may be temporarily tolerated while necessary to prevent greater evils. (Mill 
1977: 478) 
 To additionally stress this point, it might be useful to point out important differences between Mill's approach and the 48
approach of those who base democratic legitimacy on the idea of equality (e.g. Thomas Christiano). Christiano builds 
his theory on a basic claim that human beings are authorities in the realm of value because (i) they are capable of 
recognizing, appreciating and producing value, and because (ii) their exercise of this authority is itself intrinsically 
valuable. Christiano further claims that equal status of persons is based on the fact that human beings all have 
essentially the same basic capacities to be authorities in the realm of value (Christiano 2008). Mill, on the other hand, 
believes that people are obviously differently capable of appreciating intrinsic values (his version of 'higher pleasures' 
utilitarianism), and that differences in capacity should produce differences in status. This does not imply that those who 
are better educated should direct the private lives of those who are not (Mill clearly stresses this point in 'On Liberty'), 
nor should they have absolute power in political arena (this is pointed out in 'Considerations on Representative 
Government'). The underlying reason for this is not equality, however, but the idea that intellectual and moral qualities 
of all human beings should be cherished and improved, and that would be impossible if other people would direct our 
every action. This does not imply, however, the idea that everyone should have an equal say in a collective decision-
making process. 
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It is clear, in fact, that Mill's main reason for plural voting is not class legislation, the 'greater evil' 
from the previous quote. Even in a society where there is no fear of one class or group of people 
being able to control the political process without having to give reasons in order to have sufficient 
support, Mill would still opt for plural voting and against the equality of votes. This is a clear 
indication that Mill accepts both the knowledge and the authority tenet.  
I do not look upon equal voting as among the things which are good in themselves, provided they can be 
guarded against inconveniences. I look upon it as only relatively good [...], but in principle wrong, 
because of recognizing a wrong standard, and exercising a bad influence on the voter's mind. It is not 
useful, but hurtful, that the constitution of a country should declare ignorance to be entitled to as much 
political power as knowledge. (Mill 1977: 478) 
Mill was strongly influenced by the classical political philosophy, and his plural voting proposal can 
be seen as a combination of Plato's epistocracy and Aristotle's democracy. Following Plato, Mill 
emphasized the value of greater wisdom of the few, while following Aristotle he embraced the value 
of diverse perspectives for political decision-making. (Estlund 2003: 57) Though Mill never 
embraced Plato's epistocracy (because it denied the value of diverse perspectives for decision-
making, as well as because it was not compatible with the account of moral and intellectual 
improvement of the people), he considered the idea that competence should have greater weight 
than incompetence very appealing. 
[... ] that governing is not a thing which can be done at odd times, or by the way, in conjunction with a 
hundred other pursuits, nor to which a person can be competent without a large and liberal general 
education, followed by special and professional study, laborious and of long duration, directed to 
acquiring, not mere practical dexterity, but a scientific mastery of the subject. This is the strong side of the 
Platonic theory. (Mill 1978: 436) 
When two persons who have a joint interest in any business, differ in opinion, does justice require that 
both opinions should be held of exactly equal value? If [...] one is superior to the other in knowledge and 
intelligence, the judgment of a higher moral or intellectual being is worth more than that of an inferior: 
and if the institutions of the country virtually assert that they are of the same value, they assert a thing 
which is not. One of the two, as a wiser or better man, has a claim to a superior weight […] (Mill 1977: 
473) 
It seems clear that Mill argued for deliberative democracy on instrumental grounds; his plural 
voting proposal is an example of such argumentative strategy.  
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(v) Deliberative Democracy  
One has to notice, however, that the reason why plural voting is introduced is not only to improve 
the quality of decisions produced by collective decision-making process. Mill emphasizes the 
educational role of democracy, and of the experts as well. Their influence will improve the quality 
of decisions, but it will also help common people to further develop their intellectual and moral 
skills.  
 There are very good reasons not to believe that Mill adopted a form of elitism that could 
lead to epistocracy. We have indicated earlier that Mill recognizes the value of diverse perspectives, 
as well as the danger of class legislation. If we give overly exaggerated political power to a certain 
group of people (even if they are experts), the danger of class legislation is reintroduced, and the 
value of diverse perspectives is lost. This value of diverse perspectives is best introduced through 
deliberation; though one can argue that even a form of aggregative democracy could take advantage 
of diverse perspectives and produce high-quality outcomes (e.g. Marquis de Condorcet, Kenneth 
Arrow), this is only one of the two goals of the good government. The other one, development of 
our intellectual and moral qualities, can only be achieved through deliberation.  
Those who are supreme over everything, whether they be One, Few or Many, have no longer need of the 
arms of reason; they can make their mere will prevail; and those who cannot be resisted are usually to 
well satisfied with their own opinions to be willing to change them, or listen without impatience to 
anyone who tells them that they are in the wrong. [...] the one which develops the best and highest 
qualities is the position of those who are strong enough to make reason prevail, but not strong enough to 
prevail against reason. (Mill 1977: 478-479) 
Following this argumentation, one could be led to believe that the only reason for plural voting is to 
attain the balance between groups or classes that would force them to deliberate instead of simply 
asserting their will, and the only reason for adopting deliberative procedures is to improve the moral 
and intellectual qualities of people engaged in deliberation. There are good reasons not to embrace 
this interpretation: though Mill’s argumentation was aimed to maximize the individual liberty, this 
liberty can be limited when our actions have impact on lives of other individuals. As long as we 
make decisions that are within our private sphere, neither the majority of the people nor (moral) 
experts should have an authority to limit our liberty. Things change, however, when our decisions 
influence other people beside us, just like all political decisions do. Giving greater power to the 
voice of an expert in such a situation can be legitimate. 
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There would be no pretense for applying this doctrine to any case which could with reason be considered 
as one of individual and private right. In an affair that concerns only one of two persons, that one is 
entitled to follow his own opinion, however much wiser the other might be than himself. But we are 
speaking of things that equally concern them both; where, if the more ignorant does not yield to the 
guidance of the wiser man, the wiser man must resign to more ignorant. [...] No one but a fool, and a fool 
of peculiar description, feels offended by the acknowledgement that there are others whose opinion, and 
even whose wish, is entitled to a greater amount of consideration than his. (Mill 1977: 473-474) 
(vi) The Role of Plural Voting 
Mill is well aware of the defects any form of government might have. He points out that the worst 
defects a democratic government might face are its inability to produce good decisions and its 
tendency to be influenced by particular interests of dominant groups (Mill 1977: 436). Plural voting 
was introduced as a means to counter these defects: its main purpose was to ensure that the 
representative government produces high quality outcomes, and that no group has exclusive right to 
the benefits of social cooperation by the power of votes alone (and without having to deliberate and 
convince others to support the decision in question).  
 It is unclear, however, how exactly the plural voting proposal was supposed to counter the 
first defect of democratic government, i.e. to ensure that it produces good decisions. How was the 
plural voting supposed to achieve its purpose? In order to answer this question, we must first 
analyze the sophisticated structure of a democratic government and the key stages of a democratic 
decision-making process. Mill firmly believed in the idea of epistemic division of labor and, 
consequently, that laws and political decisions should be made by the most competent members of a 
society (i.e. experts). He saw division of labor as one of the central reasons for rejecting direct 
democracy, but nonetheless did not believe that parliament should make laws, public policies and 
political decisions. This task was appointed to small expert bodies (commissions), while it was the 
task of the parliament to discuss and deliberate on proposed laws and decisions, as well as to accept 
or refuse proposals made by such commissions (Mill 1977: 424). Unlike expert bodies, Mill did not 
think that the parliament should be composed primarily of experts: 
[Members of parliament] are not a selection of the greatest political minds in the country, from whose 
opinions little could with certainty be inferred concerning those of the nation, but are, when properly 
constituted, a fair sample of every grade of intellect among the people which is at all entitled to a voice in 
public affairs. Their part is to indicate wants, to be an organ for popular demands, an a place of adverse 
discussion for all opinions relating to public matters, both great and small [...] (Mill 1977: 433) 
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Therefore, considering the division of labor and a purely deliberative function of the parliament, 
Mill did not have in mind that plural voting will directly ensure more competent law-makers and 
policy-makers. Plural voting is introduced to give additional strength to opinions and even wishes 
of those better educated, and to increase the number of people representing these opinions and 
wishes in the parliament. If small expert bodies (commissions) are those who devise practical 
means (laws, policies, decisions) to achieve a desired political end, it is the parliament which sets 
these political ends, and in setting them, the parliament represents the general public, but plural 
voting enables it to put a greater emphasis on those ends that well-educated people consider 
valuable (because their opinions are better represented in the parliament). Plural voting thus 
improves the quality of political decisions not by improving the technical process of finding the best 
practical solutions to designated problems, but by improving the quality of political aims we as a 
society want to achieve. This is why Mill does not set strict constrains on education (he does not 
insist that only philosophers, or only experts in political science or economics, have greater political 
power), nor does he name the exact profession one has to have in order to have a plural vote. His 
main idea is that people who have dedicated some time and effort to improving their intellectual and 
moral capacities are generally more capable of knowing what is more valuable in life (they are 
better acquainted with higher pleasures), and are therefore more capable of setting valuable aims for 
the society in general . This is clearly an inegalitarian position.  49
(vii) Public Justification  
What makes the plural voting procedure legitimate? As Estlund points out (Estlund 2003), Mill 
acknowledges the need for plural voting to be generally acceptable rather than simply correct. 
Authority does not follow from expertise, but from our acceptance that those wiser than us should 
have greater political power than us. This takes a form of hypothetical (or maybe normative) 
consent, and not a form of the actual consent.  
It is only necessary that this superior influence should be assigned on grounds which [all] can 
comprehend, and of which [all] are able to perceive justice. (Mill 1977: 474) 
 Mill's view is radically different from the thoughts of many contemporary political philosophers and epistemologists 49
who discuss the role of experts in a democratic society. Philip Kitcher and Thomas Christiano, for example, agree that it 
is the role of a democratic process to set up important aims, and the role of experts to devise means for achieving them 
(Kitcher 2011, Christiano 2012). We should be democratic egalitarians when discussing political aims, and advocate for 
expertism only when discussing practical means for achieving those aims. Mill disagrees and rejects democratic 
egalitarianism: there are those who are more competent in setting valuable aims and they should have greater political 
power in a democratic decision-making process. 
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This is why Mill has to find a criterion for expertise that can be reasonably accepted by everyone. 
The problem is the fact that there is reasonable disagreement on who counts as wise. However, the 
idea that good education improves ability to rule more wisely is uncontested.  
[The distinctions in voting power] are not made arbitrary, but are such as can be understood and accepted 
by the general conscience and understanding. [They are based on something that] would not necessarily 
be repugnant to any one's sentiment of justice. (Mill 1977: 476) 
Finally, the reason why everyone should accept plural voting procedure is the quality of outcomes.  
Which of these modes of getting over a difficulty is most for the interest of both, and most conformable to 
the general fitness of things? [...] that the better judgment should give way to the worse, or the worse to 
the better? (Mill 1977: 473-474) 
Since Mill believes that good education improves our ability to rule more wisely (i.e. to make better 
decisions), and since he believes that everyone shares (or should share) this belief, he emphasizes 
plural voting as a procedure that gives greater political power to those who can rule more wisely, 
and consequently favors it as a procedure that tends to create better outcomes .  50
 As we have seen, the plural voting proposal has two goals: (i) to improve the quality of the 
outcomes by giving the educated additional political power, and (ii) to improve the intellectual and 
moral qualities in individuals by making them deliberate and exchange reasons and arguments.  
4.2.b. Rejecting Mill’s Account 
(i) Introduction 
Mill's view represents a sophisticated version of instrumentalism: a political decision is legitimate if 
(and only if) it is a product of a (solely) instrumentally justified decision-making procedure. A 
collective decision-making procedure has legitimacy-generating qualities if it is able to improve the 
well-being of citizens (by improving the virtue and intelligence of the people under its jurisdiction, 
and by organizing the existing virtues and good qualities of the people in a way that promotes the 
long-run common good) better than any other procedure. Unlike other instrumentalist discussed in 
this thesis (e.g. Marquis de Condorcet and Robert Talisse), Mill does not think that the desired end 
state will be best achieved through a procedure that treats everyone as an equal, but instead through 
 One can consistently argue against this idea and rise against it not only argument based on procedural fairness, but an 50
epistemic argument as well (see Estlund 2003).
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a procedure that differentiates between people with different competences and gives greater 
political power to those who are more competent. Therefore, Mill (at least partly) accepts the 
authority tenet, one claiming that normative political knowledge of those who know better is a 
warrant for them having political authority over others. Finally, it might seem that Mill's account is 
compatible with liberal criterion of legitimacy—his departure from equality might seem to be 
publicly justified, since Mill himself requires that the criterion for expertise must be reasonably 
acceptable to everyone. If that can be achieved, we have to acknowledge the authority tenet and 
dismiss the idea of political equality of citizens.  
 I do not think that Mill's plural voting account can be publicly justified. In the rest of this 
part of the chapter I shall demonstrate why Mill's account represents probably the most 
sophisticated implementation of the authority tenet, but also why it should nonetheless be rejected 
as a position failing to satisfy the liberal criterion of legitimacy. First of all, there is a strong moral 
argument against epistocracy—it is grounded in the public principle of equality (Christiano 2008) 
or in the value of non-domination (Pettit 1999, 2012, Lister 2014). Furthermore, there is an 
epistemic argument that shows how Mill fails the liberal criterion of legitimacy, i.e. an argument 
demonstrating that some reasonable people might reject the plural voting proposal (the demographic 
objection) on epistemic grounds (Estlund 2003, 2009). Both arguments are discussed in the rest of 
this chapter. 
(ii) Scholocracy and the Liberal Criterion of Legitimacy 
The idea that political justification must rely only on claims and doctrines acceptable to all 
reasonable citizens (Rawls 1993) represents one of the most important principles of political 
philosophy today. Mill anticipates this when he acknowledges the need for plural voting to be 
generally acceptable rather than simply correct. Authority does not come merely from expertise, nor 
does it come from actual consent. In order for experts to have authority over others, both (i) their 
expertise and (ii) their greater political power must be accepted by the general conscience and 
understanding (Mill 1977a). Mill, of course, claims that scholocracy, a form of government 
characterized by plural voting, can meet these two criteria.  
 I agree that scholocracy might be able to meet the first criteria. Unlike epistocracy, 
scholocracy might be successful in avoiding the 'invidious comparisons' objection (we might 
reasonably disagree on who the expert is regarding some important moral and political issues). 
'Invidious comparisons' objection is not incompatible with the idea that a well-educated population 
will, other things equal, tend to rule more wisely. And if better-educated population will tend to 
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produce wiser decisions, then it might seem that better-educated individuals must be better in 
producing wiser decisions. Of course, we might end up disagreeing on the kind of education that 
improves our ability to produce wiser decisions (Baccarini & Ivanković 2015), but I am willing to 
accept (for the sake of the argument) the claim that there is some education that improves our 
ability to produce wiser decisions, as well as that it would be unreasonable to deny that the 
population with this education would rule more wisely. I shall elaborate this claim in the next 
chapter: for now, I am prepared to grant that Mill's scholocracy meets the first criteria, i.e. that we 
can have a public agreement on who is better in dealing with public matters. However, I shall claim 
that scholocracy is not able to meet the second criteria, i.e. that the attribution of greater political 
power to those we have accepted as better in dealing with public matters cannot be justified to all 
reasonable citizens. Combined moral (appeal to the expert-boss fallacy) and epistemic argument 
(the demographic objection) show that, even if we have agreed that some education generally 
makes the population better in producing correct or just decisions, this does not imply that those 
who have received this education should have greater political authority or greater chance to 
influence the decision-making process.  
(iii) First Specific Objection: The Argument from Equality and the non-domination Argument 
A moral argument against epistocracy can be raised from both liberal and republican political 
tradition. While liberals usually focus on the intrinsic value of equality, claiming that all of us 
should have equal positive liberties regarding participation in the decision-making process, 
republicans focus on non-domination as a negative conception of liberty that introduces equality in 
the decision-making procedures. 
 Epistocracy entails the idea that some individuals or groups of citizens should have all 
political power (strong and moderate epistocracy), or at least should have greater political power 
than other citizens (weak epistocracy). This clearly undermines the procedural fairness of a 
decision-making procedure: if we do not have equal say regarding public decisions, we are not 
being treated as equals. Christopher Griffin clearly embraces this idea when he writes "democracy 
is non-instrumentally just because it expresses our equal standing, as citizens." (Griffin 2003: 117) 
Though instrumentalists might argue that substantive equality implemented in laws and policies is 
more important than procedural equality of a decision-making process (Arneson 2003a, 2003b), 
their views are undermined by the fact of reasonable pluralism—when people disagree on what the 
correct or just decision is, they will also disagree on whether particular political decisions 
substantively expresses equal respect. Since we cannot agree on the substantial quality of the results 
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(at least not to the level that would justify some people having greater political authority because 
they are experts in producing results of this substantive quality), we should consider procedural 
fairness as an important component for the legitimacy-generating potential of decision-making 
procedures  (Christiano 1996, 2008). The argument form equality seems convincing when facing 51
strong and moderate epistocracy—"the more contentious the debates over justice and the common 
good, the more important is that we are not publicly declared to be unworthy of any say in the 
decisions." (Griffin 2003: 119) Since strong and moderate epistocracy disenfranchise some people 
regarding some (or all) political decisions, they are targeted by Griffin's argument. Weak or 
sophisticated epistocracy, like Mill's scholocracy realized through the plural voting proposal, seems 
to be (at least partly) able to avoid this objection, since it gives every citizen a say regarding all 
political decisions—it is only that it does not give everyone an equal say. However, though weak 
epistocracy avoids Griffin's objection, it still fails to be a decision-making procedure that embodies 
public equality (Christiano 20008). Though it might include participation of all citizens in the 
process of making and authorizing collective decisions, it is still not a fair procedure, since not 
everyone has an equal chance to influence the final outcome (Estlund 2008). This argument has 
been thoroughly analyzed in the second chapter of this thesis, so I shall not discuss it here in detail. 
 Another way of raising a moral argument against epistocracy is by introducing a modern 
republican value of non-domination. Unlike 'populist' republicans who take democratic participation 
as one of the highest forms of the good (Rousseau 1968, Arendt 1958) and whose views have been 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, contemporary republicans take democracy primarily as a means to 
protecting individual liberty (Pettit 1999). Following these contemporary republican views, the 
argument against epistocracy is very straightforward: epistocratic institutions will constitute 
relationships of domination. Conceiving non-domination as a goal, Pettit argues that the state 
should be arranged so as to minimize domination between citizens and between citizens and state 
(Lister 2014). Of course, one might object that a group of wise citizens will be better able to arrange 
the institutions of the state to minimize domination, and therefore a small group of experts should 
 It is important to emphasize that, though procedural fairness excludes epistocracy from a set of decision-making 51
procedures with legitimacy-generating potential, it does not exclude epistemic democracy, which relies both on 
procedural fairness and the quality of outcomes. Furthermore, epistemic democracy requires only a weak epistemic 
value of democratic procedures—everyone should be able to see that democratic decisions are better than those 
produced by alternative fair decision-making procedures, like coin-flipping or equal lotteries. Epistocracy, on the other 
hand, requires a strong epistemic value—everyone should be able to see that decisions produced by an epistocratic 
government are better than those produced by any other (fair or unfair) decision-making procedures, including 
alternative epistocratic governments. Since in the conditions of reasonable pluralism we cannot have public agreement 
on the quality of results produced by various epistocratic procedures, we cannot have a public justification of 
epistocracy. Epistemic democracy can have public agreement on the quality of decisions produced by a democratic 
decision-making process because it has to compete only with other fair decision-making procedures (coin-flipping or 
equal lotteries), and not with all other decision-making procedures.
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rule to minimize domination between citizens and between citizens and state. This is an argument 
similar to those raised against egalitarian positions, when it is argued that a small group of experts 
might be better in producing decisions that promote public equality. Just as Christiano rejects the 
idea that substantive equality of outcomes has a priority over procedural equality of the decision-
making process (Christiano 2008), Pettit rejects the idea that non-domination in decisions and 
outcomes has a priority over non-domination in the decision-making process (Pettit 1999). In fact, 
both argue the opposite: it is non-domination (or equality) in the decision-making process that has 
priority over non-domination (or equality) of decisions. Having (equal) control over the state is the 
only way to avoid domination. 
If we are subject to a government that can dominate us, then we are going to lack control over changes in 
the government's will towards us and towards those of our kind. But this lack of political control means 
that any social control we enjoy over changes in the will of our fellow citizens towards us are also likely 
to be somewhat precarious [...] Let government be a law unto itself and we will be vulnerable both in 
relation to the state and in relation to our fellow citizens. (Pettit 2012: 24-25) 
Of course, domination in decisions cannot always be avoided, yet what matters is how the decision-
making procedure affects relationships among citizens, or between citizens and the state. In small 
groups, but also in large communities, not having an equal say can be an instance of domination. If, 
in a group composed of Alf, Betty, Charlie and David, David is the king, Alf, Betty and Charlie are 
on the subordinate end of the relationship with David. Even if David is benevolent and picks 
domination-minimizing rules, the satisfaction of Alf's, Betty's and Charlie's essential interests 
depends on David's benevolence. The three are dependent (and unfree) because of the structure of 
the decision-making procedure, i.e. because the procedure establishes a relation of domination 
(Lister 2014). This is true even if no coercion, oppression or violence ever comes about, and even if 
David keeps promoting domination-minimizing rules. Strong epistocracy, as well as some forms of 
moderate epistocracy, in which only some individuals or a smaller groups of people participate in 
the process of making and authorizing political decisions, can thus be rejected as procedures that 
generate and encourage domination among citizens or between citizens and the state.  
 Weak or sophisticated epistocracy, characterized by the plural voting system, also represents 
a procedure that generates and promotes domination. Namely, if David has four votes, Charlie has 
three, Betty has two and Alf has only one vote, David has a much easier time getting his way than 
do the others. He needs only Charlie's or Betty's vote to win, and is able to force a tie if Alf is on his 
side. In other words, he loses only when all others are against him. Alf, on the other hand, needs at 
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least two other people to get his way (Lister 2014). There is certainly a form of domination present 
in the structure of this decision-making procedure. In order to complete the analogy, imagine that a 
political community is divided in four groups according to levels of education (e.g. A = less than 
high school, B = high school, C = university, D = graduate degree), with each group being of equal 
size. Members of each group get different number of votes (e.g. A 1, B 2, C 3 and D 4), and all 
together members of A will be dependent on the benevolence of members of D (Lister 2014). Even 
if members of D give their best to promote domination-minimizing rules, a fact still remains that the 
relation between members of group A and members of group D is one of domination. 
 Weak epistocracy (scholocracy) is therefore no better than moderate or strong epistocracy in 
answering this objection. Every model of epistocracy represents a form of domination among 
citizens, or between citizens and the state.  
(iv) Second Specific Objection: The Demographic Objection 
As it has been discussed earlier in this chapter, expert-boss fallacy points out that political authority 
does not simply follow from expertise. Mill acknowledges this when he introduces the second 
criterion for the authority of experts—the greater political power of experts (after we have 
successfully defined who the experts are) must be accepted by the general conscience and 
understanding (Mill 1977a). In other words, the greater political power of experts must be 
justifiable to all reasonable views—there should not be a single reasonable (or qualified) objection 
against the plural voting proposal.  
 The demographic objection emphasizes that the better-educated need not be better able to 
rule wisely owning to other epistemically detrimental features of the group. The educated portion of 
the population may disproportionately have epistemically damaging features that countervail the 
admitted epistemic benefits of education (Estlund 2003). Having a higher degree of education is 
disproportionately a privilege of certain races, classes or genders, which might be seen as biases 
that damage the quality of collective decisions. For example, literacy tests that indirectly 
disenfranchised poor Black Americans were employed in the American South after the Second 
World War, and lasted until 1965. These literacy tests made it impossible for a certain group (one 
that was already discriminated by not being able to receive a decent education) to promote its 
interests in the public sphere, but also to adequately contribute to the public deliberation and 
participate in the epistemic activities of the political community. Even nowadays, secondary or 
higher education is not equally available to everyone—social status, education and the income of 
parents have been shown as (some of) important indicators for the level of education their children 
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will receive (Farkas 2006). Consequently, the plural voting proposal will give greater political 
power to a certain class or group of people (or reduce the political power of some other class or 
group), and this might introduce some biases and other epistemically damaging features into the 
procedure, making it less likely to produce a correct outcome than a democratic procedure (one in 
which everyone receives an equal vote).  
 One way of answering this objection is by selecting a subset from the educated in which 
certain groups (classes, races, sexes) are represented in proportion to their presence in a general 
population. This should eliminate epistemically damaging features from the procedure by 
proportionally representing certain known classifications. However, there are two further objections 
to this answer. First, what about empirically latent (not empirically testable) features? Someone can 
suspect that the educated are disproportionately liberal or conservative (or racist and sexist), even 
before there is any way to check that empirically. If someone's objection is based on empirically 
latent features, though it might be disputable, it might be very difficult to disqualify such an 
objection or characterize it as unreasonable. Second, there might be some features that travel with 
education (or are even caused by education) and so get unintentionally favored by the plural voting 
proposal. Estlund invites us to imagine that, unbeknownst to anyone, the better-educated are also 
more sexually frustrated. This feature might offset the benefits of their education, at least regarding 
some public issues, and since these conjectural features are not always known, we would not know 
which issues are thus compromised (Estlund 2003, 2008).  
 Not all of us have to agree that the demographic objection and objections based on latent or 
conjectural features, are strong enough to make us reject scholocracy and the plural voting proposal. 
It is enough that it is not unreasonable to hold these objections. Let us recall that liberal criterion of 
legitimacy requires that political justification of a decision-making procedure must be acceptable to 
all reasonable citizens—if there is even one reasonable (or qualified) objection against a decision-
making procedure (and I think that demographic objection can be reasonable or qualified, even if 
untrue), than the decision-making procedure does not meet the liberal criterion of legitimacy.  
 In the end, even if we can all agree that some kind of education enables those who receive it 
to rule more wisely, we cannot justify a decision-making procedure that privileges these groups to 
each and every reasonable citizen. Since the demographic objection is a reasonable argument 
against scholocracy and the plural voting proposal, they have to be rejected as procedures that 
violate the liberal criterion of legitimacy.  
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4.2.c. Conclusion 
This part of the chapter is focused on the account of political legitimacy presented by John Stuart 
Mill. I characterized his position as a monistic approach to political legitimacy, i.e. as a form of 
instrumentalism. According to Mill, a political decision is legitimate if (and only if) it is a product 
of a (solely) instrumentally justified decision-making procedure. Mill clearly accepts the truth tenet 
(there are political decisions that are better and worse independently of the procedure that has 
produced them) and the knowledge tenet (there are some people who know better what should be 
done in politics, or who are better in producing true or correct decisions), and he seems to be 
accepting a sophisticated form of the authority tenet (those who know better should have greater 
political authority).  
 Mill's position is characterized as 'sophisticated' because, though he accepts the authority 
tenet, he introduces the idea that political authority (at least partly) comes from the acceptance of 
those who are governed. Though Mill's scholocracy (together with the plural voting proposal) surely 
represents a well-developed decision-making procedure with many epistemic qualities (e.g. 
combining the democratic value of diverse perspectives with the value of greater wisdom of the 
few), it is nonetheless unable to meet the liberal criterion of legitimacy. Namely, some might 
reasonably reject the plural voting proposal on the grounds of the demographic objection.  
 I consider Mill's scholocracy as the best political implementation of the authority tenet. It is 
definitively stronger than any form of epistocracy (unlike strong and moderate epistocracy, 
scholocracy avoids 'invidious comparisons' objection), and if Mill's plural voting proposal can be 
reasonably rejected, then any decision-making procedure that accepts the authority tenet can be 
rejected on the grounds of liberal criterion of legitimacy.  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CHAPTER V 
EPISTEMIC DEMOCRACY 
The central claim of epistemic democracy is the idea that the democratic decision-making process is 
evaluated at least in part for its knowledge-producing potential, and its legitimacy-generating 
potential is determined in relation to this (Peter 2011). This is a rather general idea and it allows us 
to characterize many different positions as epistemic: Fabienne Peter's (2011) pure epistemic 
proceduralism discussed in the second chapter and Robert Talisse's (2009a) pragmatist deliberative 
democracy discussed in the third chapter are thus epistemic positions, though the former rejects the 
truth tenet and the latter rejects the knowledge tenet. A position can be qualified as epistemic even if 
it rejects the idea that there are procedure-independent standards for evaluating political decisions, 
as well as if it rejects the idea that some people are better than others in producing decisions that are 
in accordance with that standard.  
 Of course, there are huge differences among various epistemic positions, and not all should 
be endorsed as those offering a plausible account of political legitimacy. Earlier in this thesis I have 
claimed that the truth tenet and the knowledge tenet should be granted, and consequently that 
positions that reject them should be abandoned. Furthermore, I have claimed that the authority tenet 
should be rejected, and the positions that affirm it should be abandoned as well. We need an 
epistemic position that will acknowledge the truth tenet and the knowledge tenet, but will reject the 
authority tenet. Since it endorses the knowledge tenet but rejects the authority tenet, this position 
will have to introduce purely procedural (moral) along with instrumental (epistemic) considerations, 
thus having a non-monistic form: it will have to take into consideration both the fairness of a 
procedure and the procedure's ability to produce (procedurally-independent) good outcomes. 
Finally, since it (at least in part) uses procedural fairness to evaluate legitimacy-generating potential 
of a decision-making procedure, it has to be a kind of egalitarian position. The standard account of 
epistemic democracy, sometimes referred to as (rational imperfect) epistemic proceduralism  52
(Estlund 1997), is such a position.  
 This chapter is divided into three parts. In the first part I present the standard account of 
epistemic democracy, the position that I advocate and want to defend in this thesis. I follow David 
 Estlund (1997) originally named his position epistemic proceduralism, but since a few substantially different 52
positions have been developed in the past decade, and all can be described as a form of epistemic proceduralism, it is 
useful to make a distinction introduced by Peter (2012), thus differentiating between pure epistemic proceduralism 
(Peter), rational imperfect epistemic proceduralism (Cohen, Estlund) and rational perfect epistemic proceduralism 
(Rousseau, Dewey). 
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Estlund (1997, 2008, 2009, 2010) in claiming that, in order to have legitimacy-generating potential, 
a decision-making procedure has to be epistemically the best one among fair decision-making 
procedures. In other words, a legitimacy-generating procedure has to meet two conditions: (i) it has 
to be a fair decision-making procedure, and (ii) it has to be epistemically more reliable than any 
other fair decision-making procedure. I end the first part by concluding that democracy is a 
decision-making procedure with legitimacy-generating potential.  
 Since democracy can take many forms, in the second part of the chapter I discuss epistemic 
aggregative democracy, which emphasizes the epistemic qualities of voting mechanisms. I analyze 
the famous Condorcet's jury theorem, according to which, provided that voters are independent and 
better than random and the political choices are binary, the more citizens participate in the decision-
making process, the greater the chance that the decision produced will be correct. This theorem can 
be a strong argument in favor of aggregative democracy since it shows that no deliberation is 
necessary in order for a procedure to have epistemic value—voting mechanisms alone are enough to 
ensure very high chances that a democratic procedure will produce the correct result. I reject 
epistemic aggregative democracy by showing that Condorcet's jury theorem cannot be applied to 
most political decisions.  
 In the third part of this chapter I discuss epistemic deliberative democracy, one that I find to 
be epistemically the best procedure among fair decision-making procedures. First, I analyze how a 
decision-making procedure can have substantive (epistemic) qualities and how these epistemic 
qualities can be acknowledged and accepted by all reasonable (qualified) points of view. After that, 
I discuss two advantages deliberative democracy has over aggregative democracy: its ability to 
assess and organize information dispersed throughout the political community, and its ability to 
detect and remedy epistemic injustice, a practice that can have highly negative impact on 
procedure's ability to produce correct outcomes.  
 5.1. THE STANDARD ACCOUNT OF EPISTEMIC DEMOCRACY 
The standard account of epistemic democracy was first formulated by Joshua Cohen (1986), who 
originally referred to it as epistemic populism. 
[Epistemic populism] has three main elements: (1) an independent standard of correct decisions—that is, 
an account of justice or of the common good that is independent of current consensus and the outcomes of 
votes; (2) a cognitive account of voting—that is, the view that voting expresses beliefs about what correct 
policies are according to the independent standard, not personal preferences for policies; and (3) an 
 116
account of decision making as a process of adjustment of beliefs, adjustment that is undertaken in part in 
light of the evidence about the correct answer that is provided by the beliefs by others. Thus, the 
epistemic conception treats the process of decision making as, potentially, rational process of the 
formation of common judgments. (Cohen 1986: 34) 
Standard epistemic democrats hold that there exists, independently of the actual decision-making 
process, a correct decision, and that the legitimacy-generating potential of a decision-making 
procedure depends, at least in part, in its ability to generate the correct outcome. This is clearly a 
position that invokes truth-oriented (veritistic) epistemology (Goldman 1987), but also a form of 
consequentialist epistemology, one that evaluates epistemic practices on the basis of their ability to 
produce true beliefs (Percival & Stalnaker 2002). Furthermore, it invokes a partly instrumentalist 
justification since a procedure's ability to produce correct decisions is important for its legitimacy-
generating potential, and by rejecting the authority tenet it also invokes a partly (purely) 
proceduralist justification since procedural fairness is important for its legitimacy-generating 
potential.  
 The standard account of epistemic democracy thus takes a form of non-monistic account of 
political legitimacy. Two questions arise from this classification. First, since a decision-making 
procedure has legitimacy-generating potential depending on both its purely procedural and its 
instrumental qualities, we have to determine whether both qualities are equally important or one has 
priority over the other. Second, since the procedure's ability to produce correct outcomes (according 
to some procedure-independent standard) is a constitutive part of its legitimacy-generating 
potential, we have to determine how epistemically reliable should a procedure be: does it have to 
yield a correct outcome every time (a perfect procedure) or does it have to yield a correct outcome 
in most cases, or at least yield correct outcomes more often than incorrect outcomes (an imperfect 
procedure).  
5.1.a. What Comes First: Purely Procedural or Instrumental Qualities of a Procedure? 
Since the standard account of epistemic democracy is portrayed as a non-monistic account of 
political legitimacy, a natural question that follows is "What comes first?” Should procedural 
fairness have priority over the correctness of outcomes, should it be the other way around, or should 
both qualities be of equal importance for the legitimacy-generating potential of a procedure? David 
Estlund (1997, 2008, 2009) offers the most sophisticated version of the standard account of 
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epistemic democracy, which ultimately rests on the liberal principle of legitimacy : "Our exercise 53
of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the 
essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light 
of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason." (Rawls 1993: 137) The liberal 
principle of legitimacy takes as a default position the absence of authority or legitimate coercive 
power, and requires its justification whenever it is exercised (Estlund 2008). Though this does not 
(at least explicitly) point towards giving priority to purely procedural or instrumental qualities, it 
limits the use of some arguments in the process of justification of particular decision-making 
procedures, i.e. it opens the door for the invidious comparisons objection. Universal suffrage is thus 
given a default status, and we are facing an additional burden of justification whenever we want to 
establish the legitimate power of one group over the other. As long as the conditions of reasonable 
pluralism subsist, this effectively blocks the authority tenet—greater political wisdom of some 
citizens does not authorize them to rule over the others (expert-boss fallacy), and even if there 
would be a convincing moral argument why everyone should endorse the authority of experts 
(normative consent), citizens would be unable to agree on who the experts are. It seems that the 
liberal principle of legitimacy thus gives priority to purely procedural qualities of a decision-making 
procedure over its instrumental qualities. First of all, a decision-making procedure has to be 
grounded in ideas and principles acceptable to all reasonable (or qualified) points of view—since 
the unequal distribution of political power yields the invidious comparisons objection and cannot be 
publicly justified, in order to have legitimacy-generating potential a decision-making procedure has 
to be fair, i.e. to distribute political power equally among all reasonable citizens.  
 Some might see this as a disappointing (or even cowardly) retreat towards pure 
proceduralism—epistemic democracy was promising a lot by emphasizing both the moral (fairness 
of a procedure) and the epistemic (substantive quality of outcomes) qualities of a decision-making 
procedure, but in the end it turns out to be primarily a moral justification of democracy, claiming 
that the truth of particular laws or decisions cannot enter the process of justification of decision-
making procedure that have produced them, unless it can be recognized by all reasonable (qualified) 
citizens. Why should an objection based on false (but still reasonable or qualified) doctrine defeat 
justifications that employ true premises and valid reasoning? Estlund answers this objection by 
claiming (unlike Rawls) that the liberal criterion of legitimacy (or the principle of qualified 
 Estlund calls his version of this principle the principle of qualified acceptability, which requires that, in order to have 53
legitimacy-generating potential, a decision-making procedure has to be grounded on ideas acceptable to all qualified 
points of view. He stresses that this is a necessary, but not necessarily a sufficient condition for having legitimacy-
generating potential (Esltund 2008). 
 118
acceptability) is true—it expresses a truth about legitimacy, i.e. it expresses the truth about what 
kind of doctrines should be allowed to be defeaters in the process of public justification (Estlund 
2008, 2010). There are truths about laws and policies, as well as truths about what gives a collective 
decision-making procedure its legitimacy-generating potential. The standard account of epistemic 
democracy is thus not at odds with the truth, though it rejects the idea that, in the decision-making 
process, only true or correct views should be considered as relevant. Those who insist that the 
political process should 'track the truth' should see that the standard account of epistemic democracy 
does precisely that by asserting the liberal principle of legitimacy as the truth about legitimacy, and 
then disqualifying those who think that only true or correct doctrines should be admitted in the 
process of public justification by appealing to another truth—the truth about legitimacy, presented 
in the liberal principle of legitimacy.  
 Based on the liberal principle of legitimacy, the standard account of epistemic democracy 
claims that, in order to have legitimacy-generating potential, a decision-making procedure has to be 
epistemically the best among those justifiable to all qualified (reasonable) points of view (Estlund 
2008: 42). Since, because of the invidious comparisons objection, we are unable to justify a model 
of unequal distribution of political power that all reasonable (qualified) citizens could accept, the 
first requirement a decision-making procedure has to meet in order to have legitimacy-generating 
potential is to distribute political power equally among the members of a political community: all 
citizens should have an equal chance to participate in the decision-making process and to influence 
the final decision. Since more than one decision-making procedure can meet the first requirement 
(i.e. treat citizens as equals in the decision-making process), the second requirement is introduced to 
differentiate between fair procedures: a procedure has legitimacy-generating potential if it is 
epistemically better than any other fair decision-making procedure. Of course, even here the liberal 
criterion of legitimacy dictates that every reasonable (qualified) citizen should be able to recognize 
the procedure as epistemically better than any other fair decision-making procedure in order for it to 
have legitimacy-generating potential (Estlund 1993).  
5.1.b. How Epistemically Reliable Should a Procedure Be? 
Though the fairness of a procedure has certain priority over its ability to produce outcomes that are 
correct or true according to a certain procedure-independent standard, the non-monistic view still 
emphasizes the instrumental epistemic value of a decision-making procedure. Of course, it makes 
sense to ask what degree of epistemic value are we looking for: does the decision-making procedure 
have to yield a correct outcome every time (perfect procedure) or does it have to yield a correct 
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outcome in vast majority of cases, or at least yield correct outcomes more often than incorrect 
outcomes (imperfect procedure). 
 It is useful to fall back to Rawls and his differentiation between perfect, imperfect and pure 
procedural justice to better understand the possible alternatives. According to Rawls (1971), pure 
procedural justice describes situations in which there is no criterion for what constitutes a just 
outcome other than the procedure itself. Since there is no procedure-independent standard for the 
evaluation of outcomes, this account clearly rejects the truth tenet. An account of epistemic 
democracy that draws on pure procedural justice is Fabienne Peter's (2011) pure epistemic 
proceduralism, which is discussed and finally rejected in the second chapter. Unlike pure procedural 
justice, both perfect and imperfect procedural justice describe situations when there is a procedure-
independent criterion for what constitutes a fair or just outcome of the procedure. They 
acknowledge the truth tenet, but disagree on the procedure's ability to produce the correct outcome. 
Perfect procedural justice describes situations when the procedure guarantees that the fair outcomes 
will be achieved, and imperfect procedural justice describes situations when no method guarantees 
that the fair outcome will be achieved.  
 Can the decision-making procedure guarantee that the correct decision will be produced? 
Rousseau believes it can: democratic procedures answer the question "What should we, as a 
political community, do?" and the answer to this question is true or correct according to some 
procedure-independent standards. The correct answer to the abovementioned question is "whatever 
is common to the wills of all citizens," or whatever is every citizen's "general will" (Rousseau 
1984). Democratic procedures are good means for discovering the general will, and if the 
democratic procedure is properly conducted, it guarantees that the general will will be detected. The 
procedure does not establish the correct outcome (i.e. one in accordance with the general will), but 
if the procedure is properly conducted, it cannot miss—a properly conducted procedure will always 
yield a correct result. A decision produced by a democratic decision-making procedure will in the 
end be legitimate not because of the qualities of a procedure that has produced it (i.e. not because it 
was produced by a democratic procedure), but because it is true or correct (i.e. because it represents 
the general will). Rousseau's position, often characterized as the correctness theory of democratic 
legitimacy (Estlund 1997, Peter 2011), thus represents a case of democratic instrumentalism—a 
democratic decision is legitimate because it is correct according to some procedure-independent 
standards, and democracy is a procedure that enables us to find correct decisions. A properly 
conducted democratic decision cannot make a wrong decision. 
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 Rousseau's account represents a case of democratic instrumentalism (a monistic theory of 
democratic legitimacy) and would therefore have a problem with meeting the liberal principle of 
legitimacy, but it could, for the sake of the argument, be transformed into a non-monistic position, 
where the decision-making procedure is regarded as epistemically perfect, producing correct 
outcomes every time it is properly conducted. This new view would still face two fatal objections: 
first of all, the correctness theory is very demanding and it requires from a decision-making 
procedure to be extremely epistemically reliable. Just like from scientific procedures, we can also 
expect from democracy to generate outcomes of some procedure-independent quality, but we 
cannot expect from every democratic decision to be correct. Rousseau does not offer an account 
demonstrating what gives democracy this enormous epistemic reliability: some argue that 
Condorcet's jury theorem could be used to support Rousseau's claim (Grofman & Feld 1988, 1989), 
and I discuss and ultimately reject this argumentative strategy in the second part of this chapter, 
where I address aggregative epistemic democracy. For now, it is suffice to say that Rousseau's 
correctness theory is too demanding—it attributes democratic procedures much higher epistemic 
reliability than they could possibly have.  
 Second, the correctness theory seems to ask from minority voters not only to accept the 
legitimacy of a democratic decision, but its truth as well. Since a decision is legitimate because it is 
true or correct, and not because it is produced by a decision-making procedure with legitimacy-
generating potential, every democratic decision must simultaneously be accepted both as legitimate 
and true. This calls for some kind of deference of judgment: a minority voter should accept that he 
or she was wrong and simply change his or her view according to the majority view. Following 
Ralws (1950, 1971) and Estlund (1997), I have already argued in the third chapter, when I discussed 
Fabienne Peter's account of epistemic peerhood, that accounts that require deference of judgment 
should be rejected. An account of political legitimacy should demonstrate why minority voters 
should recognize democratic decisions as legitimate even when they had voted otherwise. Citizens 
should be able to keep their political beliefs and opinions even when the majority thinks otherwise: 
to ask them to recognize the legitimacy of democratic decisions is one thing, and to ask them to 
recognize the truth is quite another. This clearly calls for an account of democratic legitimacy that 
allows citizens to recognize that a democratic decision is legitimate even when they do not 
recognize it as true or correct. Democracy should be seen as an imperfect decision-making 
procedure—it cannot guarantee that every decision will be true or correct, though it has an ability to 
approximate correct or true outcomes.  
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 In order to demonstrate how an imperfect decision-making procedure can have legitimacy-
generating potential, Estlund (2009) introduces an analogy with a jury system. Assuming that the 
procedure has been properly conducted, the jury trial produces decisions with legal force, but also 
with some moral force. If the defendant is found guilty than we have a duty to punish him, and if 
the defendant is found not guilty, we have a duty to let him or her go and a duty not to carry out 
private punishments. The jury trial seems to create moral duties regardless of whether the defendant 
is really guilty or not guilty, i.e. regardless of whether any particular verdict is true or correct. 
However, the jury trial would not have this moral force if it did not have its considerable epistemic 
virtues (Estlund 2009: 19). If the jury trial would not have greater chance to reach the correct 
verdict than flipping a coin, it would not have sufficient moral force to produce moral duties. 
Verdicts produced by the jury trial are morally binding even when they are incorrect because the 
jury trial (besides being a fair procedure) has a certain epistemic value that makes it more reliable 
than other fair procedures. Decisions produced through such a procedure are not legitimate and 
morally binding because they are true or correct (as Rousseau would have it), but because they are 
the product of a legitimacy-generating procedure. One can still believe that the verdict produced by 
a jury system (or a democratic decision) is incorrect, but he or she must acknowledge it as 
legitimate since it was produced by a legitimacy-generating procedure.  
 Of course, there might be other collective decision-making procedures that are even more 
epistemically reliable (have greater tendency of producing correct decisions) than democracy (e.g. 
epistocracy and scholocracy discussed in the fourth chapter), but they fail to meet the first 
requirement of political legitimacy (i.e. procedural fairness). Democracy is epistemically the best 
procedure among those that are able to meet the first requirement of political legitimacy (e.g. coin-
flipping, equal lotteries, queen for a day). Other, possibly epistemically better decision-making 
procedures, are eliminated because they are unable to meet the liberal principle of legitimacy, i.e. 
because not every reasonable (or qualified) citizen can see that they are epistemically better than 
other decision-making procedures.  
5.1.c. Conclusion 
I have started this chapter by describing the standard account of epistemic democracy, a position 
which I follow and want to defend in this thesis. Following Joshua Cohen (1986) and David Estlund 
(2008) I have argued that, in order to have legitimacy-generating potential, a decision-making 
procedure has to meet the liberal principle of legitimacy, i.e. it has to be justified by ideas and 
values that all reasonable (or qualified) citizens can be expected to accept. A decision-making 
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procedure thus has to meet two requirements: (i) it has to be fair and give all citizens an equal 
chance to participate in the decision-making process, and (ii) it has to be epistemically the best 
procedure among the set of fair procedures. Procedural fairness of a procedure thus has certain 
priority over its ability to produce substantively correct outcomes. Furthermore, legitimacy-
generating procedure does not have to produce correct outcomes in all cases or in a vast majority of 
cases: all it has to do is to produce correct outcomes more often than any other fair decision-making 
procedure. Finally, this assessment of the epistemic qualities of a procedure also has to be done in 
accordance with the liberal principle of legitimacy: every reasonable (or qualified) citizens must be 
able to see that a certain procedure epistemically performs better than any other in order for it to 
meet the second requirement and have legitimacy-generating potential.  
 I have ended this part of the chapter by claiming that democracy is a decision-making 
procedure with legitimacy-generating potential: it treats all citizens as equals and performs better 
than any other fair procedure, like coin-flipping or equal lotteries. However, as I already argued in 
the second chapter when I discussed Thomas Christino's position, democracy can take many forms 
and some of these forms will perform epistemically better than some other forms of democracy. In 
the rest of this chapter I analyze two such forms of democracy: aggregative democracy, where the 
emphasis is put on the voting mechanisms and their ability to utilize the epistemic value of voting, 
and deliberative democracy, where the emphasis is put on the process of public deliberation and its 
epistemic value. I end this chapter by arguing that deliberative democracy represents a more 
convincing account and is able to produce correct decisions better than any other fair decision-
making procedure.  
  
5.2. EPISTEMIC AGGREGATIVE DEMOCRACY 
In the first part of this chapter I have accepted the main thesis of the standard account of epistemic 
democracy (or rational epistemic proceduralism): in order to have legitimacy-generating potential, a 
collective decision-making procedure has to be epistemically the best procedure among fair 
decision-making procedures. Furthermore, all reasonable (or qualified) citizens should be able to 
recognize this epistemic quality of a decision-making procedure. Epistocracy is thus disqualified for 
not being a fair decision-making procedure, i.e. for failing to satisfy the first criterion of political 
legitimacy. Coin-flipping, equal lotteries, queen for a day and democracy are all fair decision-
making procedures (all give each and every citizen an equal chance to participate in the decision-
making process and to influence the final decision), so they are able to meet the first criterion. 
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However, important differences appear when we apply the second criterion of political legitimacy—
these decision-making procedures will tend to produce results of different epistemic quality, with 
some procedures performing better and some procedures performing worse. I have ended the first 
part of this chapter with the claim that democracy will, in general, produce better results than other 
fair decision-making procedures (e.g. coin-flipping, equal lotteries, queen for a day), and thus meet 
the second criterion of political legitimacy.  
 By claiming that democracy is better than queen for a day (a decision-making procedure in 
which we randomly select one citizen who will be authorized to rule for a day or to make a 
particular political decision) in producing correct or true decisions, we are asserting that there is 
something (instrumentally) epistemically valuable in the democratic decision-making process, 
something that makes the epistemic competence of a political community more reliable than 
epistemic competence of its individual members. What makes a democratic decision-making 
procedure epistemically better than queen for a day? How is it able to produce political decisions 
with epistemic quality that exceeds the epistemic average of its individual members?  
 Aggregative democracy claims that the aim of the democratic processes is to solicit citizens' 
preferences on what should be done in politics and aggregate them together to determine which 
decisions should be made. Proponents of this view hold that democratic participation should 
primarily focus on voting, and the decision with the most votes thus becomes legitimate. Though 
aggregative democracy usually claims that citizens' preferences should be aggregated, it can take 
epistemic form by arguing that, instead of preferences, citizens' opinions on what is right (or true or 
correct) should be aggregated. Epistemic aggregative democracy claims that political communities 
can, under certain conditions, make better decisions than individuals, even without deliberation and 
exchange of arguments. Though common individuals are not very competent and are often wrong 
about what should be done in politics, they can collectively be wise and make collective decisions 
of significant epistemic quality. The crowds can thus be wise and make correct decisions more often 
than individuals (Surowiecki 2005).  
 In this part of the chapter I shall discuss Condorcet's jury theorem, which represents the 
strongest argument in favor of epistemic aggregative democracy. This theorem asserts that, as long 
as voters are more likely to vote correctly than incorrectly, adding more voters increases the 
probability that the majority decision is correct. Consequently, a large group of voters (provided 
they are more often right than wrong) can come to the right decisions more often than any of its 
members (Condorcet 1994). I shall first demonstrate how the jury theorem supports epistemic 
aggregative democracy, and then point out several objections that can be raised against it. In the 
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end, I shall conclude that aggregative democracy lacks the epistemic quality necessary for having 
legitimacy-generating potential.  
5.2.a. Condorcet’s Jury Theorem 
Suppose that a political community is facing an important binary question: it has to decide whether 
to build a nuclear or a coal-fired power station. One of these two options is objectively better than 
the other one, i.e. we can say that one option is correct, while the other is incorrect. Furthermore, 
suppose that each voter is, independently, 51 percent likely to choose a correct option (and 49 
percent likely to choose the incorrect option). If we would adopt queen for a day as an appropriate 
decision-making procedure, the probability that this decision-making procedure would produce a 
correct decision is 51 percent. However, if we would adopt aggregative democracy (with majority 
rule) as an appropriate decision-making procedure, the probability of it producing a correct decision 
would depend on the size of the electorate. In a group of 1000 voters, this probability would be 69 
percent, and in a group of 10 000, it would be 99.97 percent. This indicates that aggregative 
democracy has considerable epistemic value: the majority is almost certain to choose the right 
option, as long as each voter is independently just a little better than random (Goodin & Estlund 
2004).  
 The probability of the majority choosing the right option depends on the size of the 
electorate and the average competence of each voter, as shown on the graph bellow, with the size of 
the electorate represented on X-axis, the probability that the majority will come to the correct 
decision represented on Y-axis, and the epistemic competence of each voter taken as 0.6 (List & 
Spiekermann, forthcoming).  
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Graph 5.1. 
The rationale behind the jury theorem is rather simple: if we have a fair coin, when we flip it there 
is a 50 percent chance that it will turn heads, and a 50 percent chance it will turn tails. Of course, if 
we flip it two or three times, we should not be surprised if it turns heads (or tails) each time. If we 
flip it two times, the probability that it will turn heads both times is 25 percent, and if we flip it 
three times, the probability of it turning heads each time is reduced to 12.5 percent. The more times 
we flip the coin, the smaller the chance that it will turn heads (or tails) every time. Additionally, the 
more times we flip the coin, the more likely it is that the heads—tails ratio is almost exactly 50/50. 
Now, consider we have a non-fair coin, one that has 51 percent chance of turning heads and 49 
percent of turning tails. If we flip it only two or three times, we should not be surprised if it turns 
tails every time. However, the more times we flip it, the greater the chance that the heads—tails 
ratios will almost exactly be 51/49. And if, after numerous flips, the chance that heads will be the 
result of exactly 51 percent of flips is huge, the chance that heads will be the result of more than 50 
percent of flips is even greater. Hence the argument for epistemic aggregative democracy: if each 
citizen is 51 percent likely to be right regarding any particular (binary) political decision, the more 
citizens participate in the decision-making process, the greater the chance that the majority of them 
will be right. This is so even if we abandon the naive idea that all citizens are better than random—
the argument for epistemic aggregative democracy stands even when we assume that the average 
competence is above 50 percent, with individual competences that produce this average being 
distributed normally around the average (some above and some below the average) (Estlund 1997, 
2008).  
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 There are several ways to argue against epistemic aggregative democracy and the jury 
theorem it relies upon. First of all, the jury theorem requires that citizens are mutually independent 
and that one's chance to come to the right decision in no way influences the chance of any other 
citizen to come to the right decision. If one can show that citizens cannot be expected to be 
independent, the jury theorem fails. Second, the jury theorem (as formulated by Condorcet) can 
only be applied to binary choices. If political issues cannot be reduced to binary choices, the jury 
theorem fails. Third, the jury theorem requires that the average competence is (at least) above 50 
percent. If the average competence is below 50 percent, the more citizens participate in the 
decision-making process, the greater the chance that the majority will hold incorrect or untrue 
decision. Therefore, if the average competence is below 50 percent, or if individual competences 
are distributed abnormally around the average, the jury theorem fails to support the epistemic 
aggregative democracy. In the rest of this part of the chapter I shall consider these three objections 
and conclude that epistemic aggregative democracy should be rejected as a decision-making 
procedure with legitimacy-generating potential.  
Objection 1: Voter Independence 
One of the key preconditions for the jury theorem is voter independence: if people tend to follow 
leaders or experts in their decision-making, the theorem fails to support epistemic aggregative 
democracy. Namely, if citizens, although their individual competence is above 50 percent, tend to 
follow the opinions of their political leaders or experts (who might individually be more competent 
than any particular citizen), the epistemic qualities of the jury theorem are lost—we are back at the 
queen for a day decision-making procedure, and the only change is that we collectively vote on who 
shall be the queen, instead od selecting the queen randomly. Furthermore, since we begin by 
following the political or epistemic authority of other individuals, the jury theorem cannot even be 
used to epistemically justify our selection of (political or epistemic) authorities. Therefore, in order 
for the jury theorem to by applicable, the independence of voters must be established.  
 This precondition might not seem very demanding—all that citizens have to do is to 
consider their own reasons and arguments for and against a certain decision, and to clearly say what 
they think is right, without discussing the decision in question with other citizens. This position is 
completely opposite to Talisse's deliberative democracy (Talisse 2009a)—the epistemic value of a 
procedure is ensured only if citizens do not deliberate and exchange reasons and arguments, but 
instead refrain from communication and simply vote for what they think is the right decision 
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(Condorcet 1994). This will ensure that citizens are independent in the voting process, and the 
epistemic value of the jury theorem will be preserved.  
 Though forming your own opinion is very important for the jury theorem, some argue that it 
is simply not enough to ensure the voters’ independence (Dietrich & Spiekermann 2013, Ladha 
1992, List & Spiekermann, forthcoming). Imagine the following scenario: in the final months of 
2007, the US government wants to know whether the recession is imminent. It decides to ask its 
advisors and to adopt the majority view, and in order to ensure their independence, instructs secret 
services to keep an eye on them and to prevent them from communicating. Since we can assume 
that these experts are at least better than random, it should follow that, the more experts are 
consulted, the greater the chance that the recommendation supported by the majority vote will be 
correct. The problem here is the fact that the experts are very likely not independent, even though 
they do not communicate. First of all, they all rely on the same publicly available evidence, and 
hence this evidence influences them and makes them vote in the same way. If the available evidence 
suggests the sustainable economic growth, most (and maybe all) experts will conclude that the 
economic stability is not jeopardized and will vote in the same way. Though experts do not 
communicate, they are not independent. Furthermore, these experts are probably educated at some 
prestigious universities in US (e.g. Harvard Department of Economics, Chicago School of 
Economics) and they probably rely on the same theoretical assumptions for the interpretation of the 
evidence. Their similar education will make their votes dependent even though they do not 
communicate. Therefore, experts (and, by analogy, citizens) can be dependent even though they do 
not communicate and exchange reasons and arguments, and even though they do not follow some 
political or epistemic authority (Dietrich & Spiekermann 2013). The following sketch makes that 
clear by pointing out that, even though there is no casual relation between voters V1 and V2, they 
are both influenced by the same cause C (body of evidence or theoretical assumptions), and 
therefore their relation to the state of the world X is dependent on C. "Even though the votes are 
causally independent, they are not probabilistically independent due to the common cause 
C." (Dietrich & Spiekermann 2013: 94) 
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Diagram 5.1. 
#  
Having access to the same body of evidence, or sharing the same education and theoretical 
background can make the ideal of independence unachievable, thus undermining the strength of the 
jury theorem. 
  
Objection 2: Binary choices 
The jury theorem, as presented by Condorcet (1994), is limited only on binary choices, i.e. 
situations when we have to decide whether or not a particular law of policy is true or untrue, correct 
or incorrect, just or unjust. This can certainly be useful, but most political decisions are not that 
simple, and there is a complex decision-making process that shapes the final binary choices that 
citizens can vote upon. For example, if citizens have to decide whether or not to build a nuclear 
power station, some time before this binary question was put on the agenda, someone had to decide 
whether or not to include coal-fired power station (instead of nuclear power station) into the agenda. 
If we take a natural solution by claiming that citizens should be able to decide among multiple 
options, and not only among two, the epistemic value of the jury theorem is brought into question. 
Consider the following problem that a political community has to answer: 
In order to ensure a decent power supply for the local community, having in mind the need to keep our 
environment clean and sustainable, we should: 
 X) build a thermonuclear power station 
 Y) build a coal-fired power station 
 Z) limit the use of electricity and build none of the above  
There are two possible voting mechanisms and decision-making methods that can be used here. 
First, we could break this choice into three binary questions: should we do X or Y, should we do Y 
or Z, and finally, should we do X or Z (Arrow 1963, 1984, Peter 2011). Since Condorcet's jury 
theorem should still be applicable here, this mechanism should have considerable epistemic value—
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in larger political communities it would be virtually infallible. Consider the example below, 
borrowed from Peter (2011), having in mind that in epistemic aggregative democracy citizens do 
not express their preferences, but their beliefs on whether something is true, correct or just. 
Table 5.1. 
Following the abovementioned pairwise majority voting mechanism, citizens would select the 
following: 
 {X, Y} → X 
 {Y, Z} → Y 
 {X, Z} → X 
Citizens would select X since they see it as more correct than Y and Z, and they would consider Y 
as a middle-ranked solution, one that is worse than X but better than Z. Finally, everyone would 
have good reasons to reject Z and consider it the worse option among the three—even individual 3, 
who considers Z to be the correct solution, would have strong epistemic reasons to embrace X, 
since the Condorcet's jury theorem would guarantee with a very high probability that X is correct. 
However, Kenneth Arrow's (1963, 1984) famous paradox of voting shows that this kind of pairwise 
majority voting mechanism can yield inconsistent results. Consider the following variation of the 
distribution of preferences / beliefs of what is correct: 
INDIVIDUAL 1 INDIVIDUAL 2 INDIVIDUAL 3
MOST PREFERRED 
/ CORRECT
X Y X
MIDDLE RANKED Y Z Z
LEAST PREFERRED  
/ CORRECT
Z X Y
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Table 5.2. 
Following the same pairwise majority voting mechanism, citizens would select the following: 
 {X, Y} → X 
 {Y, Z} → Y 
 {X, Z} → Z 
Citizens would consider X to be more correct than Y, and Y to be more correct than Z, but would 
nonetheless consider Z to be more correct than X . What should citizens do in such a situation? 54
One option is to limit the voting process to only two pairwise choices, but then the agenda (which 
alternatives should we consider first) determines the result of the voting process: if we first vote 
between X and Y, and then between the winner of the first vote and Z, we will get one result, and if 
we first vote between Y and Z, and then between the winner of the first vote and X, we will get 
different result. The epistemic value of the jury theorem will be lost since the correctness of the 
final outcome will depend on the agenda, i.e. on something else than the beliefs of citizens engaged 
in the voting process. It is clear that Condorcet's jury theorem loses its persuasive power when we 
INDIVIDUAL 1 INDIVIDUAL 2 INDIVIDUAL 3
LEAST PREFERRED  
/ CORRECT
X Y Z
LEAST PREFERRED  
/ CORRECT
Y Z X
LEAST PREFERRED  
/ CORRECT
Z X Y
 In order to better understand Arrow's paradox of voting, let us try to apply this abstract scheme on the power station 54
example. Individual 1 is a person who thinks that having a lot of power is crucial for the development of the local 
economy, and also thinks that it would be good to preserve the environment if possible. Individual 1 thus sees nuclear 
power plants as having priority over other alternatives, and sees the idea of spending less electricity and not building 
power plants as disastrous for the economy and clearly incorrect. Individual 2 also believes that electricity is very 
important for the economic development, but is very afraid of the nuclear disasters like those in Chernobyl or 
Fukushima. Consequently, individual 2 will consider coal-fired power station as the best option, followed by no power 
station at all—everything is better than risking a nuclear disaster. Finally, individual 3 cares about the environment and 
not about economy—he considers not building any power stations as the best option, and nuclear power station as the 
second best, since it has lesser negative impact on the environment and he is not afraid of the disaster because those are 
extremely rare. Individual 3, of course, thinks that having a coal-fired power station is an environmental disaster and 
thus clearly incorrect. If we try to vote on a binary question, such as "Should we build a nuclear power plant?", "Should 
we build a coal-fired power plant?" or "Should we not build any type of a power plant?” the majority of citizens will 
vote negatively on all three options. Not only will we be stuck without a clear answer on what should be done, but the 
epistemic qualities of the jury theorem will also be lost because of the Arrow's paradox. 
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try to break multiple choice questions into a series of binary questions—Arrow's paradox of voting 
can be used to undermine the rationality and epistemic value of epistemic aggregative democracy.  
 There is another way of applying the jury theorem on multiple choice questions: instead of 
breaking them into a series of binary questions, we can prove that, if every citizen is more likely to 
select the correct answer than any other answer, the more people participate in the decision-making 
process, the greater the chance that the majority will select the correct answer (Goodin and List 
2001). If we are facing a political choice with three alternatives, only one of which is correct, and if 
every citizen is more likely to vote for the correct alternative than for any other, than increasing the 
number of citizens who participate in the decision-making process will increase the chance that the 
alternative supported by the majority of citizens is true. If each citizen has a 34 percent chance of 
selecting a correct alternative (and 33 percent of selecting each of the remaining alternatives), and if 
a 1000 people participate in the decision-making process, the chance that the majority will select the 
correct alternative is almost 49 percent (Goodin and List 2001). Though this chance is not as 
impressive as with the binary choice questions (when with a 1000 participants the majority will be 
right in 69 percent of the cases), it still points out that aggregative democracy has considerable 
epistemic value (queen for a day would produce a correct result in 34 percent of the cases, and 
aggregative democracy in 49 percent). Furthermore, the larger the number of citizens who 
participate in the decision-making process, the greater the chance that the majority will select the 
correct option—for large political communities this chance rises well above 50 percent, though not 
as high as to suggest virtual infallibility of majority rule.  
 A problem with applying jury theorem on multiple choice questions is reintroduced, 
however, when we consider additional alternatives. While increasing the number of people who 
participate in the decision-making process increases the chance that the majority will select the 
correct option, increasing the number of alternative choices decreases this chance. It seems, 
however, that possible alternatives regarding some political decisions (e.g. creating the state budget) 
are so numerous that the jury theorem would not be a decent guarantee that the option selected by 
majority rule is correct. It would still make an option selected by the majority more likely to be 
correct than any other option, but if the number of other options is huge, then the chance that the 
one selected by the majority is not very impressive. Aggregative democracy would still be an 
epistemically better decision-making procedure than coin-flipping (or, in the case of multiple 
alternatives, dice-rolling), equal lotteries and queen for a day, but we would be left wondering 
whether there is some other fair decision-making procedure that can make our laws and policies 
better or more correct.  
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  Condorcet's jury theorem is very persuasive when applied to binary choice questions. It 
loses its epistemic value when multiple choice questions are introduced, and though it still produces 
epistemically better outcomes than some other fair decision-making procedures (Goodin and List 
2001), much of its persuasive strength is lost. 
Objection 3: Individual Competence 
One of the key premises of Condorcet's jury theorem is the requirement that every voter is at least a 
little better than random, or the average competence is above 50 percent, with individual 
competences that produce this average being distributed normally around the average. However, 
this is by no means obvious, and it seems prudent to investigate this presumption. People have more 
or less systematic views about many issues. Political parties, religious communities, associations of 
civil society and many other organizations gather people who have, to a certain degree and 
regarding some (more or less general) topic, very similar views. If their system is bad (e.g. if it is 
grounded in a false premise) then they could easily be wrong all the time. Take for example 
utilitarians or Kantians; they ground their moral and political beliefs regarding numerous laws and 
policies in the principle of utility or the categorical imperative—if it turns out that one (or both) of 
these principles or ideas is false, they will end up being wrong about many moral and political 
issues. It seems that, at least regarding some moral and political questions, coin-flipping can be 
more accurate than majority rule. If we live in a society where most citizens are utilitarians, and if 
the principle of utility is a false moral principle, the jury theorem will only ensure that the majority 
produces a wrong decision (since it works both ways, if 51 percent of voters are utilitarians, in a 
political community of 10 000 citizens the probability that the majority will select the wrong 
decision would be 99.7 percent). Similarly, if we live in a society where the majority of people are 
racists or sexist, the jury theorem only increases the chance that the majority will come to wrong 
decisions on political matters involving race or sex (Estlund 2009). 
 The problem is that we do not know whether the utility principle or the categorical 
imperative are correct principles and ideas, or at least in the conditions of reasonable pluralism we 
cannot publicly demonstrate that to other reasonable citizens. Consequently, some reasonable 
citizens will have good reasons not to embrace epistemic aggregative democracy as a procedure 
with legitimacy-generating potential. Let us remember that the main argument for epistemic 
aggregative democracy was its ability to produce correct decisions in a vast majority of cases—
however, if some people (e.g. Kantians or anti-racists) think that it will in fact produce wrong 
decisions in a vast majority of cases (because most people are biased towards race or embrace the 
 133
wrong moral principle, thus systematically making their political judgements unreliable), they will 
have good (epistemic) reasons to reject epistemic aggregative democracy and embrace some other 
fair decision-making procedure, at least when deciding about these problematic issues. However, 
since there are still unknown and unexplored biases and errors people might have in their systematic 
thinking, and since we will not be able to reach a public agreement on existing biases and errors, 
there will always be some citizens who will be able to reasonably reject epistemic aggregative 
democracy. The argumentative strategy employed here is very similar to the one I used to reject 
Mill's plural voting proposal—the demographic argument warns us that some systematic biases 
might be present in the group of well-educated citizens, and if it is not unreasonable to claim this, 
plural voting fails as a decision-making procedure with legitimacy-generating proposal since it is 
not able to meet the liberal criterion of legitimacy (i.e. it is not accepted by all reasonable citizens). 
5.2.b. Conclusion 
In the first part of this chapter I have embraced the main thesis of the standard account of epistemic 
democracy—in order to have legitimacy-generating potential, a decision-making procedure has to 
be epistemically the best procedure from the set of fair procedures. We first discard unfair decision-
making procedures, and from the set of remaining procedures select the one that has the highest 
chance to produce correct outcomes. In this part of the chapter I have analyzed epistemic 
aggregative democracy, a decision-making procedure that embodies public equality by giving every 
citizen an equal chance to participate in the process of making and authorizing political decisions, 
and a procedure that might have considerable epistemic value if Condorcet's jury theorem can be 
applied to political decision-making. The jury theorem shows that aggregative democracy can be 
epistemically more reliable than other fair decision-making procedures. However, the jury theorem 
has very demanding assumptions: first, voters should be probabilistically independent, second, all 
political choices have to be binary, and third, citizens should be better than random. I have rejected 
Condorcet's jury theorem by arguing that none of the abovementioned assumptions can be publicly 
realized: because of common evidence and background citizens are not independent, political 
problems often (almost always) take the form of multiple choice questions, and at least in certain 
situations citizens can be worse than random. Though epistemic aggregative democracy meets the 
first criteria of legitimacy (i.e. it is a fair decision-making procedure), it fails to adequately meet the 
second criteria (i.e. its epistemic qualities are not sufficient to give it legitimacy-generating 
potential). We should instead turn to a different model of democratic decision-making and analyze 
the epistemic value of public deliberation—if public deliberation can help us come to correct 
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decisions more often than any other fair decision-making procedure, then epistemic deliberative 
democracy must be the procedure with legitimacy-generating potential. 
5.3. EPISTEMIC DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
I have begun this chapter by accepting the central thesis of the standard account of epistemic 
democracy: in order to have legitimacy-generating potential, a decision-making procedure has to be 
fair (a moral requirement) and has to be able to produce substantively better outcomes than any 
other fair decision-making procedure (an epistemic requirement). In the second part of this chapter I 
have analyzed whether aggregative democracy can have sufficient epistemic value to meet this 
requirement: though the level of necessary epistemic quality is not very high (it has to be better than 
other fair decision-making procedures, like coin-flipping or equal lotteries), aggregative democracy 
supported by Condorcet's jury theorem is not able to adequately meet this challenge. It might be 
better than coin-flipping and equal lotteries, but is it epistemically better than other forms of 
democratic decision-making? In this part of the chapter I discuss the instrumental epistemic value of 
deliberative democracy, claiming that it is epistemically the best decision-making procedure among 
the set of fair decision-making procedures.  
 The literature on the epistemic qualities of deliberative democracy is vast and I do not want 
to discuss much of it in this part of the chapter. Many of these qualities have already been discussed 
and endorsed in the third chapter where I analyzed the pragmatist account of deliberative 
democracy. Instead, here I want to specify how a public account of epistemic value of deliberative 
democracy should look like. It is not enough that deliberative democracy has a tendency to produce 
correct decisions—all (reasonable) citizens have to be able to see and understand this tendency, i.e. 
everyone must be able to see the epistemic value of deliberative democracy. Having established 
how a public justification of epistemic value of deliberative democracy should look like, I consider 
two comparative advantages it has over aggregative democracy: first of all, I analyze how it helps 
citizens assemble information dispersed throughout the political community, thus making better 
informed and better supported decisions, and second, I discuss its ability to discover and counter 
epistemic injustice, something that aggregative democracy fails to achieve. 
5.3.a. Public Justification of (Instrumental) Epistemic Value of Deliberative Democracy 
Before we can start discussing how the epistemic value of deliberative democracy should be 
justified, it is useful to stress once again what level of epistemic value is necessary for a procedure 
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to have legitimacy-generating potential. Deliberative democracy is not challenged by epistocracy, 
scholocracy and other expert-oriented decision-making procedures since these are not fair decision-
making procedures—they fail to meet the liberal criterion of legitimacy (Rawls 1993) or the 
qualified acceptability requirement (Estlund 2008), i.e. they are not acceptable to all reasonable (or 
qualified) citizens. Therefore, deliberative democracy does not have to have strong epistemic value
—moderate epistemic value is sufficient since it has to be better than other fair procedures 
(including coin-flipping, equal lotteries and queen for a day), and not better than all (fair or unfair) 
procedures. I follow Estlund (1997, 2008) in claiming that deliberative democracy does not have to 
show that it is epistemically the best procedure (as pragmatist deliberative democrats want to show), 
but instead it only has to prove that it is better than other fair procedures. Let us now consider two 
possible approaches to the justification of deliberative democracy. 
(i) Substantive Justification 
Having established what it means that a procedure has sufficient epistemic value, I want to turn to 
the process of measuring this epistemic value. One way of proving that a procedure has 
instrumental epistemic value (that it is good in producing correct decisions) is to define some 
substantial standard or correctness, and then to check how often the procedure produces decisions 
that meet this standard. We say that correct decisions are those that maximize the overall utility, or 
those that respect and follow God's will, and then check which decision-making procedure is the 
best in meeting this independent standard of correctness, i.e. which procedure is the best in 
producing correct or true decisions. The problem, of course, arises when we have to define this 
independent standard of correctness, since in the conditions of reasonable pluralism we cannot have 
a public agreement on what represents a correct, true or just decisions. This is the main reason why 
Thomas Christiano (1996, 2008), whose position is discussed in detail in the second chapter, rejects 
the idea that we can have an instrumental justification of democracy—if a procedure is justified 
because it represents good means to achieve a desired end, we need to be able to define this desired 
end, and it has to be seen as desirable by all citizens in order to establish a public instrumental 
justification of that procedure. Since we cannot have a public agreement on any substantial standard 
of correctness (i.e. any desirable end state), we cannot have a public instrumental justification of 
democracy. I recognize the strength of Christiano's argument and agree that we cannot use any 
particular moral or religious doctrine to establish the standard of correctness, though I think that 
some basic ideas (like Christiano's own idea that more well-being is better than less) can be used to 
establish a public instrumental justification of deliberative democracy.  
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 It is clear that not all reasonable citizens will agree on a certain comprehensive doctrine or a 
certain conception of the good. Are there, however, some interests and values so basic that all 
reasonable people will be able to recognize them? Consider, for example, Rawls' idea of primary 
goods, things that every rational man is presumed to want (Rawls 1971), including certain civil and 
political rights, but also health and wealth, as well as the social bases of self-respect. We can 
instrumentally prefer a decision-making procedure if we can show that it is better in producing 
more primary goods than some other decision-making procedure. Similarly, well-being seems to be 
something that is desired by (and due to) all citizens (Christiano 2008), and if we can show that a 
certain decision-making procedure produces more well-being than some other procedure, we can 
say that it is instrumentally better than the other procedure. Alternatively, we can try to define some 
primary bads (Estlund 2008) or evils (Edyvane 2013), like war, famine, epidemic and genocide, 
which every reasonable person should be able to recognize as something undesirable. We can thus 
say that a decision-making procedure has instrumental epistemic value if it produces decisions that 
avoid these primary bads or evils.  
 Some might argue that the epistemic value democracy has is then relatively small: after all, 
democratic regimes have started (unjust) wars, suffered from famine and epidemic, and sometimes 
even committed genocide. I have to agree—the epistemic value of deliberative democracy is not 
amazing, but it also does not have to be amazing. Deliberative democracy has to show that its 
epistemic value is greater than the epistemic value of other fair decision-making procedures, like 
coin-flipping, equal lotteries and queen for a day. This immediately puts opponents in an awkward 
position. To challenge this thesis is to deny that any democratic arrangement could tend to 
perform  better than random (Estlund 2008). That is, I believe, clearly wrong: though democratic 55
 Queen for a day can actually be a fair decision-making procedure that is better than random, at least as long as the 55
majority of people are more often correct than not. Therefore, deliberative democracy has to prove that it is better than 
queen for a day, not simply better than random. I do not consider this particularly difficult, since queen for a day suffers 
from a serious deficit. When considering the epistemic value of decision-making procedures, we should not focus only 
on their ability to produce correct decisions, but also on the damage they can cause by selecting wrong decisions 
(Estlund 1997). In a decision-making procedure that incorporates voting and majority rule, a few evil or extremely 
incompetent citizens will not have a significant impact on the quality of final decisions. However, in queen for a day 
procedure such evil or incompetent citizens might be selected to make a decision, and the damage they might cause will 
be far greater than the damage caused when democracy makes a wrong decision. Queen for a day is a fair decision-
making procedure (it meets the moral requirement) that might be better than random, but it is still not better than any 
other fair decision-making procedure (it fails to meet the epistemic requirement). Namely, deliberative democracy has 
greater epistemic value than queen for a day. 
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decisions can sometimes be wrong, they are generally considerably better than randomly made 
decisions .  56
(ii) Formal Justification 
Another way of proving that a procedure has instrumental epistemic value (that it is good in 
producing correct decisions) is by claiming that it is composed of elements that usually help in (or 
contribute to) producing correct outcomes. This way we can say that someone who has studied for 
an exam will produce better answers than someone who has not studied, though we do not know 
neither questions nor answers in that exam (Estlund 2008). We can thus claim that deliberative 
democracy will tend to produce correct decisions since deliberation generally helps us come to right 
answers. This is an argumentative strategy employed by many defenders of deliberative democracy, 
including Robert Talisse (2009a, 2009b) and Cheryl Misak (2004, 2009), whose positions are 
discussed in the third chapter. They avoid the appeal to any specific conception of the good and 
ground their argumentation in certain fundamental epistemic principles, pointing out that 
responsiveness to reasons, evidence and arguments is the constitutive norm of a belief, and the best 
guarantee that our beliefs will be responsive to best reasons and evidence is to engage in public 
deliberation and establish political conditions that will foster and protect public deliberation. Misak 
and Talisse offer an instrumentalist justification of deliberation, and they avoid Christiano's 
objection since they do not appeal to any specific conception of the good.  
 Both the substantive and the formal approach suffer from certain deficits: substantive 
approach cannot say anything about the democracy's ability to produce correct decisions regarding 
something other than primary goods or primary bads, while the formal approach lacks any means to 
verify whether deliberative procedure contributes to the quality of the decisions produced. 
However, if we take these two approaches as compatible and combine them together, we can 
remedy deficits arising from both sides. We can support the formal approach by claiming that there 
are some cases (primary goods or bads) where democracy performs better than any other fair 
decision-making procedure. We can simultaneously support the substantive approach by claiming 
 Imagine that a political community has to decide what will be the value added tax (VAT) for some basic product. One 56
way is to deliberate about the tax rate and reach the final decision by voting after deliberation (deliberative democracy). 
Another way is to throw a 100-sided die and let the chance decide the tax rate (coin-flipping). Yet another is to let 
citizens cast their votes, and then randomly select one of the votes and set the tax rate according to that vote (random 
lotteries), or to randomly select one citizen and give it authority to decide what should be done (queen for a day). While 
throwing a 100-sided die can make terrible decisions (like 100% tax rate), and equal lotteries and queen for a day can 
allow particular interests to shape the future of a political community, deliberative democracy guarantees, at least to a 
certain extent, that the decision in question will not be disastrous for the community nor will it explicitly promote 
interests of only a certain individual or group. 
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that, since deliberative democracy performs well on the issues regarding primary goods or bads, the 
same procedure would tend to perform well on other matters (Estlund 2008).  
 Deliberative democracy can thus be publicly justified: every reasonable (qualified) citizen 
should be able to see and recognize its epistemic value when discussing issues regarding primary 
goods or bads, and everyone should be able to conclude that it tends to perform well on other 
matters. In the rest of this part of the chapter I shall discuss two formal cases for deliberative 
democracy, i.e. I shall argue that, unlike aggregative democracy, deliberative democracy is 
composed of elements that usually help in (or contribute to) producing correct outcomes. 
5.3.b. Advantage 1: Assessing Information Dispersed Throughout the Political Community 
In the third chapter I have discussed Fabienne Peter's new theory of epistemic democracy, one 
grounded in the idea of epistemic peerhood and second-personal epistemic authority. Peter rejects 
the knowledge tenet by claiming that political issues are often too wide-ranging or complex, or that 
relevant information is dispersed among the members of political community (Peter 2012). Though 
I have argued that the knowledge tenet should be granted, I follow Peter's idea that relevant 
information is dispersed throughout the political community and emphasize that a decision-making 
procedure with epistemic value sufficient for having legitimacy-generating potential should be able 
to assess and organize the dispersed information. This is clearly something coin-flipping, equal 
lotteries and queen for a day are unable to achieve—in order to have this epistemic value, a 
decision-making procedure has to rely on collective intelligence and the idea that something 
epistemically valuable is gained when a group (instead of an individual) makes a political decision. 
This idea was put forward by Aristotle (1984), who used it to counter Plato's (2000) epistocratic 
views. It is important to note that the idea that something epistemically valuable is gained when a 
group makes a political decision can support both aggregative and deliberative democracy. 
Condorcet's jury theorem, for example, clearly states that a large group of individuals who are better 
than random (at least regarding binary questions) will perform better than an individual. In fact, the 
larger the group, the greater the chance that it will produce correct decisions. Though the jury 
theorem mathematically shows that, if some conditions are met, a group will tend to produce better 
decisions than an individual, it says nothing on how the information dispersed throughout the 
political community can be collectively assessed. Each citizen is expected to vote independently, 
while deliberation and exchange of reasons and evidence are not considered as something valuable 
or necessary for the epistemic quality of the procedure. Even if we consider a weaker version of 
epistemic aggregative democracy, one not grounded in Condorcet's jury theorem, this problem 
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cannot be avoided. A weaker version of aggregative democracy could allow that we learn from the 
choices other people make  (e.g. I can learn that you do not support nuclear power stations by 57
noticing that you have voted against the proposal that includes building a nuclear power station in 
our region), but this still does not allow us to understand the underlying reasons for those choices. 
Assuming that relevant information is dispersed throughout the political community, the only way 
to collectively assess this information is to enter a public deliberation and see what reasons, 
arguments and evidence other people used to make their choice regarding a particular political 
question.  
 David Estlund introduces a useful analogy that might help us understand how public 
deliberation helps us collectively assess the dispersed information: 
Consider the proverbial blind men and the elephant. Each can touch a different part, but this is not enough 
to identify the animal before them. [...] If the blind men can talk with each other, there is some hope that 
they can figure out that the object is an elephant, though no one could do this alone. (Estlund 2008: 
229-231) 
Deliberation can be seen as a process of putting together different parts of a puzzle, and these 
valuable parts of a puzzle are pieces of information that one has, featured in reasons, arguments and 
evidence one has to support his or her vote. Democracy is epistemically valuable primarily because 
it enables sharing and assessing diverse perspectives (Bohman 2006). This can only by achieved 
through public deliberation: mere aggregation of preferences or beliefs regarding what is right is not 
enough. Aggregative democracy is thus epistemically inferior to deliberative democracy: it fails to 
incorporate the epistemic value of diverse perspectives, which can only be realized through public 
deliberation. 
 Of course, besides incorporating the epistemic value of diverse perspectives, deliberative 
democracy can help us detect when individual beliefs or votes are biased, self-interested or 
epistemically flawed in some other way (Talisse 2009, Peter 2008). In the final part of this chapter I 
shall focus on one particular example and try to demonstrate how deliberative democracy can 
remedy epistemic injustice, i.e. correct systematic and persistent biases and prejudices that cause a 
hearer to give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker's word (Fricker 2007, 2013). Besides being 
a serious moral problem, epistemic injustice is also an epistemic flaw, and a decision-making 
procedure that is unable to discover and remedy epistemic injustice will, other things equal, have 
 Since this version of epistemic aggregative democracy does not include voter independence (because citizens tend to 57
learn by observing the choices of others), it cannot be supported by Condorcet's jury theorem (Goodin 2003). 
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lesser epistemic value than a procedure that can remedy it more successfully. In the next section I 
shall argue that aggregative democracy cannot remedy epistemic injustice, which can only be 
recognized and removed (though not always successfully) through public deliberation. 
5.3.c. Advantage 2: Remedying Epistemic Injustice 
Epistemic injustice might be about distributive unfairness in respect of epistemic goods (such as 
access to information or education). This kind of injustice can seriously damage the legitimacy-
generating potential of a decision-making procedure, making it fail both the moral (fairness of 
procedure) and the epistemic (correctness of outcomes) requirement. I shall discuss these kinds of 
epistemic injustice, as well as how they can be remedied, in the sixth chapter. Here I want to focus 
on the distinctively epistemic (and not distributive) kinds of injustice described and analyzed by 
Miranda Fricker (2007, 2013). Testimonial injustice is a kind of epistemic injustice when a 
prejudice or bias causes a hearer to give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker's word. Police 
not believing a black person can be an example of testimonial injustice. This injustice is caused by 
the prejudice in the economy of credibility. Another distinctively epistemic kind of injustice Fricker 
calls hermeneutical injustice, which happens when one is in an unfair disadvantage because of the 
social interpretative resources. Consider a female secretary being sexually harassed in 1960's, 
before the concept "sexual harassment" was coined. Though she was able to realize that something 
wrong had been done to her, she was unable to clearly express it to others since the appropriate 
concept was missing. Hermeneutical injustice is thus caused by a structural prejudice in the 
economy of collective hermeneutical resources (Fricker 2007). Just like unfair access to information 
or education, these distinctively epistemic kinds of injustice can seriously damage the legitimacy-
generating potential of a decision-making procedure, threatening both its fairness and its ability to 
produce true, correct or just decisions.  
 In the rest of this part of the chapter I shall focus on testimonial injustice, a kind of 
epistemic injustice that is easier to detect and remove. Though testimonial injustice takes a form of 
credibility deficit, not every credibility deficit is a case of testimonial injustice. One can make an 
innocent error, have bad epistemic luck or simply have a false belief about the speaker, thus 
attributing the speaker lesser credibility than what is due to him . This is a case of credibility 58
 Imagine an ethicist searching the Internet for information about the author of a scientific article. She finds out that the 58
author of the article works at the School of Medicine, and concludes that the author is not an expert in ethics. However, 
it might be that the author is also an ethicist or a bioethicist, teaching medicine students bioethics or practical ethics and 
thus being affiliated to the School of Medicine. This is clearly a case of credibility deficit since the first ethicist 
attributed inadequate credibility to the second, but this is not a case of epistemic injustice (Fricker 2007: 22). 
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deficit, but there is no ethical or epistemic culpability. Similarly, if a hearer makes a careless search 
and ends up having a false belief about the speaker (and attributes him credibility on the basis of 
that false belief), we might find this error epistemically culpable, but there is still no ethical 
culpability, and an ethically non-culpable mistake cannot wrong the speaker. Ethical poison of 
testimonial injustice comes from the bias or prejudice in the judgment of the hearer (Fricker 2007). 
Furthermore, most cases of testimonial (epistemic) injustice are systematic: they are created by 
identity prejudices that 'track' the subject through different dimensions of social activity (economic, 
educational, professional, legal, political, etc.). They are an operation of identity power—one party 
effectively controls what the other party does in the way that depends upon collective conceptions 
of social identities in play. Similarly, cases of hermeneutical injustice are also an operation of 
identity power—a group's disadvantage and inability to conceptualize its social experiences derives 
from a group participating unequally in the practices through which social meanings are generated 
(i.e. group is hermeneutically marginalized).  
 Epistemic injustice can thus endanger the fairness of the decision-making process by 
subjecting some to the identity power of others, but it can also endanger the epistemic quality of the 
decision-making process by not attributing adequate epistemic credibility to some groups. Though it 
might seem that aggregative democracy has an advantage over deliberative democracy since 
citizens no longer have to assess the credibility of the speakers (decisions are made by voting and 
no deliberation is needed, and thus it seems that the prejudices in the economy of credibility do not 
enter the decision-making process), we should not forget that most cases of epistemic injustice are 
systematic and 'track' the subject through different dimensions of social activity. A group with 
greater identity power will, because of certain biases and prejudices, systematically outvote a 
weaker group. Aggregative democracy lacks the mechanism to remove the negative epistemic effect 
biases and prejudices have on the decision-making process. The only way of remedying epistemic 
injustice is to try to detect and become aware of biases and prejudices in our economy of credibility, 
and to remove them from our decision-making processes. This can be done at the individual level or 
at the institutional level. Fricker originally takes an individualistic approach—we must be virtuous 
hearers and try to see the issue at hand from someone else's perspective (Fricker 2007). This is a 
praiseworthy task, but when faced with massive structural injustice, individual epistemic virtue 
cannot solve the problem at hand. Just like the practice of individual charity in the context of 
massive structural poverty cannot be as effective solution as economic policies and economic 
institutions that redistribute wealth and prevent mass poverty in the first place, individual epistemic 
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virtue cannot be as effective as epistemic institutions that prevent epistemic injustice from arising. 
Structural injustices call for structural remedies (Anderson 2012).  
 We should seek for the best structural solution to the abovementioned problem, i.e. we 
should look how to organize our social and political institutions, but the decision-making practices 
as well, in order to remedy epistemic injustice. Epistemic aggregative democracy seems to be 
unable to serve this purpose: since it disregards public deliberation and focuses on voting 
mechanisms, existing biases and prejudices are not detected and the existing relations of power—
those that have caused the epistemic injustice in the first place—are maintained and supported. 
Even forms of aggregative democracy that rely on Bayes' theorem, as described but not endorsed by 
Goodin (2003), where we should adjust and revise our belief (or vote) according to beliefs (or 
votes) of others, do not adequately answer this problem. Namely, Bayesian approach takes that we 
should see the fact that many citizens voted for p as an evidence for p, and we should therefore 
adjust our own vote towards p. Though this approach embodies some form of belief revision, it 
does not evaluate the content of a particular decision nor the substantive reasons supporting it, but 
simply maintains the rule of the majority group. The majority group does not owe reasons to 
anyone, and the voting mechanism does not allow minority groups to present reasons and 
arguments in favor of their own beliefs.  
 Epistemic deliberative democracy seems to be better equipped to answer this problem: 
universal participation on terms of equality of all inquirers, supported by deliberative values of 
inclusion and toleration, can be a decent ground for establishing epistemic justice (Anderson 2006). 
Furthermore, displaying pragmatist deliberative virtues can be useful for establishing 
trustworthiness: by requiring from every citizen to be ready to articulate reasons and evidence that 
support his or her belief, as well as to answer criticism by others, we are creating a system that will 
be able to detect biases and prejudices, but also to remove them, since engaging in the deliberative 
process enables us to better evaluate epistemic credibility of others (Talisse 2009a, Festenstein 
2009). Finally, biases can be seen as valuable resources for detecting other biases. By allowing 
biased people to enter the process of public deliberation and by facilitating contestation from a 
multitude of perspectives, we can become aware of our own biases and thus reduce their negative 
impact on the epistemic value of the collective decision-making procedure (Catala 2015, Goodin 
2006). Deliberation certainly cannot detect each and every bias or prejudice present in our decision-
making procedures and remedy every instance of epistemic injustice, but it can detect and remedy 
at least some of them, which is still a better result than one produced by any aggregative 
mechanism. 
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5.3.d. Conclusion 
I have generally accepted that every democratic decision-making procedure meets the first 
requirement for having legitimacy-generating potential (procedural fairness). Furthermore, some 
non-democratic procedures, like coin-flipping, equal lotteries and queen for a day, are also able to 
meet this requirement. We should differentiate among fair decision-making procedures on the basis 
of their epistemic qualities, i.e. on their ability to produce correct outcomes. Furthermore, public 
justification of the procedure's epistemic value must be given in order for that procedure to have 
legitimacy-generating potential—every reasonable (qualified) citizen should be able to see and 
recognize this epistemic value. Following Estlund (2008), I have concluded that there are at least 
some end states (like famine and genocide) that all reasonable citizens should be able to recognize 
as undesirable, and claimed that deliberative democracy can be substantively justified by appealing 
to its ability to prevent these end states. Furthermore, since deliberation generally contributes to the 
quality of the results produced (which is proved by its performance regarding some end states 
everyone can see as undesirable), deliberative democracy can be formally justified as well.  
 Furthermore, I have analyzed two advantages deliberative democracy has over aggregative 
democracy. First, it enables us to combine our knowledge and the available evidence (like pieces of 
a puzzle) in order to produce decisions of greater epistemic quality, and second, it enables us to 
remedy epistemic injustice, a serious moral and epistemic defect that aggregative democracy is 
unable to avoid.  
 Up to now, I have been trying to answer which requirements a decision-making procedure 
has to meet in order to have legitimacy-generating potential and, having determined these 
requirements, I have discussed which decision-making procedure is best in meeting these 
requirements. I have ended by claiming that epistemic deliberative democracy is the procedure with 
legitimacy-generating potential. However, certain social and economic conditions have to be met in 
order for deliberative democracy to have this legitimacy-generating potential once it is applied to 
real-life politics. In the next chapter I discuss the social and economic conditions that have to be in 
place in order to ensure the procedural fairness and the substantive epistemic quality of deliberative 
democratic decision-making procedures.  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CHAPTER VI 
INSTITUTIONALIZING EPISTEMIC DEMOCRACY 
The primary focus of my thesis is to build an epistemic justification of democratic procedures. This 
task is addressed in the first five chapters: having endorsed the truth and the knowledge tenet, and 
having rejected the authority tenet, I have concluded that the justification of democratic legitimacy 
has to rest (in part) on its epistemic value, because otherwise it would have equal legitimacy-
generating potential as other fair decision-making procedures (like coin-flipping or equal lotteries). 
Finally, following Estlund (2008), I have emphasized that democracy's epistemic value does not 
have to be very strong—democracy does not have to produce correct decisions every time or almost 
every time, it is enough that it performs better than any other fair decision-making procedure. 
However, democracy can take many different forms, and different democratic procedures can have 
(and do have) different (instrumental) epistemic value. I have finished the fifth chapter by arguing 
that public deliberation has greater epistemic value than the simple aggregation of political 
preferences or claims through a voting mechanism, thus concluding that epistemic deliberative 
democracy represents the procedure with legitimacy-generating potential.  
 However, many questions still remain unanswered. Should political decisions be made 
through deliberation of all citizens, or should their political representatives make political decisions 
for them? What is the role of experts in a democratic decision-making process? Can epistemic 
democracy function properly in any socioeconomic system, and if not, what are the appropriate 
social and economic conditions for epistemic democracy? These are some of the questions I shall 
try to answer in this chapter. Of course, many other important questions will have to remain 
unanswered: as it was said earlier, this research is primarily focused on the epistemic value of 
democracy and the epistemic account of political legitimacy.  
 In the first part of this chapter I discuss the role of experts in a democratic decision-making 
process. Having endorsed the knowledge tenet in the third chapter, I have claimed that there are 
those who know better what should be done in politics. Democratic procedure would lose much of 
its appeal if it would be unable to take advantage of the experts' knowledge. I follow Kitcher (2011) 
and Christiano (2012) in embracing a form of division of epistemic (and political) labor—citizens 
and their political representatives should deliberate and set aims that the political community is to 
pursue, while experts and policy-makers should devise means (laws, public policies and political 
decisions) needed to achieve the aims set by citizens. Of course, I also claim that the process should 
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not be unidirectional: experts should be able to help citizens select feasible and coherent aims, while 
citizens should be able to help experts in creating policies and decisions. Deliberative democracy is 
an appropriate political setting for this kind of bidirectional communication.  
 Social and economic conditions necessary for the epistemic (but also moral) value of 
democracy are discussed in the second part of this chapter. I claim that it is not enough to ensure 
equal formal participation of all citizens in the process of making and authorizing political decisions
—we should go deeper and ensure substantial political equality, which requires imposing relatively 
strict deliberative norms not only on formal, but also on informal political sphere. In order to ensure 
moral and epistemic value of democracy, we should favor social and economic arrangements 
characterized by wide dispersion of capital, having in mind that substantial inequalities in wealth 
and social status can cause political inequalities and unequal participation of citizens in a 
democratic decision-making process, thus endangering the legitimacy-generating potential of 
democratic procedures.  
6.1. THE ROLE OF EXPERTS IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 
John Dewey (1987) took an optimistic view of democracy—he saw it as a 'method of organized 
intelligence', or as a method by which information dispersed throughout the political community 
can be assessed and used to make better decisions about issues of public interest. Similar views are 
held by many other defenders of pragmatist deliberative democracy (Talisse 2009a, 2009b, Misak 
2000, 2009) discussed in the third chapter of this thesis. Citizens should present the arguments, 
reasons and evidence for their political claims, they should engage each other in public deliberation 
and evaluate the presented reasons and evidence, and finally they should collectively decide what 
should be done. Dewey and other pragmatists believe that decisions produced by this deliberative 
process will have greater instrumental epistemic value than those produced by voting (aggregative 
democracy) or equal lotteries, but even greater instrumental epistemic value than decisions 
produced by epistocracy and other forms of the rule of experts.  
 One of the problems of this approach is the fact that politics regards numerous complex 
issues, many of which we know very little (or virtually nothing) about. Political decisions regarding 
genetically modified organisms, climate change or the consequences of joining the Eurozone are so 
complex that we cannot have informed and critical judgments about these issues without receiving 
extensive education. Of course, some people (those who have received such education) will be able 
to make informed and critical judgments (this is why I think that the knowledge tenet should be 
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granted), but we will not be able to understand and evaluate the reasons, arguments and evidence 
they use to support their claims. As John O'Neill (2002: 259) puts it, " [...] the arguments pass me 
and most other citizens by. I simply would not know how to appraise the evidence even if you gave 
me all the detail. I want to know not if the evidence supports this or that conclusion, but whether I 
have good reasons to trust those who offer it." It turns out that we are not as independent epistemic 
agents as it was thought during the Enlightenment—we heavily rely on others when we form, 
justify and defend our beliefs. Furthermore, because of the division of epistemic labor, we cannot 
expect every citizen to equally be able to make informed and critical judgments regarding different 
political issues: owing to their extensive education, some will be able to present better reasons and 
evidence, and those who have not received such an education will not be able to evaluate or even 
understand these reasons and evidence. If we want to have a decision-making procedure that can 
make decisions of decent epistemic quality, we should acknowledge the fact of epistemic inequality 
and find a way using superior knowledge of the few.  
 I have claimed in the third chapter that the knowledge tenet should be granted—there are 
some people who, with respect to some issues, know more than others. Furthermore, I have argued 
in the fourth chapter that the authority tenet should be rejected—even if someone is an expert, this 
fact does not make one a boss. Finally, in the fifth chapter, I have argued that the legitimacy-
generating potential of collective decision-making procedures should partly depend on their ability 
to produce correct or true decisions. This brings us to a difficult question: if there are those who 
know better and if the legitimacy-generating potential of decision-making procedures depends in 
part on their ability to produce correct decisions, but those who know better should not have greater 
political authority than those who know worse, what should be the role of those who know better? 
What should be the role of experts  in a democratic society? 59
 There are two straightforward answers to this question, and they have both been discussed in 
the previous chapters. One extreme way to solve this problem is to deny the plausible suggestion of 
unequal knowledge (Peter 2012) or to deny that unequal knowledge matters (Talisse 2009a), i.e. to 
reject the knowledge tenet. Another extreme way to solve it is to deny the plausible idea of political 
and moral equality (Plato 2000, Mill 1977a), i.e. to endorse some form of the authority tenet. I have 
 Alvin Goldman (2001) defines an expert in an area as someone who has (1) an amount of true beliefs that is 59
considerably greater than ordinary people and that meets a threshold with respect to: (i) the subject matter in a domain; 
and (ii) the ideas and arguments within the community of persons who have a lot of true primary beliefs concerning the 
subject matter in the domain; and (2) a set of skills that enable that person to test the ideas and arguments as well as 
extend the ideas and arguments of the community to new problems and objects within the domain.
 147
discussed and rejected both polar alternatives in the third and fourth chapter, and now I want to 
argue in favor of some form of a middle ground, i.e. in favor of some division of epistemic labor.  
6.1.a. Technical vs. Moral Knowledge 
To claim that, regarding some issues, there are those who know what should be done better than 
others is not to claim that for every issue there is a group of people who are experts. Thomas 
Christiano (2008) introduces a useful differentiation between technical and moral knowledge. 
Technical knowledge regards crafts, skills and disciplines like engineering, medicine, carpentry, 
physics or computer sciences. Most people can see this knowledge as useful and some educational 
institutions can be publicly seen as reliable sources of this knowledge. We can agree that we want to 
be medically treated by doctors (and not engineers) and that we want our bridges to be designed and 
built by engineers (and not doctors). Regarding these crafts, skills and disciplines we can publicly 
agree (at least to a certain degree) whether someone is an expert. However, there is another kind of 
knowledge, one that regards what is right and what is wrong. This moral knowledge is not public as 
technical knowledge is, and we have a widespread disagreement on both the moral issues and the 
experts in morality. While we can publicly agree that we want to be medically treated by doctors, 
we cannot publicly agree on who should make our laws regarding euthanasia or abortion. Some will 
favor ethics professors (though they will also disagree since some are Kantians, some utilitarians 
and some might employ virtue ethics), others will favor their religious leaders (who might also 
disagree depending on the religion they represent), and yet some might favor scientists (doctors, 
evolutionary biologists, sociologists) or even other public figures (singers, actors, football players).  
 Though Christiano's differentiation can be useful, it can hardly be applied to most political 
issues. Namely, political questions usually ask what should be done regarding a certain problem or 
state of things, which inevitably invokes the normative approach and moral knowledge. Climate 
change, genetically modified organisms and nuclear energy might at first seem as purely scientific 
issues (technical knowledge), but as soon as we ask what should we, as a political community, do 
about them, we are introducing the political dimension (moral knowledge) . Namely, these policies 60
bring costs that some citizens have to bear, but also bring benefits that some citizens will probably 
 Carl Schmitt (2007) writes that scientific claims are incomprehensible if one does not know who exactly is affected, 60
combated, refuted or negated by such claims. Since scientific claims affect, refute or negate someone or some groups of 
persons (e.g. proclaiming the truth of Darwinism refutes the Christian view of creation, claims about the human 
contribution to the climate change refute those who think that government should not regulate the economy). Making 
something scientific does not make it non-political (Turner 2007).
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enjoy more than others. How should these costs and benefits be distributed is definitively not a 
purely scientific issue.  
 This brings us to an interesting position: we can publicly agree that someone is an expert in 
nuclear physics (technical knowledge), but we cannot publicly agree that the same person is an 
expert regarding whether we should build a nuclear power station (moral or political knowledge) . 61
However, we still believe that the knowledge in nuclear physics somehow helps us make better 
decisions on nuclear power stations and better energy policies. If all members of a political 
community gained the relevant technical knowledge in nuclear physics, it is reasonable to expect 
that the decisions on nuclear power stations would improve. Having this technical knowledge would 
help us formulate and pursue our freely chosen projects more effectively. However, since we do not 
have this technical knowledge, and yet some people (experts) do, our deference to experts might be 
appropriate since experts help us overcome the limitations of our own knowledge (Kitcher 2001, 
2011, Zagzebski 2012).  
 How can we reconcile the former idea that experts with technical knowledge cannot be 
(publicly) considered as experts regarding moral or political knowledge with the latter idea that 
certain form of deference to experts might be appropriate? To understand how this can be done, we 
should look more closely into different stages of the decision-making process.  
6.1.b. The Strict Division of Epistemic Labor 
There are some theories of democracy that rely on a strict division of epistemic labor. They 
recognize the need for laws and policies to be authorized by all reasonable (or qualified) citizens, 
and want to achieve the quality of outcomes by including only the experts in the decision-making 
process. This is still a democratic rule since laws and policies are democratically authorized, but the 
content of laws and policies is shaped by experts, selected by people to represent them and to make 
decisions for them. This is (to a certain degree) a case with most modern Western democracies—
those participating in the process of shaping the laws and policies and usually experts and 
politicians, and not ordinary citizens. However, some scholars tend to overemphasize the division of 
labor, basically dividing citizens into two groups: those who make laws and policies (politicians and 
experts) and those who do not participate in the decision-making process, but only in the process of 
authorization. Joseph Schumpeter (2008) and Anthony Downs (1957) thus portray citizens as 
 Note that this does not imply that there are no experts regarding moral or political issues, as Peter (2012) would have 61
it. There might be experts regarding these issues. The only problem is that we cannot publicly agree on who the experts 
are. There is no such group of experts regarding moral and political issues that can be seen and recognized as such by 
every member of the political community. 
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rationally ignorant of the facts of the society and lacking the knowledge necessary to make 
reasonable policies. There is nothing fundamentally wrong with citizens in general—they simply 
decided to specialize in other fields (engineering, philosophy, carpentry, etc.) and not in politics. We 
cannot be experts regarding everything. Since there are those who specialize in politics (i.e. 
politicians), they should make laws and public policies, and their right to make these decisions does 
not come from their expertise (that would call for the authority tenet and some form of epistocracy), 
but from our choice that these experts in politics should rule. Of course, if we are not satisfied with 
their performance, we can remove these experts from power in the next elections, and select new 
experts in politics—those we believe will perform better and produce better decisions. While 
Schumpeter requires that the citizens evaluate the performance of politicians directly (by evaluating 
the quality of the results their rule has produced), Downs allows that citizens can use cognitive short 
cuts (like party affiliation) for determining how their interests and concerns can be advanced. Both 
positions, however, perceive society as divided into two groups: those who make decisions 
(politicians) and those who authorize them (citizens).  
 The problem with this approach is that it gives us an oversimplified account of what is going 
on in a democratic society. Their accounts omit group associations, media, universities, think tanks 
and lobbying and interest groups. Many of these groups are devoted to political issues, and usually 
they make a certain difference in the policies and laws that are enacted in a political community 
(Christiano 2012). For instance, trade unions usually have a strong opinion on minimum wage 
policies or labor laws in general, and workers organize in trade unions because thus they can 
influence the decision-making process. Schumpeter and Downs embrace too strong an interpretation 
of the division of epistemic labor, dividing society into two groups and failing to explain the role of 
many other political actors in a political community. Their accounts seem to be epistemically flawed
—a division of epistemic labor that is too strong can lead to the loss of the value of diverse 
perspectives (Bohman 2006), but can also turn out to be incompatible with political equality 
(Christiano 2012). We should try to find a different model of decision-making, one that also rests on 
the division of epistemic labor, but is nonetheless able to include political equality and the epistemic 
value of diverse perspectives in the decision-making process. 
6.1.c. The Appropriate Division of Epistemic Labor 
Kitcher (2011) and Christiano (2008, 2012) present a different account of the division of epistemic 
labor. This account of the division of epistemic labor should be "compatible with the idea that 
citizens are essentially in the driver’s seat with regard to the society and equals in the process of 
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driving the society." (Christiano 2012: 33) Citizens are "in the driver's seat of the society" as long as 
they, as free and equal, choose the basic aims that society should pursue. Citizens select basic 
values and the trade-offs among those values, and they select their political representatives 
respectively. In other words, citizens choose in what kind of a world they want to live (i.e. they 
choose a package of political aims), and political representatives offer different end states that 
citizens can vote for. Of course, citizens have different values and will set different aims, and 
political representatives (as well as citizens and interest groups) can deliberate and negotiate to form 
workable majorities in the legislature. Deliberation and (in part) negotiation are activities performed 
by the representative government (e.g. the parliament). After the majority in the representative 
government has defined the aims the society should strive for, the first step in the decision-making 
process is over. The next step is the process of making laws and public policies that will enable the 
realization of the selected aims. Finding the best means to meet the desired and defined aims is the 
function of the executive and administrative parts of the government (Christiano 2012, Mill 1977a).  
 I follow Christiano (2012: 34) in claiming that "the rationale for this division of labor is that 
expertise is not as fundamental to the choice of aims as it is to the development of legislation and 
policy." Citizens are able to deliberate on values and to understand their own interests, often better 
than the experts can, and if we want political decisions to promote interests of all citizens equally 
(Christiano 2008), we should favor a decision-making system in which citizens (as free and equal) 
select aims the society is to pursue . If citizens choose the aims of the society (through 62
representative bodies with a legislative role), and if the executive and administrative parts of the 
government properly perform their function, we can say that the citizens are (in a large part) in 
control of the society. Of course, since politicians and civil servants in the executive and 
administrative parts of the government need not necessarily be experts in all the relevant issues they 
have to make decisions about, experts from universities, political parties, interest group associations 
and parts of the administration are invited to participate in the deliberation and the policy-making 
process. It is important to emphasize, however, that their role is no longer defining valuable aims 
the society is to pursue, but devising means and trade-offs necessary for achieving the already 
defined aims.  
 There are two arguments in favor of citizens choosing aims the society is to pursue. The first one is the moral 62
argument, claiming that the interests of all citizens can be publicly equally improved only if the political aims are 
selected by a procedure that gives everyone an equal chance to participate in the process of selecting these aims 
(Christiano 2003, 2008). The second one is the epistemic argument, claiming that a wise and benevolent despot would 
be unable to perceive and understand everyone's interests (and thus make correct political decisions), so we should 
favor an aim-defining procedure that gives everyone a chance to participate in the process of choosing aims the society 
is to pursue (Mill 1977a, 1977b). 
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Diagram 6.1. 
#  
The model of democratic decision-making presented above seems to be able to incorporate both the 
moral demand for equality of all citizens (which enters in the first stage of the process) and the 
epistemic demand for the quality of results (which enters partly in the second and mostly in the 
third stage of the process). If we apply this model to Plato's ship analogy from the fourth chapter of 
this thesis (Plato 2000), we are no longer facing a problem of democracy corresponding to the rule 
of passengers who lack the necessary knowledge about navigation, but still want to command the 
ship. Instead, the passengers now choose the destination they want to arrive at, and the passengers 
(or their representatives) select experts (the captain and his crew) who will take them to the 
destination they have chosen earlier.  
 Although I endorse the solution described in the previous paragraph, I acknowledge that it 
faces a serious challenge. I have granted that the citizens lack relevant technical knowledge to make 
public policies directly and to devise methods (laws, policies, decisions) for realizing desired aims. 
But, if they lack technical knowledge to make public policies directly, can they have sufficient 
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technical knowledge to determine who are (and who are not) the relevant experts in the field? Or 
should they trust experts blindly? 
6.1.d. Do Experts Have Fundamental or Derivative Epistemic Authority? 
To trust someone is to simply treat him or her as a source of knowledge (Faulkner 2002). We often 
tend to evaluate our sources of knowledge to see how reliable they are and whether they should be 
considered sources of knowledge at all. This is where we face a serious challenge: arguments and 
reasons offered by experts are often so complex that we cannot comprehend them, or at least we 
cannot evaluate them properly. If we cannot evaluate the reasons and arguments experts use to 
defend their claims, can we evaluate their expertise?  
 Expertism is a position that claims that we, as non-experts, cannot possess enough evidence 
to evaluate an expert’s testimony as credible or non-credible. Furthermore, since we lack the 
relevant knowledge and experience in the field, we are not only unable to assess the truth of the 
expert's testimony, but unable to assess the expert's reliability as well. All we can do is to trust 
experts blindly, and that need not be epistemically inappropriate: blindly trusting experts can be 
seen as desirable epistemic behavior or even as an epistemically virtuous behavior. After all, the 
majority of our beliefs (including our beliefs about medicine, geography, history, astronomy, 
biology, physics, etc.) are based on the testimony of experts (Lehrer 2006). According to this 
position, the experts' epistemic authority is fundamental, and (since we depend on their knowledge) 
we have an epistemic right to trust them without evidence. Expertism thus takes a form of social 
foundationalism, a position that takes experts' beliefs to be basic and fundamental  (Goldman 63
1987). 
 Evidentialism, on the other hand, claims that we should have some form of evidence of the 
experts' reliability—we should not trust experts blindly, even though we cannot directly evaluate 
experts' reasons and arguments. Experts thus have a derivative authority, which requires the hearer 
to give his reasons for thinking that the source of information is reliable (has relevant knowledge 
and skills, or is acting under favorable conditions) and is in a good position to make an accurate 
claim (Foley 1994). One does not have an epistemic right to trust experts without adequate evidence 
of their expertise, but also without adequate evidence of the experts' impartiality towards the issue 
at hand (Festenstein 2009). In order for an expert to have (derivative) authority, a hearer must have 
evidence that there is a particular standing practice in a community to trust experts, that there are 
 Social foundationalism is in this case analogous to foundationalism in individualist epistemology.63
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some epistemic reasons why this is the standing practice in a community, that this very expert has 
special expertise in this very domain, and that in these very circumstances an expert has no interest 
to deceive us (Prijić-Samaržija 2011).  
 I believe that expertism should be rejected: while I agree that we cannot often possess 
enough evidence to qualify the experts’ testimony as credible or non-credible, I do not think that 
this undermines our ability to assess the experts’ reliability. Many negative effects can influence the 
experts' ability to produce correct beliefs, and we can assess the experts' reliability by checking 
whether some of these effects were in place when the experts made their belief. Furthermore, 
experts' beliefs are often confronted by opposite beliefs by some other experts (e.g. beliefs 
regarding climate change, genetically modified organisms and nuclear energy ) and eventually we 64
are those who have to decide which group of experts shall we follow.  
 We (or members of representative government) cannot directly assess whether the means 
suggested by experts and the administrative and executive government will achieve the desired end, 
i.e. whether the laws and policies that are about to be enacted will lead our society toward the aims 
we have collectively put forward through a democratic procedure. However, we can assess the 
reliability of the experts who have created these laws and policies, and we can decide whether or 
not to authorize them. Consider another jury analogy: members of a jury are not experts in forensics 
and are unable to properly assess the evidence found at the crime scene. However, one or more 
experts in forensics are called to testify before the court, and the members of a jury assess the 
experts' reliability, and not the evidence presented by experts directly.  
It is a feature of juries that they do not for the most part if at all consider the truth or falsity of the 
evidence directly, but the trustworthiness of those who present it. Thus it is with the citizens' jury: often, it 
is the character of those on whose testimony we call, their capacity to speak on the issue in question, their 
reliability, independence and disinterestedness that is at issue. The model provides the best we can hope 
for in the institutional dimension to answerability. (O'Neill 1998: 100) 
The process I have described this far puts a heavy emphasis on the role of experts in decision-
making: citizens (and their representatives) choose the basic aims that society is to pursue, and 
citizens (and their representatives) decide who will be entrusted with the task of creating public 
policies and laws that are to realize these aims. People recognized as experts (regarding moral and 
 One way of assessing the expert's reliability is checking whether the expert is biased or has an interest to deceive us. 64
This can, among other things, be done by checking who is funding the research the expert is working on. If an expert is 
claiming that the climate change is not happening, we will rightfully tend to trust him less if he is financed by petrol 
industries than if he is financed by the state. 
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technical knowledge) then use their superior knowledge and skills to create policies and laws, 
which are authorized by the citizens (or their representatives). It is important to notice that this is 
not a form of epistocracy (since those who make laws are chosen by citizens, and the laws are 
authorized by citizens, and not by the mere fact of expertise of those who made them). Furthermore, 
deliberation among citizens and various interest groups regarding the aims the society is to pursue is 
encouraged, and citizens are essentially in the driver’s seat with regard to the society (Christiano 
2012). I find this model of the division of epistemic (and political) labor appealing, though I believe 
that it can be further improved by introducing the deliberation between experts and citizens. 
6.1.e. Interaction between Experts and Citizens 
The decision-making process I have described in this part of the chapter seems to be unidirectional. 
The citizens discuss which aims the society should pursue and they select political representatives 
who also deliberate and negotiate until these aims are clearly defined. Then the executive 
government proceeds to devise means (laws, public policies and political decisions) needed to 
achieve these aims, and it consults and rests heavily on the guidance of experts in various fields. 
Though I think that this scheme represents a decent depiction of the role of experts in a democratic 
society, I find it oversimplified and lacking the bidirectional character necessary for constituting the 
epistemic value of democracy. Namely, it seems that experts should be able to contribute to the first 
stage of decision-making process (selection of aims), from which they are normally excluded, and it 
also seems that citizens should be able to contribute to the second stage of the process (creation of 
laws and policies) from which they are normally excluded. A decision-making procedure that is able 
to integrate the epistemic value of bidirectional deliberation between citizens and experts, while 
simultaneously keeping the citizens in the driver’s seat of the society, should be epistemically better 
than a unidirectional procedure.  
(i) Communication from Experts to Citizens 
Since we live in a society characterized by the plurality of reasonable (yet often incompatible) 
doctrines, the aims advocated by citizens will be diverse and often incompatible. Sometimes the 
incompatibility of our aims will be clear to us and we will be aware that at least some aims should 
be changed in order to reach a compromise. However, sometimes the aims selected by citizens can 
seem compatible to them, yet experts might know that in fact they are not. Citizens might agree that 
they want to live in a society characterized with full employment, some form of equality of wages 
and the fiscal discipline. All these aims can be considered valuable and consistent by citizens, yet 
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economic experts will rather quickly agree that the three aims are not compatible—they cannot be 
achieved simultaneously (Iversen & Wren 1998, Hemerijck 2013). If the experts cannot influence 
the process of selecting aims the society is to pursue, they might receive a task of creating laws and 
policies that serve to achieve incompatible political aims. Such laws and policies will be 
epistemically crippled (since laws and policies supporting one political aim will damage or 
jeopardize another aim) and the epistemic value of such decision-making procedure will be brought 
into question.  
 Furthermore, though citizens might advocate some aims categorically, many other aims will 
be advocated because they are seen as desirable, yet their desirability might change if the cost for 
achieving them is too high. One might hold that supporting traditional agriculture is a valuable aim 
that society should pursue, but one might also be ready to abandon this aim if the cost for achieving 
it are protectionist laws that lead to international isolation or substantial transfers (in form of taxes) 
from successful branches of the economy to agriculture practices with small cost-efficiency. In 
order for citizens to understand the cost for achieving some political aims, citizens should 
understand the means (laws, policies and decisions) necessary for the achievement of these aims. 
Since means are devised by experts, the communication between experts and citizens is essential for 
selecting eligible political aims. Deliberation should not persist only within separate stages of the 
decision-making process (e.g. the deliberation among citizens and representatives in the first stage 
and the deliberation among experts and policy-makers in the second stage), but between different 
stages of decision-making process as well.  
(ii) Communication from Citizens to Experts 
Can citizens help the experts in the process of making political decisions, laws and policies? Of 
course, citizens select aims the society is to pursue, but can their participation in the decision-
making process (i.e. in the process of devising means to achieve the desired aims) improve the 
epistemic quality of decisions, laws and policies? There are many examples that point out instances 
when experts would have produced a better decision had they listened to reasons and arguments 
citizens had to offer. Whyte and Crease (2010) analyze a case of radioactive material (including 
cesium) deposited by rain on portions of Great Britain after the Chernobyl meltdown in April 1986. 
Sheep ingested contaminated grass, and since the level of radiation found in samples of lamb meat 
was well beyond the maximum permissible level, the regulatory agencies ordered that the sheep 
should be slaughtered. Scientists, who did not consult the sheep farmers, predicted that the grass 
will be radioactive for three weeks, but they conducted several serious mistakes: they based their 
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research on the absorption of cesium in human digestive system (instead of the digestive system of 
sheep), they thought that the level of radioactivity will correspond to the level of rainfall (forgetting 
that, once the rain falls, the water is not evenly accumulated and thus some areas will receive much 
higher level of radiation than other areas), and they conducted experiments regarding the cesium 
absorption in fenced lawns (disregarding the fact that sheep do not eat an equal amount of grass 
when they are fenced and when they are in the open, among other things because they do not do the 
same level of physical activity). Local farmers (who were, of course, ignorant regarding the nuclear 
physics) tried to warn scientists and experts about these errors and negligence, but the scientists 
were unwilling to consider the sheep farmers' knowledge. This was caused by some actors having 
too narrow a conception of scientific expertise: some actors with relevant knowledge and 
competences, but no formal credentials, were not recognized as potential contributors—credentialed 
scientists overlooked relevant types of knowledge and competences (Whyte and Crease 2010). This 
was an instance of epistemic (testimonial) injustice, discussed in the fifth chapter of this thesis: a 
prejudice or bias caused a hearer (scientist) to give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker's 
(sheep farmer's) word (Fricker 2007, 2013). Furthermore, this practice jeopardized the trust the 
local population had in the credentialed experts—since scientists acted arrogantly and refused to 
even listen to what sheep farmers had to say, they were unable to produce decisions of adequate 
epistemic quality, but they also threw away the chance to demonstrate the (epistemic) value of 
experts' methods to the local population.  
 In order to have the desired epistemic value, the decision-making process should be 
bidirectional—though it is primarily the role of the people (and their representatives) to determine 
the aims the society is to pursue, experts should participate in public deliberation and give insights 
on how difficult it is to achieve those aims, and though it is primarily the role of experts (and the 
executive government) to devise means (laws, policies, decisions) that will help us achieve the 
desired aims, citizens (and NGO's and other interest groups) should participate in the deliberation 
with experts and give their epistemic contribution regarding the decisions, policies and laws that 
will be enacted to promote desired aims. The role of policy-makers (the executive and the 
administrative government) is to moderate the deliberation between experts and citizens and to 
analyze the different kinds of epistemic contributions that different actors can bring into 
deliberation  (Douglas 2005).  65
 The role of philosophers (and in particular philosophers of science) might be to help them moderate these 65
discussions, and thus they might be seen as interactional experts (Whyte and Crease 2010).
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6.1.f. Conclusion 
In this part of the chapter I have claimed that the epistemic individualist's view, typical for the Age 
of Enlightenment, is not appropriate for contemporary societies. Reasons, arguments and evidence 
supporting some scientific claims can be so complex that we cannot understand and evaluate them 
properly—we would need extensive education and specialization that would take years or even 
decades to understand and properly evaluate only a small set of political decisions. There are 
epistemic authorities and we should trust them, but this trust should not be blind. When we are 
unable to evaluate the experts' claims (or reasons and evidence supporting these claims), we should 
evaluate the experts' credibility instead. Scientists' impact factor, as well as their reputation within 
the scientific community and their interests regarding the issue at hand must be assessed in order to 
put our trust in them. In order for a decision-making procedure to have a satisfying level of 
epistemic value, it should incorporate the idea of division of epistemic (and political) labor. Citizens 
should select aims and values the society is to pursue, and experts should devise means (laws, 
policies and political decisions) that will help us achieve those aims. However, the process should 
not be unidirectional: experts can help the citizens to select better (more consistent or more feasible) 
aims, while the citizens can help experts by introducing new perspectives and missing information 
into the decision-making process. This part of the chapter does not try to establish the final account 
of the division of epistemic labor—it only sketches what should be the role of experts in epistemic 
democracy. 
6.2. EPISTEMIC DEMOCRACY AND INFORMAL POLITICAL SPHERE  
I have claimed that, in order to have legitimacy-generating potential, a decision-making procedure 
has to be justified on the basis of reasons and arguments all qualified (or reasonable) citizens can 
endorse. The standard account of epistemic democracy is characterized as a non-monistic position: 
a procedure has to have both purely procedural and instrumental (non-procedural) qualities in order 
to be able to generate legitimate decisions. It has to give every qualified citizen an equal chance to 
participate in the process of making and authorizing political decisions  (moral or purely 66
procedural requirement) and it has to perform better and produce better results than any other fair 
decision-making procedure (epistemic or instrumental requirement).  
 Eventually, the procedure can give some citizens a greater chance to participate in the decision-making process, but 66
this has to be justified on the grounds which all reasonable (or qualified) citizens can understand and endorse. The 
invidious comparisons objection successfully blocks any such attempt, so the equal and universal suffrage can be seen 
as a default position, with any unequal distribution introducing extra burden of justification.
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 A decision-making procedure takes place in real societies, where social and economic 
factors can significantly shape the procedure's ability to meet the two criteria. If a single group 
sharing the same worldviews or interests controls the political and the public sphere, or if a small 
group of people has control over the media or science, we can expect that epistemic qualities of the 
democratic decision-making procedure will be damaged. Sometimes the damage will be so 
extensive that coin-flipping will be an epistemically more reliable decision-making procedure than 
the majority rule (e.g. racial laws in Texas in 1920s and 1930s). It is clear that, in such conditions, 
the procedure's epistemic qualities are damaged and democracy cannot have a legitimacy-
generating potential. Similarly, if a single group sharing the same worldview controls the political 
and the public sphere, or if a small group of people has control over the media or science, we can 
expect that the moral qualities of the democratic decision-making procedure will be damaged as 
well. Some citizens will have greater chance to influence and shape the final decisions, and this 
greater chance will be based on something not everyone can accept as relevant or appropriate. 
Greater political authority of some will be justified by reasons and arguments not all reasonable 
citizens can affirm and endorse. Again, in such conditions the procedure's moral qualities are 
damaged and democracy cannot have a legitimacy-generating potential. 
 In this part of the chapter I want to point out that, in order to have legitimacy-generating 
potential, epistemic democracy has to incorporate many egalitarian ideas and policies. Though there 
are many factors that contribute to the unequal distribution of political (and epistemic) power, I 
shall focus on the unequal distribution of wealth as the central problem that damages epistemic and 
moral qualities of a democratic decision-making procedure. In order to prove my point, I shall first 
describe and analyze a few examples that clearly show how the unequal distribution of wealth 
causes the unequal distribution of political power. I shall then analyze and eventually reject David 
Estlund's solution to this problem. Estlund (2008) claims that, at least regarding some sorts of input 
in political process (e.g. financing the political campaigns), we should apply a form of Rawlsian 
difference principle (Rawls 2001)—we should allow unequal inputs in the decision-making process 
if (and only if) these unequal inputs will lead to a greater level of input altogether, and a greater 
chance to influence the final decisions for those who are worst-off. Having rejected Estlund's 
proposal, in the final section I claim that only a truly egalitarian state can guarantee favorable social 
and economic conditions for democracy's legitimacy-generating potential.  
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6.2.a. How Does Wealth Inequality Cause Political Inequality? 
There is more than one way how a citizen can participate in a decision-making process and shape 
the final decisions produced by a democratic procedure. Voting is one way of participating in a 
decision-making process, and most forms of democracy endorse the idea 'one person—one vote'. 
Strong egalitarian requirement is uncontested here. However, one can also participate in a decision-
making process by contributing money to campaigns. Of course, contributions cannot influence 
outcomes directly—votes are what wins elections. Contributions can be used by parties to influence 
voting behavior by paying for things that increase the likelihood that their supporters will 
outnumber those of other parties (e.g. using "get out the vote" operations, registration drives and 
advertisements) (Rosenstone & Hansen 1996). Running for an office or trying to present and 
explain one's reasons and arguments to others is not a cheap or easy task, especially in large 
political communities. Paid advertisements, public relation experts, appearances in the media and 
public rallies can greatly help one to convey one's political message and one's agenda. However, 
these means are not equally available to every citizen: wealthier candidates and candidates 
supported by wealthy contributors will, other things equal, have access to better means for 
conveying their political messages to the public than poor candidates and candidates supported by 
poor contributors. Though not a single donation can be regarded as decisive, "the presence of 
campaign contributions leads to an endogenous wealth bias in the political process since the 
decisive agent whose preferences will prevail in equilibrium will be wealthier than the 
median.” (Campante 2011)  
 The presence of campaign contributions can thus be problematic for two reasons: first, it 
effectively gives wealthier citizens a greater (indirect) chance to influence the outcomes of decision-
making processes, thus not treating all citizens as equals (a moral problem), and second, it forces 
parties to adopt platforms to attract the wealthy in order to receive more contributions that can be 
used to pay to convey the party's political message to the public, thus shaping laws and policies 
which are not in the interest of the people (or on the basis of best reasons), but in the interest of the 
wealthiest (or towards those who are able to fund their campaigns) (an epistemic problem).  
 If campaign contributions are a source of unequal distribution of political power, then they 
should be forbidden in order to preserve democracy’s legitimacy-generating potential. Though the 
antecedent of the former claim is generally accepted and supported by numerous independent 
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studies , the consequent is still an object of an extensive debate. Namely, many scholars think that 67
limiting our right to financially (or in some other relevant way) support a candidate limits our basic 
liberal rights and the freedom of speech. However, sometimes the freedom of speech has to be 
restricted to be protected. Imagine a deliberative assembly in which anyone could speak as long as 
one wanted to, talk out of turn, disobey the moderator, etc. The epistemic quality of such 
deliberation would be damaged, and we might even want to place restrictions on such deliberation 
in order to give everyone a chance to exercise his or her freedom of speech (Meiklejohn 1960). We 
have strong (public) epistemic and moral reasons to place certain restriction on the freedom of 
speech, and we might also have strong (public) moral and epistemic reasons to place certain 
restrictions on campaign contributions.  
 In the next section I shall discuss David Estlund's proposal: Estlund claims that, regarding 
informal political sphere, political egalitarianism can be considered a crude and implausible 
principle since it might be targeted by a special kind of leveling-down objection (similar to one 
described in the second chapter of this thesis, where I discussed Thomas Christino's position). 
6.2.b. Estlund and the Leveling-down Objection 
Estlund (2000, 2008) makes a clear distinction between the formal political sphere, the informal 
political sphere and the non-political sphere. The norms that should rule each of these spheres are 
not equally demanding: while formal politics should try to resemble the ideal deliberative 
procedure, the informal politics includes so many elements (political campaigns and advertising, 
political art, public rallies and so on) that we simply cannot hope that it can mirror the ideal 
deliberative procedure. This leads us to the problem of the second best: Estlund claims that, once 
we know that a political ideal cannot be met, aiming for the second-best approximation of that ideal 
need not be the right thing to do. If the ideal is to exclude power from politics, but one party 
nonetheless uses power to achieve its political aims (and so the ideal cannot be achieved), maybe 
we should abandon the ideal altogether and use power ourselves to confront that particular party 
(i.e. maybe abandoning the ideal will yield better results than holding it no matter what). We should 
aim for equal political participation in the formal political sphere, but since equal political 
participation cannot be achieved in the informal political sphere, we should not shape all laws and 
policies to try to approximate the ideal where it cannot be properly mirrored. Therefore, Estlund 
 Campante (2011) and Lijphart (1997) offer a large list of researchers and scholars who have verified the claim that 67
unequal distribution of wealth causes (through campaign contributions, but also through lobbying, private media, etc.) 
an unequal distribution of political influence. 
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claims, we can abandon the ideal of equal participation in the informal political sphere in favor of 
some other ideals and values. One such ideal is the epistemic value of political participation, and the 
modified version of the leveling-down objection can help us see why a system with unequally 
distributed political participation (in the informal political sphere) is better than the system with 
equally distributed political participation (Estlund 2008). 
 Egalitarians generally favor the equal distribution of the good that is being distributed. The 
leveling-down objection states that, in some situations, egalitarianism thus has to favor the state S1, 
in which everyone is equally well-off, over S2, in which some are better than others, but 
nonetheless everyone is better than he or she would be in S1. Consider the example from the second 
chapter of this thesis, originally presented by Thomas Christiano (2008). 
Table 6.1. 
When applied to the distribution of well-being, the leveling-down objection points out that 
egalitarianism has some implausible implication—namely, it seems that egalitarians should prefer 
S1 over S2, but in S1 everyone is worse-off than in S2. Furthermore, if we introduce an alternative 
state S3, in which everyone is equally well-off, and everyone is better-off than in S1, it might seem 
that the principle of equality should be indifferent towards S1 and S3. Christiano (2000, 2008) 
disagrees and claims that there is an internal connection between rationale for equality and the value 
of the relevant fundamental good that is equalized. We want well-being to be distributed equally 
because we care about well-being: egalitarians should therefore favor S3, and if S3 is not feasible, 
they should favor the state of inequality in which everyone is better-off than in the best feasible 
state of equality (i.e. egalitarians should favor S2 over S1).  
 Estlund uses similar argumentation and applies it to the distribution of citizens' political 
inputs (or campaign contributions) . He claims that "unequal opportunity for input should be 68
 It is very important to emphasize that Estlund defends equal political participation in the formal political sphere. 'One 68
person—one vote' is not a principle Estlund would consider rejecting, since it falls within the formal political sphere. 
His argumentation presented in this chapter is directed only toward political participation in the informal political 
sphere.
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S1 S2 S3
A 2 3 5
B 2 7 5
allowed, to some extent, if by doing so the overall amount of input is increased and as a result the 
expected epistemic value of the overall arrangement is improved." (Estlund 2008: 195) Inequality 
of inputs can thus be epistemically justified—since more input opportunities for everyone is 
epistemically better than less, we should favor the state of inequality in which the level of input of 
every citizen is greater than in the state of the best feasible equality of input. Of course, Estlund 
claims, the inequality should not be so great that it negatively influences the epistemic qualities of a 
decision-making procedure. It is important to emphasize that he does not see the total quantity of 
political input as a zero-sum game—just like wealth, political input of some citizens can be 
increased without decreasing the political input of others. "If everyone wrote more letters to their 
congressional representative annually than they now do, the total quantity of input would increase, 
and no one's persons absolute quantity of input would decrease." (Estlund 2008: 197)  
 Estlund does not want to justify any level of political inputs: we should limit the amount of 
input any citizen can have (i.e. limit the amount of money one can donate or contribute to a political 
campaign). Within these limits, citizens can have different levels of input, but such unequal 
distribution must lead to the increase of the level of inputs of those who are worst-off.  
Assume everyone is supplied with resources for political use at the highest level compatible with 
everyone having an equal amount. Now allow additional expenditures through (and only through) 
government-supplied vouchers. These have cash value when contributed to certain political endeavors 
such as election campaigns, and no value otherwise. Each next or marginal voucher a person buys costs 
more than the previous, but has only the same value as the last. [...] the extra amount retained by the 
agency goes into a fund and is then distributed among all those who are happy to receive only their one 
government-supplied voucher. They are available for free […]. (Estlund 2008: 196-197) 
In a town of 200 000 voters, Estlund assumes that the maximum equal level of political input 
without vouchers would be $5 per voter, for a total expenditure of $1 million. Those who want to 
have greater political input can buy vouchers, which are worth $50 (this is the money that will be 
contributed to a political campaign for each voucher), but their cost increases so that the first one 
costs $50, the second one $88, the third one $153, the fourth one $268 and the fifth and final 
voucher costs $469 (this is the money one has to give in order to get additional vouchers). Those 
who bought five vouchers will contribute $250 to a particular political campaign, but will have to 
pay $1028 to the agency. The remaining cash is then distributed among those who did not buy any 
vouchers, so that (providing that only 5% of votes bought vouchers) the maximum equal level of 
input for those who did not buy vouchers would be $19 and not $5 per voter, and the total 
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expenditure would be over $3.5 million, instead of the original $1 million. Part of this fund would 
be covered by the government (the original $1 million), and the additional $2.5 would be added to 
the original fund thanks to the difference between the value and the cost of each voucher.  
Table 6.2. 
This model introduces some interesting considerations. While previously no voter contributed more 
than $5, now every voter contributes at least $19—everyone contributes more now than they did 
before. Furthermore, the inequality of input has been introduced—while some contribute only $19, 
some contribute $250—the highest contribution is more than thirteen times the lowest. Finally, the 
total contribution is far greater than before: while the total contribution was $1 million before the 
vouchers had been introduced, it is now over $5 million. Estlund assumes that this greater quantity 
will have positive consequences for the epistemic value of the decision-making procedure, provided 
that inequalities are not too great (Estlund 2000, 2008).  
6.2.c. Rejecting Estlund's View 
I agree with Estlund that informal politics does not have to try to approximate the ideal deliberative 
situation, disregarding the potential costs and risks. We should not try to introduce equality no 
matter what, but we should, nonetheless, care for the epistemic qualities of a decision-making 
procedure. However, I disagree with Estlund regarding how this epistemic quality of the procedure 
can be preserved in the informal political sphere. I want to construct an epistemic account of 
egalitarian policies regarding political participation in the informal political sphere.  
 There are two objections I rise against the idea that unequal distribution of political inputs 
can be justified on the epistemic grounds. My first objection claims that the leveling-down 
objection cannot be successfully applied to the case of unequal political inputs—while unequal 
levels of wealth might motivate those who are more capable to be more productive, thus creating 
Voucher value Voucher value Voucher value Voucher value Difference paid to the 
agency
1 $50 $50 $50 (1 x 50) $50 $0
2 $50 $88 $100 (2 x 50) $138 $38
3 $50 $153 $150 (3 x 50) $291 $141
4 $50 $268 $200 (4 x 50) $559 $359
5 $50 $469 $250 (5 x 50) $1028 $778
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additional resources, it is dubious what would unequal distribution of political inputs motivate them 
to do, and how would this create additional resources (i.e. political inputs)? Why not simply tax 
those who are better-off, and use that money to equally improve everyone's level of political inputs. 
My second objection claims that the unequal distribution of political inputs can be reasonably 
rejected, and thus cannot be a part of a legitimacy-generating decision-making procedure. Namely, 
vouchers give greater political power to a certain class or group of people (e.g. those who are 
wealthy enough to buy them), and this might introduce some biases and other epistemically 
damaging features into the procedure, making it less likely to produce a correct outcome than a 
democratic procedure (one in which everyone makes an equal political input). Though this need not 
be true, it is not unreasonable to think that some epistemically damaging features might be 
introduced into the decision-making process, just like they would be introduced if we adopted some 
form of scholocracy characterized by the plural-voting system. Estlund's argument against 
scholocracy discussed in the fourth chapter of this thesis can thus, it seems, be used against his own 
voucher proposal.  
(i) Leveling-down Objection and Political Inputs 
Though some might argue that the total quantity of political input is a zero-sum game, where giving 
more political input to some necessarily reduces the input of others , Estlund argues that political 69
input should be treated as wealth—more wealth for some does not necessarily mean less wealth for 
others, and similarly more political input by some does not necessarily result with less political 
input by others. Political input, and not political influence, is considered as something with an 
epistemic value, and thus the more political input the decision-making procedure entails, the greater 
its epistemic value (of course, provided that the political influence is not too unequally distributed) 
(Estlund 2008). I am going to endorse, for the sake of the argument, Estlund's claim that the 
political input is not a zero-sum game. However, I believe that, even if more political input by some 
does not necessarily result with less political input by others, the leveling-down objection cannot be 
used against (strict) political egalitarians. 
 The leveling-down objection can be used against egalitarians when the distribution of wealth 
is in question: unequal distribution of wealth can indeed motivate those skilled and competent to 
produce more than they would have produced if wealth was equally distributed, and this difference 
 We should distinguish between input and influence. Input is an individual's absolute quantity of political 69
participation, while influence stands for a person's fraction of the total political input. Estlund claims that, even if 
influence is defined as a constant sum, the quantity of input is not (Estlund 2008). 
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in production can lead to a state in which the total wealth is greater when it is unequally distributed 
than when it is equally distributed. In such situations, it makes sense to follow Rawls' difference 
principle (Rawls 2001) or Christiano's principle of public equality (Christiano 2008) and conclude 
that inequalities should be allowed as long as the wealth of those who are worst-off is greater in the 
conditions of inequality than it would be in the conditions of best feasible equality. Can the same 
argumentative strategy be applied on the distribution of political input? I do not think it can. 
Namely, I do not see how giving some citizens greater political input can directly cause the increase 
in the total level of political input. Of course, the total level of political input will be increased 
because there is a difference between the cost of the voucher and its value, and this difference is 
invested to increase the political input of those who did not buy a single voucher. However, there is 
no direct connection between the unequal distribution of political input and the increased level of 
total political input, while there is such direct connection between the unequal distribution of wealth 
and the increased level of total wealth.  
Diagram 6.2. 
Consider the first case: our aim is to increase the level of total wealth (and to increase the wealth of 
those who are worst-off), and the means we want to use is additional motivation for all citizens, 
especially those who are skilled and competent. There are several ways to increase the motivation 
of all citizens, but we can all agree that equal wages and equal rewards have the opposite effect, i.e. 
they tend to decrease the motivation of citizens. Though we can disagree on what is the best way to 
increase the motivation and productiveness, we can agree that if we treat different work results and 
achievements equally, this tends to decrease the motivation of those who work.  
 Now, consider the second case: our aim is to increase the level of total input (and to increase 
the input of those who are worst-off), and the means we want to use is additional money for 
political campaigns. There are several ways to get additional money for political campaigns (e.g. 
additional taxation), and it is not so clear why the equality of political input would have the opposite 
effect, i.e. why it would decrease the available money for political campaigns. Money is out there 
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regardless of whether a political system is based on equal or unequal inputs, since it is inequality of 
wealth that causes additional motivation and productivity, not inequality of political inputs. 
Furthermore, though we might argue that the increase of political input will have beneficial 
epistemic consequences and will result with better decisions, thus (among other things) generating a 
better economic situation and more money that can be invested to increase the political input, this 
account does not need inequality of political inputs. If everyone has an equal political input, the 
increase of the total political input will increase the amount of resources available for political 
campaigns, thus again increasing the total level of political input. On the other hand, unequal 
distribution of wealth seems to be needed—even if the total level of wealth is somehow increased, 
this will not have the desired motivational effect unless those who have contributed more are 
rewarded more. If everyone has an equal level of wealth, the increase of the total wealth will not 
increase the motivation of workers and employers, and the total wealth will not be increased 
again .  70
 There is an important distinction between political input and wealth. When we discuss 
wealth, S2, a state of unequal distribution, seems to be better than S1, the best feasible state of 
equality, precisely because equal distribution of wealth decreases motivation and productivity. The 
leveling-down objection targets precisely this incompatibility between equal distribution of wealth 
and high levels of total wealth. It claims that, if you want to have a high level of total wealth, you 
should abandon the idea of the equal distribution of wealth. However, when we discuss political 
input, S2, a state of unequal distribution, seems to be better than S1, but S1 is not the best feasible 
state of equality. Namely, since there is no incompatibility between equal distribution of political 
input and high levels of total input, S3 is considered to be the best feasible equality. The leveling-
down objection does not target political input because there is no need to level it down to achieve 
 To further elaborate on this idea, imagine a town meeting that takes place every week at the local stadium. Citizens 70
deliberate and exchange reasons and arguments, and after the deliberation they vote for the decision or policy they find 
best. Since the stadium is not covered by a roof, the total time citizens can use to deliberate and make decisions is 2 
hours a week, which gives every citizen 5 seconds to talk and present his reasons and arguments. Of course, not all 
citizens participate in the discussions, and every citizen can donate his 5 seconds to his political representative or a 
particular party, which then gets more time to present its arguments. Imagine, furthermore, that someone suggests that a 
roof should be built, and this will ensure that deliberation can take place even during rainy days. If a roof is built over 
the stadium, the total time citizens can use to deliberate and make decisions is no longer 2 hours, but instead 10 hours a 
week. Since the construction of the roof is expensive, it is suggested that vouchers with additional seconds will be sold 
in order to finance the construction of the roof. Some citizens (those who had bought the maximal number of vouchers) 
will have 2 minutes to present their arguments or to donate them to their representatives or parties, while some (those 
who had not bought vouchers) will have 20 seconds. The total time citizens have to deliberate, as well as the time every 
citizen has to present his arguments, is increased, though a form of inequality has been introduced. An alternative way 
of financing the construction of the roof would be to introduce a new (progressive) tax, one that would allow the 
community to build a new roof over the stadium. The total time citizens have to deliberate would again be 10 hours, and 
we could preserve the equality of input by giving every citizen 30 seconds that can be used to present one's arguments 
or to donate them to a political representative or party. It is unclear why would the voucher system be able to collect 
more funds than the system of progressive taxation. 
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equality—provided that the equality of political input does not affect the productivity of citizens, 
there will be an equal amount of money for funding political campaigns in both the state of equal 
and the state of unequal political input. One way to get the money (and thus to increase the level of 
total political input) is to sell vouchers; another is to introduce additional (progressive) taxation. 
Looking from an epistemic point of view, it might even be better to fund political campaigns 
through progressive taxation, since this would enable us to collect more money and thus to increase 
the level of total input, increasing the epistemic value of a decision-making procedure.  
(ii) Unequal distribution of political inputs and the demographic objection 
Estlund emphasizes that there is an important distinction between the formal and the informal 
political sphere. Formal politics (e.g. deliberation in the parliament) can come closer to the 
deliberative ideal than other settings. Narrower deliberative norms should be applied in formal 
political settings since there they will likely have more epistemic benefits than costs (Estlund 2008). 
On the other hand, it would be a good thing if the informal political public sphere (political 
speeches, candidate debates, political campaigns) could incorporate the narrower deliberative 
norms. However, Estlund claims, it is very unlikely that it can even approximate these norms. 
Facing the problem of the second best, Estlund claims that we should no longer try to implement 
the narrow deliberative norms on the informal political sphere, but should instead search for 
different norms appropriate for the informal political sphere. These norms should be stricter than 
those appropriate for the non-political sphere, but should be less strict than those appropriate for the 
formal political sphere (Estlund 2008). I generally agree with Estlund, but I think that applying 
norms that are too weak on the informal political sphere can cause serious damage to the epistemic 
value of a decision-making procedure. In order to support this claim, I discuss and reject Estlund's 
voucher proposal, which represents a norm in the informal political sphere.  
  Though Estlund's proposal does not allow great inequality of political input (since it sets the 
maximal number of vouchers one can buy to five), it still represents a significant departure from 
equality. Small group of citizens (those who had bought vouchers, approximately 5% of all voters) 
will contribute $1.5 million to the political campaign of their parties and representatives, and the 
other voters (9%) will contribute $3.5 million. This means that 5% of voters will contribute with 
30% of the total political input. Though most people can afford to buy vouchers, we can assume that 
they will be bought by richer citizens, or we can at least assume that not many poor citizens will 
buy vouchers. Since it is clear that the party's success on elections depends, to a great extent, on the 
money invested in political campaign and advertising, we can conclude that greater political input 
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in the informal political sphere results with greater political influence. This introduces a form of 
political inequality, but Estlund can argue that this inequality can be epistemically justified, since it 
increases the level of the total political input, which is considered an epistemically valuable feature. 
However, this practice can also have considerable epistemic defects and reduce the epistemic value 
of a decision-making procedure.  
 Consider the epistemic argument against Mill's plural-voting proposal, discussed in the 
fourth chapter of this thesis. This argument, often referred to as the demographic objection, states 
that there might be some epistemically damaging features, characteristic for the group that has 
greater political influence, that countervail the admitted epistemic benefits of a greater level of the 
total political input. If buying the vouchers is disproportionately a privilege of certain races, classes 
or genders, these might be seen as biases that damage the quality of collective decisions. Voucher 
system will give greater political power to a certain class or group of people (or reduce the political 
power of some other class or group), and this might introduce some biases and other epistemically 
damaging features into the procedure, making it less likely to produce a correct outcome than an 
egalitarian procedure (one in which everyone receives an equal political influence). If 5% of voters 
contribute with 30 percent of the total political input, we should not be surprised if political parties 
try to implement the interests and values of these 5% into their agendas. Campante (2011: 648) thus 
writes that "an increase in inequality will enhance the advantage of the rich in providing 
contributions, by shifting resources in their favor, and this will in turn lead the parties to move their 
platforms further closer to the preferred positions of wealthier individuals. As a result, the decisive 
agent will now be someone at a higher percentile in the wealth distribution: More inequality will 
have an effect of strengthening the wealth bias in the political system." 
 Of course, political parties will need the support of other groups as well, and we must not 
forget that it is votes that in the end win the elections, not the money, but the relation between the 
two should not be neglected. If some citizens (and their interest and values) receive greater political 
influence and special treatment in the agendas of political parties, we should be certain that no 
epistemically damaging features have thus been introduced into the decision-making procedure. It 
seems, however, that it is not unreasonable to think that some epistemically damaging features will 
be introduced by giving greater political influence to the wealthier part of the political community, 
and that such decision-making systems' epistemic qualities will be damaged, resulting with 
substantively wrong or incorrect laws and policies (e.g. public policies that led to 2008 financial 
crisis). In fact, a lot of recent studies link unequal participation in the informal political sphere with 
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various substantively wrong or incorrect laws and policies (Stiglitz 2013, Piketty 2014, Campante 
2011, Krugman 2013).  
 As I have emphasized earlier, I agree with Estlund that implementing equality in the 
informal political sphere is subject to the problem of the second-best. However, I still think that, at 
least regarding campaign contributions, more equality is generally epistemically better than less. 
Furthermore, I also think that the formal and the informal political sphere are so closely connected 
that allowing substantial inequalities in the latter inevitably introduces inequalities in the former. 
This is the problem I want to address in the next section.  
6.2.d. Rawls and Substantial Political Equality 
The importance of equal participation in the formal political sphere is established by John 
Rawls' (1971, 2001) two principles of justice as fairness: 
First Principle: Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic 
liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all; 
Second Principle: Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: 
 a) They are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of  
opportunity; 
 b) They are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society (the difference 
principle). (Rawls 2001: 42-43) 
In order to have legitimacy-generating potential, a decision-making procedure has to meet the first 
principle. However, a system can only be just if it meets both the first and the second principle. 
Legitimacy thus specifies a normative minimum and points that some social states (and decision-
making procedures) should be respected even if they fall short of justice. Rawls holds that political 
liberties are a subset of the basic liberties, including the right to hold public office and the right to 
affect the outcome of elections. For these liberties Rawls requires that citizens be, not only formally, 
but also substantively equal! Citizens similarly endowed and motivated should have the same 
opportunities to hold office and to influence elections, regardless of their social class (Rawls 2001, 
Wenar 2013). Rawls is aware that formal equality is not enough—however, in order to introduce 
substantive equality of political liberties, it is not enough to focus only on the formal political 
sphere. It is not enough that every citizen has an equal formal opportunity to run for an office or to 
influence elections—political equality goes deeper and requires major changes in the social and 
economic system of a political community. Rawls rejects welfare-state capitalism primarily because 
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of its incompatibility with the fair value of political liberties (i.e. its violation of the first principle of 
justice as fairness).  
Welfare-state capitalism rejects the fair value of the political liberties, and while it has some concern for 
equality of opportunity, the policies necessary to achieve that are not followed. It permits very large 
inequalities in the ownership of real property (productive assets and natural resources) so that the control 
of the economy and much of political life rests in few hands. And although, as the name 'welfare-state 
capitalism' suggests, welfare provisions may be quite generous and guarantee a decent social minimum 
covering the basic needs, a principle of reciprocity to regulate economic and social inequalities is not 
recognized. (Rawls 2001: 137-138) 
Rawls does not deny that welfare-state capitalism would provide the formal protection of the equal 
basic rights and liberties. He denies that welfare-state capitalism would be able to protect the fair 
value of the political liberties. Though welfare-state capitalism may be able to meet the first 
principle of justice as fairness in a weak or shallow sense, it cannot provide a genuine satisfaction of 
that principle (Rawls 2001, O'Neill 2012).  
 Rawls (rightfully) warns us that the formal and the informal political sphere are closely 
linked: even if we guarantee equal participation in the formal political sphere, the unequal 
participation in the informal political sphere (e.g. campaign contributions) can damage and 
undermine the value of equal political participation of all reasonable citizens . In order to achieve 71
substantial equality, we need a socioeconomic system that can meet the following three aims: (i) 
wide dispersal of (both human and nonhuman) capital, with every individual controlling broadly 
equal amounts of capital, (ii) blocking the intergenerational transmission of advantage (including 
gift and inheritance taxes), and finally (iii) safeguards against the 'corruption' of democratic politics 
(including publicly funded election) (Rawls 2001, O'Neill 2012). I agree with Rawls regarding the 
importance of these three aims: though the informal political sphere does not have to have norms as 
strict as the formal political sphere (after all, sometimes it might even be counterproductive), 
political equality should go deeper than the formal politics. There are good moral and epistemic 
reasons to ask for the equality of political participation in the informal political sphere. It should not 
be enforced regardless of potential (epistemic and moral) costs and risks, but it still plays a role of 
an important ideal, even in the informal political sphere.  
 We should not forget that Rawls explicitly says that the fulfillment of the first principle takes priority over the 71
fulfillment of the second principle, and within the second principle fair equality of opportunity takes priority over the 
difference principle (Rawls 2001). We cannot try to apply the difference principle on the distribution of basic (political) 
rights and liberties—political equality has absolute priority in this case. 
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 Rawls' rejection of welfare-state capitalism, as well as his arguments in favor of property-
owning democracy and liberal socialism, deserves a detailed elaboration and further research. My 
intention, however, is not to analyze these systems in detail, but instead to point out that political 
equality must be sought for both in formal and informal politics. If we want to establish 
democracy's legitimacy-generating potential and its epistemic value, we should ensure equal 
participation of all citizens both in the formal and (as far as possible) the informal political sphere.  
6.2.e. Conclusion 
This part of the chapter points out that the unequal distribution of wealth is one of the central 
problems that damage epistemic and moral qualities of a democratic decision-making procedure. 
Studies analyzed in this chapter show that unequal distribution of wealth causes the unequal 
distribution of political power. I have discussed Estlund's proposal according to which we should try 
to mirror the ideal deliberative procedure only on the formal political sphere, and I have accepted 
this claim. However, I have claimed that political equality should still play a central role in the 
informal political sphere. Departures from equality in the informal political sphere can (and usually 
do) negatively affect the epistemic value of a decision-making procedure. Having rejected Estlund's 
voucher proposal, I have concluded that epistemic democracy needs favorable social and economic 
conditions in order to ensure democracy's legitimacy-generating potential.  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SUMMARY 
The subject of my thesis is the epistemic justification of democratic legitimacy. Can political 
decisions we make be right or wrong, or true or false? If they can be true or false, are there people 
who are better at getting it right or wrong? And if there are, does this imply that those who are 
better in making correct decisions should have political authority over others? If not, what should be 
the role of experts in politics? These are some of the key questions I try to answer in this thesis. I 
start by rejecting pure proceduralism, a position claiming that political decisions have no truth-
value, or that their truth-value is not above the reasonable disagreement. I argue that political 
decisions can be right or wrong and that, at least regarding some clear cases (like famine and 
genocide), all reasonable people should be able to agree on the (un)desirability of some end states. I 
also reject the idea of epistemic peerhood which claims that though political decisions are right or 
wrong, all citizens are equally likely to make a right decision. Our background, education and area 
of specialization make some people epistemically more reliable, at least regarding some political 
issues. Finally, I discuss and reject the idea that those who know best should have political authority 
to rule over others. Citizens can reasonably disagree on who the experts are, and thus political 
authority cannot be grounded in expertise, but in the idea of (normative) consent of reasonable 
citizens instead. I follow and further support David Estlund's position, claiming that a collective 
decision-making procedure should have both purely procedural (respect for the moral equality of 
citizens) and instrumental (good chance to produce correct decisions) qualities in order to have 
legitimacy-generating potential. Political decisions are therefore legitimate if (and only if) they are 
the product of epistemically the best procedure from among the set of fair procedures. I argue that 
deliberative democracy is such a procedure. Since the fairness of the procedure and epistemic 
quality of outcomes constitute its legitimacy-generating potential, democratic procedures should 
still rely on the expertise of those who know better (though expertise is no longer considered as a 
ground for political authority), but distribute resources and positions to promote fairness and 
equality in a political community as well.  
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SOMMARIO 
Il tema della mia tesi di dottorato è la giustificazione epistemica della legittimità democratica. Le 
questioni fondamentali sono: possono le nostre decisioni politiche essere giuste o sbagliate, oppure 
vere o false? Se possono essere vere o false, ci sono delle persone che sono più competenti nel 
realizzare le scelte giuste? Se la risposta è positiva, queste persone dovrebbero avere un’autorità 
politica superiore rispetto agli altri? Se la risposta è negativa, quale dovrebbe essere il ruolo degli 
esperti nei processi politici? Queste sono alcune delle domande più importanti alle quali cercherò di 
rispondere nella mia tesi di dottorato. Inizio con la confutazione della posizione chiamata 
"proceduralismo puro", una posizione che sostiene che le decisioni politiche non possono avere il 
valore semantico di verità o che questo possibile valore è soggetto al disaccordo ragionevole. Cerco 
di dimostrare che le decisioni politiche possono essere giuste o sbagliate e che tutte le persone 
ragionevoli dovrebbero poter concordare almeno sull’indesiderabilità di alcuni casi chiari (per 
esempio le deprivazioni estreme e il genocidio). Confuto l'idea di uguaglianza epistemica, che 
sostiene che, anche se le decisioni politiche possono essere giuste o sbagliate, tutti i cittadini hanno 
un’uguale probabilità di prendere una decisione giusta. La nostra formazione, l’educazione ed il 
campo di specializzazione rendono alcune persone maggiormente affidabili dal punto di vista 
epistemico, almeno per quanto riguarda alcune questioni politiche. Infine, discuto e rifiuto l'idea per 
cui coloro che hanno maggiori competenze dovrebbero, in virtù di questo motivo, avere l’autorità 
politica di governare gli altri. I cittadini possono dissentire in modo ragionevole su chi sono gli 
esperti, e quindi l’autorità politica non può essere basata sulla competenza. Al contrario, deve essere 
basata sull'idea del consenso (normativo) tra i cittadini ragionevoli. Seguo la posizione di David 
Estlund e le offro ulteriore supporto. Questa posizione sostiene che, per poter avere la qualifica di 
legittimità, la procedura nella quale si prendono decisioni collettive dovrebbe avere qualità 
puramente procedurali (come il rispetto per l’uguaglianza morale dei cittadini) e qualità strumentali 
(come l’elevata probabilità di produrre decisioni corrette). La conseguenza è che le decisioni 
politiche sono legittime se (e soltanto se) sono il prodotto della procedura migliore dal punto di 
vista epistemico tra le varie procedure eque. Affermo che la democrazia deliberativa rappresenta 
una procedura di questo genere. Poiché l’equità delle procedure e le loro qualità epistemiche 
costituiscono ciò che può generare la loro legittimità, le procedure democratiche dovrebbero basarsi 
sulle qualità epistemiche dei più competenti (sebbene la competenza non sia più considerata come 
una delle basi dell'autorità politica), ma anche distribuire le risorse e gli incarichi pubblici con la 
finalità di favorire l’equità e l’uguaglianza nella comunità politica. 
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